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The responsibility to protect concept (R2P), as specified in the report of the 
International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, 
is a re-articulation of the overworked right of humanitarian intervention. Since 
then, the concept has been used by the international community, as a form of 
moral argumentation that justifies the use of force for human protection 
purposes. One of the connecting threads of this thesis has been to reflect on the 
meaning, effects and limits of ‘responsibility’ within R2P. This thesis explores the 
concept’s institutionalization, its juridico-moral framework and structure of 
address. The resulting insight points to a ‘notion of irresponsibility’ that is 
internal to responsibility practices, as these originate from modern forms of 
social organization and their ‘mentalities’. This thesis attempts to argue that the 
global ethical responsibility we find within R2P emanates from a foreclosing 
structure of address. Such a foreclosing structure fails the promise of protection 
at an inter-subjective/intra-subjective level and transforms global ethical 
responsibility into a project of governance, management and control. This 
vantage point is one in which the ‘international community’ of liberal 
international law and legal cosmopolitanism projects a self-assured self and fails 
to account for the limits of its own self-understanding, irresponsibility and 
violence. The juridico-moral framework of R2P both constitutes and is 
constitutive of forms of political subjectivity. Therefore, it materially 
circumscribes the politico-ethical limits of the structure of address of social and 
political violence globally. Drawing on Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, the 
‘notion of irresponsibility’ expounded in this thesis exposes the internal 
conditions, paradoxes and ‘aporias’ of responsibility and therefore, it also 
embodies them. It works as a conceptual resource, a kind of ‘talking-back’ to its 
discourse and presents a re-appropriation or representation of the global scene of 
address of social and political violence. This vantage point yields a radically 
different approach from that taken by liberal internationalists and legal 
cosmopolitans. This research contributes a critique of the juridico-moral 
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In 2001, the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) published a report under the name “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) 
to address the so-called ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ and the many calls of 
intervention of the 1990s – Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo.
1
 This thesis 
attempts to investigate the moral, political and legal claims of the responsibility 
to protect concept in international law. R2P has become the prominent medium 
of inquiry and structure of address of the ‘international community’ in response 
to mass human atrocities and gross human rights violations. Through an analysis 
of the relationship between just war theory and R2P, I am able to explain why just 
war reasoning is being reinvented within R2P and to show how the language of 
protection can overshadow international practices of expanding punitiveness in 
the name of human rights. The thesis argues that the responsibility to protect 
concept materializes not only as a practice of protection but also as a form of 
punishment.  
 
The mainstream discourse around R2P typically ignores the broader meaning and 
effects of military intervention for human protection purposes. In this sense, 
what is at stake is how the concept materially controls the discursive framework 
of moral justifications on the use of force for human protection purposes. The 
present thesis exposes the conditions, paradoxes and ‘aporias’ of responsibility 
within the R2P and points to a ‘notion of irresponsibility’ that is internal to 
responsibility practices, as these originate from modern forms of social 
organization and their mentalities. Drawing on critical legal literature, critical 
international relations literature and the accounts of social and political 
responsibility we find in Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, the thesis argues that 
the global ethical responsibility we find within R2P emanates from a foreclosing 
structure of address. This foreclosing structure of address fails the promise of 
cosmopolitan protection by denying or failing to account for its own ‘internal’ 
																																																								
1  Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (2001). The 
Responsibility to Protect, International Research Development Center, Foreword. 
	 2 
irresponsibility, violence and inter-subjective/intra-subjective constitution. 
Through this lens, the ‘international community’ projects a self-assured collective 
self in terms of identity, legality/illegality and sovereignty, and transforms global 
ethical responsibility into a project of governance, management and control. It 
communicates a ‘duty of care’ that is based primarily on punishing violators of a 
liberal international order, rather than on recognition, protection and/or 
solidarity.  
 
To turn the lens to ‘international political subjectivity’ has analytical and 
substantial value for international lawyers and policy-makers and for rethinking 
the theorizing of responsibility in international law. This is a radically different 
approach to ‘theorizing responsibility’ in international law from that taken by 
liberal internationalists and legal cosmopolitans. By exposing and acknowledging 
the irresponsibility of the responsibility to protect concept, this thesis argues that 
irresponsibility can become the condition of ethical responsibility.  
 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 generated heated arguments among 
policy-makers, security officials, academics and international lawyers on a range 
of issues. From the legal justifications given, to the way in which NATO and its 
allies conducted the operation, to its effects on the ordinary lives of people at the 
time of intervention and its aftermath, the operation became the focal point of 
dialogues between lawyers, politicians and policy-makers alike.
2
 Under the pleas 
of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Commissioners were brought 
together to forge a new consensus or a common ground on how to approach 
these issues.
3
R2P’s emergence can be seen as part of the broader 
institutionalization of human rights at the end of the Cold War, an active ‘human 
security’ agenda and of the ‘moral internationalism’ of major liberal international 
																																																								
2 See for example Christopher Greenwood. (2002). Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law, pp. 141-175, Jonathan I. Charney. (1999). Anticipatory 
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, pp. 834-
841. 
3 We the Peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century, Report of the Secretary 




 R2P swiftly became the lingua franca on the use of 
force for human protection purposes.
5
 Between 2009 and 2011 a joint office in 
New York for the special advisor for the Prevention of Genocide and Special 
adviser on R2P was created, along with the development of a “convening 
mechanism” and the establishment of a UN-wide “contact group” on R2P.
6
 Today, 
the responsibility to protect concept is arguably the dominant medium of inquiry 
with which international actors and organizations assess their response to mass 
atrocities and mass human rights violations. It is the dominant juridico-moral 
framework used to justify intervention for human protection purposes.  
 
R2P entails the re-articulation of state sovereignty as ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ - sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must 
be borne by the broader community of states.
 7
 It is comprised of three pillars: the 
responsibility to react, to prevent and to rebuild. In 2005, R2P was taken to the 
World Summit.
8
 The version of R2P adopted within the Summit Document 
Outcome (SDO) has been referred to as ‘R2P lite’.
9
 Broadly, it is the idea of 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ within R2P that has been celebrated as decisively 
solidifying the collective responsibility of the international community to respond 
to serious threats citizens face when individual states are unwilling or unable to 
																																																								
4 See for example Roland Paris. (2006). Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, International 
Security, Vol. 26, Isuue 1, pp. 87-102, Taylor Owen. (2004). Human Security – Conflict, Critique, 
Consensus: Colloquim Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold Definition, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, 
No. 3, pp. 373-387, Anne Orford. (2013), Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect, 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 83-108, David Levy and Natan Sznaider. 
(2004). The Institutionalization of cosmopolitan morality: the Holocaust and Human Rights, Journal of 
Human Rights, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 143-157. 
5 Christopher Hobson. (2016). Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect in Libya, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 44, Issue 3, pp. 433 – 454, p. 433 to 434. 
6 Jennifer Welsh. (2013). Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect, Global Responsibility to 
Protect, Volume 5, pp. 365-396, p. 366. 
7 The concept ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ is generally attributed to former UN adviser for the 
Prevention of Genocide and former South Sudanese diplomat Francis M. Deng, see Francis M. Deng, 
Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and I. William Zartman (eds.). (1996). Sovereignty 
as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, 1996, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C, see 
also the influential article in The Economist by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. (1999). Two 
Concepts of Sovereignty, The Economist, Retrieved from economist.com 
8 World Summit Outcome 2005, undocs.org A/RES/60/1, 16 September, Articles 137 and 138.  




 The principle of state sovereignty and the prohibition 
not to use force in international relations are considered core norms of 
international law.
11
 Although the Commission re-stated its respect for state 
sovereignty, the conception of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ used by the ICISS 




Significantly, in 2007, R2P was used in Resolution 1769, which authorised the 
deployment of peacekeepers to the Darfur region of Sudan (UNAMID); and in 
2011, the Security Council in Resolution 1973, used R2P for the first time to 
authorise member states to take all necessary measures, including military force, 
for the protection of civilians in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
13
 France, the United 
States, the UK, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, 
Portugal and South Africa voted in the affirmative and Brazil, Germany, India, 
China and Russia abstained.
14
 The intervention in Libya became a cause for 
celebration for pro-R2P advocates.
15
 In the words of Thomas Weiss: “Libya 
suggests that we can say no more Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas – and 
occasionally mean it.”
16
 For others, R2P reflects the “dominance of the liberal 
peace thesis”
17
 or “bifurcates the international system between sovereign 





10  Catherine Powell. (2012). Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 106, Issue 2, pp. 298-316, p. 298. 
11 UN Charter Article 2(4) and Article 2(7), Christine Gray. (2008). International Law and the Use of 
Force, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, p. 30, Malcolm N. Shaw. (2008). International Law, Sixth 
Edition, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3. 
12 ICISS report, op cit., p. 8 to 9, emphasis on par. 1.34. 
13  UNSCR 1769 (2007), undocs.org S/RES/1769, 31 July and UNSCR 1973 (2011), undocs.org 
S/RES/1973, 17 March. 
14 Powell, op cit. 
15 Ibid., Anne-Marie Slaughter. (2011). Why Libya Sceptics were proved badly wrong. Financial Times, 
August 24, Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams. (2013). The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’ 
Ivoire, Libya, and the Responsibility to Protect, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 7, pp. 825-850. 
16 Thomas G. Weiss. (2011). RtoP Alive and Well after Libya, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 25, 
Issue 3, pp. 287-292, p. 291, see also Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss. (2009). From Idea to Norm 
– and Action?, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1, pp. 22-53. 
17 David Chandler. (2004). The responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’, International 
Peacekeeping, Vo. 11, No. 1, pp. 59-81. 
18 Mahmood Mamdani. (2010). Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish? Journal of Intervention and 
State-Building, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 53-67. 
	 5 
The issue of military intervention for human protection purposes is a highly 
controversial and hotly debated issue within the disciplines of international law 
and international relations. Hence, this thesis benefits from the use of literature 
from both disciplines. Since its inception and subsequent institutionalization, 
R2P has been rapidly growing its own literature that bridges the disciplines of 
international law, international relations and security studies.
19
 Research around 
the concept assesses R2P’s impact on international law;
20
 its implications on 
international criminal justice;
21
 or its ethical or normative dimension and 
viability.
22
 This thesis is situated primarily within the latter group, however to 
assess R2P’s ethical dimension and viability necessarily includes considerations 
both on its impact on international law and its relationship with international 
criminal justice. The thesis does not want to opt for a strict ‘for or against’ 
position, which either embraces the responsibility to protect concept as ‘the only 
game in town’ or dismisses it as a western liberal fixation. This thesis hopes to 
take a critical and cautious position.  
 
Considering and reflecting on this chain of events, practices and rapidly 
emerging literature, this thesis attempts to explore what the collective 
responsibility within R2P professes, or promises, to be and how it materializes. 
To do so, the present thesis investigates the concept’s institutionalization, its 
juridico-moral framework and how it has been used, both in theory and in 
practice. The aim of this research is to probe deeply into the meaning of 
‘responsibility’ within R2P, as well as to examine the concept’s role, effects and 
																																																								
19 There is a journal specializing in the study and practice of R2P, Global Responsibility to Protect, 
Editors Sara E. Davies and Luke Glanville and Chief Editor Alex J. Bellamy. 
20 For example Louise Arbour. (2008). The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International 
Law, Review of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 445-458, Anne Orford. (2011). International 
Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge University Press, Maria Banda and Jennifer 
Welsh. (2010). International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding State’s 
Responsibilities, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 213-231. 
21 For example Carsten Stahn. (2012). Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A 
Test for ‘Shared Responsibility’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 10, Issue 2, pp. 325-349, 
Frédéric Megrét. (2010). ICC, R2P and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit, 
The Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 21, pp. 21-51. 
22 For example Roland Paris. (2014). The Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of 
Preventive Humanitarian Intervention, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 569-603, Aidan 
Hehir. (2013). The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to 
Protect, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 137-159, Chris Brown. (2013). The Antipolitical 
Theory of the Responsibility to Protect, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 423-442. 
	 6 
limits. Hereinafter the term ‘the responsibility to protect concept’ is to be used to 
signify the broader ‘idea’ – being the use of military force by the wider 
community of states to protect populations. The term ‘R2P’ specifically refers to 
the report of the ICISS, as well as subsequent UN documents, reports of 




Approach and Methodology 
 
Legal and political debates, as well as the discourse around R2P on the issue of 
military intervention for human protection purposes, have largely been 
preoccupied by the problematic and ethical dilemma of action or inaction. This 
dilemma suggests that there are only two possible scenarios when we are 
confronted with mass atrocities: either act and do ‘something’ or do nothing. 
Military intervention for human protection purposes was challenged both when 
it happened, for instance in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), and also ‘where it did 
not happen’ in Rwanda (1994) and in Syria (from 2011 until today). The added 
emphasis on action/inaction or on the legal justifications of military 
interventions, as well as the dubbing of interventions as either a ‘success’ or 
‘failure’ in relation to achieving state consensus or UN authorization, appear to 
me to have led to the downplaying of the important ways states routinely 
intervene or are implicated in the internal affairs of other states. In other words, 
such predilections marginalize the different and multiple ways ‘we’ are and have 
been, both as individuals and collectives, always related and active in each other’s 
lives. For example, through their mere sharing of financial and diplomatic ties or 
strategic geo-political priorities, their collaboration under regional security 
organizations, through the use of economic sanctions or other financial 
agreements, the selling and use of military technology and weapons, or through 
																																																								
23 ICISS report, op cit., Summit Outcome Document, op cit., A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, un docs.org A/59/565 
(2004), par. 29, 27 March, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, 
Report of the Secretary General, undocs.org A/79/2005, 21 March, Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect, Report of the Secretary General, undocs.org A/63/677 (2009), 30 November, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, Report of the Secretary General, undocs.org 
A/71/1016 – S/2017/556 (2017), 10 August. 
 
	 7 
judicial intervention on criminal and corporate matters - states are active and 
routinely intervene in the relations of other states. This understanding has been a 
major, primary and enduring concern of mine in the process of putting together 
this thesis. Therefore, this thesis attempts to show that such a standpoint, the 
need to emphasize our everyday global interconnectedness and inter-
subjective/intra-subjective constitution, is largely excluded from the discourse 
around R2P and from the discipline of international law in particular. 
Consequently, this thesis attempts to show the value of such an approach. 
 
The ‘theorizing of responsibility’ in international law has been preoccupied with 
legal accountability and blameworthiness.
24
 However, responsibility cannot 
merely be conceived as legal accountability, but is better understood as ‘an 
ability to respond’. ‘Response-ability’ emerges in a ‘scene of address’, within a 
relation and in the face of an encounter.
25
 ‘Response-ability’ is partly formed by 
the form the ‘structure of address’ will take, which necessarily includes the 
mediation of language, of norms and of legal universals. This ‘scene’ is 
significantly a ‘space’ of constitution and of process. Within this ‘scene’, the 
subject not only recognizes, but also misrecognizes, fails to recognize or resists to 
extend recognition. Through this lens, both international law and the 
responsibility to protect are seen as processes or spaces of communication and 
constitution and subject-formation. This approach allows me to bypass the 
problematic dilemma of action/inaction, of legality/illegality, the predilection of 
international lawyers to legal individual accountability and to examine the 
‘responsibility to protect concept’ from a wider theoretical, philosophical and 
socio-legal angle.  
 
To this end, the above understanding would have been perhaps impossible 
without the primary reading of scholarly work, such as Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
																																																								
24 Outi Korhonen and Toni Selkälä. (2016). Theorizing responsibility, in Anne Orford and Florian 
Hoffmann, (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, Oxford University Press, pp. 
844-861. 
25 Judith Butler. (2005). Giving an Account of Oneself, Fordham University Press, Butler uses the ‘scene 
of address’ or ‘space of address’ interchangeably to situate the process of being addressed and addressing 
an Other. 
	 8 
world-systems analysis and his exegesis of the connection between the different 
forces at play within the world-system of global capitalism circa 1500.
26
 Along 
with critical literature on human rights and international security, this thesis 
explores some of the paradoxes and ‘aporias’ of human rights and by extension 
the inherent paradoxes and ‘aporias’ within R2P itself.
27
 Additionally, the 
approach of this thesis would lack important insights without the literature 




I immersed myself in the reading and use of critical theory as I found it a fruitful 
way to interpret, theorize and understand contemporary global phenomena such 
as the ‘war on terrorism’, or the vision and limits of liberal internationalist and 
legal cosmopolitan approaches.
29
 The use of the work of Jacques Derrida and 
Judith Butler contained within this thesis is a consequence of this engagement.
30
 
Furthermore, critical legal, critical IR theory and post-Hegelian ethics of 
recognition allowed me to think of both individual and collective subjects as 
historically and discourse situated selves, whereby identity comes into being and 
always becomes in relation to difference, otherness and normativity.31 In order to 
inquire on the meaning of responsibility, I treat the responsibility to protect 
																																																								
26 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein. (2004). World-Systems Analysis: an introduction, Duke University 
Press, Immanuel Wallerstein. (2011). The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture of the European 
World-Economy in the sixteenth century, University of California Press. 
27 For example, Costas Douzinas. (2000). The End of Human Rights, Hart Publishings, Oxford, Tarik 
Kochi. (2009). The Other’s War: Recognition and the Violence of Ethics, Birkbeck Law Press, Marc 
Neocleous. (2014). War Power, Police Power, Oxford University Press. 
28 Martii Koskenniemi. (2005). From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 
Cambridge University Press, Martii Koskenniemi. (2001). The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and 
Fall of International Law 1870 – 1960, Cambridge University Press, Gerry Simpson. (2004). Great 
Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, Cambridge University 
Press. 
29 Some influential readings have been those of Carl Schmitt, Jacques Ranciére and Chantal Mouffe, see 
in thesis text for relevant references. 
30 Jacques Derrida. (1995). The Gift of Death, The University of Chicago Press, Butler, 2005, op cit., 
other important works of Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler are also taken up in the Chapter but in these 
two works respectively, both Derrida and Butler provide a more coherent account on the relationship 
between moral agency (freedom and reflexivity), responsibility, subjectivity and normativity. 
31 For example, David Campbell. (1992). Writing Security: United States as Foreign Policy and the 
politics of identity, University of Minnesota Press, Cynthia Weber. (1998). Performative States, 
Millenium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 77-95, p. 92, Dan Bulley. (2009). Ethics 
as Foreign Policy: Britain, the EU and the Other, Routledge, Kate Shick and Patrick Hayden (eds.). 
(2016). Recognition and Global Poltics: Critical Encounters Between State and World, Manchester 
University Press, Kochi, op cit., Patchen Markell. (2003). Bound by Recognition, Princeton University 
Press. 
	 9 
concept as a social ‘practice’;
32
 and in this sense, morality and moral behaviour as 
a social product.
33
 I think of the responsibility to protect concept as a ‘discursive 
framework’.
34
 Through this lens, “responsibility practices” are also revealed to us 
as techniques of governance.
35
 As such, this research contributes a critique of 
liberal cosmopolitan responsibility within R2P and an exploration into our 
resourcefulness for global ethical judgment.	 
	
Derrida’s work, especially with regards to the Gift of the Death36, is a story of the 
many faces of responsibility in relation to religion, ideology, the ethical order and 
economic/legal rationality. Derrida is specifically concerned with the meaning of 
moral and ethical responsibility in Western religion and philosophy, as well as 
with the connection between religious ideology and economic/legal rationality. 
Derrida’s story (or history) of responsibility questions the relationship between 
self, other, absolute responsibility, general politico/legal responsibility and the 
ethical order. His work is important for this thesis because he exposes the 
significance of inter-subjectivity/intra-subjectivity in the moment of decision and 
encounter with the Other. Derrida cautions against teleological and foreclosing 
theorizations of the meaning of responsibility; in other words, of programmatic 
ethical responses. He unravels the significance of problematizing responsibility 
and subjectivity everywhere and every time. It is in this sense that Derrida’s 
deconstruction of responsibility is particularly useful as a methodological lens 
which aims to overcome programmatic or static ethics in relation and attached to 
notions such as the everchanging and elusive ‘international community’ and ‘self’, 
as well as the ethical imperatives of community and self to the suffering Other(s).  
 
As a juridico-moral framework, the responsibility to protect rationalizes practices 
of international protection and naturalizes, as this thesis argues, a foreclosing 
and self-assured framework of ethical relationality aimed at the protection of life 
																																																								
32 Scott Veitch. (2007). Law and Irresponsibility: On the legitimation of human suffering, Routledge-
Cavendish, p. 37. 
33 Zygmunt Bauman. (1989). Modernity and the Holocaust, Polity Press, p. 175. 
34 Michel Foucault. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, translated by 
A. M Sheridan Smith, Pantheon Books, New York, pp. 31-49, Chapter 2: Discursive Formations. 
35 Veitch, op cit., p. 41. 
36 Derrida, 1995, op cit.		
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that is oriented towards governance, management and control rather than 
solidarity. The question of subjectivity is significant in this respect. The 
Derridean lens offers a conception of subjectivity grounded in a responsibility 
towards every Other and, much more importantly, always problematizing the 
space and rationality of mainstream notions of responsibility everywhere. His 
work provides the basis for a poststructuralist ethics which opens up the space of 
community and of re-theorizing being-with providing “the potential to recast the 
political on the basis of our responsibility to respect the event of the decision”37, 
“to judge, analyse, to make decisions in the context of an event”.
38
 This 
responsibility “can be linked to a notion of radical interdependence, in which the 
ethics of intersubjectivity are in the foreground”
39
 against a conception of 
responsibility that is grounded on the territorialisation of responsibility: on state 
sovereignty, citizenship and nationality and even on professional, vicarious and 
role responsibility. Put simply, the Derridean lens offers a methodological 
framework that is a counter-narrative to a self-assured cosmopolitan juridico-
moral framework that does not include, dismisses or is not interested in the 
misrecognitions, violence and irresponsibility of its protection practices.  
 
In a similar vein, Butler’s work, especially with regards to Giving an Account of 
Onesel, 40  provides poststructuralist ethics the possibility of hope. In 
irresponsibility, in the failure of recognition, the elusive, everchanging and 
ungrounded community and self must always interpret their own socially 
constituted ethical position in the moment of decision. The notions of 
‘international community’ and ‘international self’ are not mere effects or carriers 
of social structures. Drawing on Foucault’s reflexive relation of the subject to 
norms, Butler pluralizes the notions of identity, of sovereignty, of self and 
community to ground a notion of responsibility in the recognition of 
																																																								
37 E. Jeffrey Popke. (2003). Poststructuralist ethics: subjectivity, responsibility and the space of 
community, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 27, Issue 3, pp. 298-316, p. 307, see also Roxanne 
Lynn Doty. (1997). Aporia: A critical exploration of the agent-structure problematique in International 
Relations Theory, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, Issue 3, pp. 365-392. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 307, referencing David Slater. (1997). Spatialities of power and postmodern ethics – rethinking 
geopolitical encounters, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 15, pp. 55-72. 
40 Butler, 2005, op cit.	
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misrecognition which is inescapably bounded with critique. In this sense, the 
international self and community, as well as its responsibility to the Other(s), are 
infinitely re-constituted through the subject’s critical deliberation offering us the 
possibility of hope and against a Kantian conception of an autonomous subject of 
political reason. The critical international self which emerges can be the 
academic, the student, the UN worker, the international lawyer, the discourse-
situated subject that reflexively problematizes its relation to codes of 
responsibility and the ethical dominant order when taking a decision and 
everywhere. The ‘we’ of the ‘inter’-national community and of law emerges as an 
amalgam of a body of practices, of institutions, codes of conduct and ethics and 
as a perhaps a consciousness in its own of the in between, that ‘inter’ of the 
international. 
 
As the aim of this thesis is to re-cognize the notion of responsibility within the 
responsibility to protect concept, the thesis begins with the concept’s 
institutional framework, moves to current notions of responsibility one finds in 
the R2P discourse in relation to just war thinking and its ethics, and finally looks 
at the importance of subjectivity and critical deliberation in theorizing 
responsibility in international law. The methodological approach of this thesis 
arrives from a poststructuralist vantage point and is a critical approach since it 
approaches international law and moral arguments within international law as 
“languages” and as a “grammar”.
41
 The reading and analysis of the responsibility 
to protect concept presented in this thesis situates the thesis within a critical 
legal literature which inquires: (1.) on manifestations and representations of 
power and authority in the texts and sources of international law, and (2.) on the 
violence and militarization of liberal cosmopolitan responses to large scale loss of 
life.  
 
‘Critical theory’ typically attempts to challenge “established modes of thought 
and action” and claims “a desire to explore and perhaps foster the possibilities 
																																																								
41 Koskenniemi, 2005, op cit., p. 7. 
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being foreclosed or suppressed by that which exists or is being put in place.”
42
 
Critical legal theory does not provide blueprints or programmatic policies to be 
worn as straightjackets for the purposes of ‘ending of mass atrocities’, suffering or 
violence ‘once and for all’ and has been criticized precisely for this.
 43
 Rather, such 
approaches to international law and global security apparatuses draw on the 
limits of visions, programs or policies that take as given ontological and 
epistemological assumptions on the nature of human life or human rights. Its 
target is not the international order but the production of ordering systems and 
principles, which cannot acknowledge their own limits of intelligibility. 
Possibilities might then emerge precisely from the process of undoing, of 
exposing these limits.
44
 Likewise, this thesis attempts to rethink the responsibility 
to protect concept in terms of a relation that builds upon the conditions, albeit 
uncertain and unfixed, that bring moral subjects into being. It aims to show how 
the understanding of the responsibility to protect concept as a ‘structure of 
address’, whereby identities, meanings and courses of action take place, a broader 
‘scene of address’ of global inter-subjective/intra-subjective constitution can be 
captured.
45
 Even if the ICISS claimed in its report, a desire to inquire on the 
appropriateness of the use of force, it focused instead on the legal and procedural 
dimension of the use of force for human protection. As Campbell points out, the 
question ‘why fight?’ implies a series of “second-order questions, of when, where 
and how, or who with and what with, one should fight.”46 An inquiry into military 
intervention for human protection purposes cannot be abstracted from its 
contemporary social context, yet nor from the material and historical spaces we 
emerge from and frame such moral questions. The central ethical question is not 
																																																								
42 David Campbell. (2005). Beyond Choice: The onto-politics of Critique, International Relations, Vol. 
19, Issue 1, pp. 127-134, p. 128, derives the terms ‘onto-political’ from William E. Connoly, The Irony of 
Interpretation, in Daniel W. Conway and John E. Seery (eds.). (1992). The Politics of Irony: Essays in 
Self-Betrayal, New York: St Martin’s, p. 133. 
43 See for example Beate Jahn. (1998). One Step Forward, Two steps Backward: Critical Theory as The 
Latest Edition of Liberal Idealism, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 27, Issue 3, pp. 
613-641 and Ntina Tzouvala. (2016). New Approaches to International Law: The History of a Project, 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 215-233. 
44 It is deliberately that I do not term the methodology as ‘deconstruction’. I have been fortunate to read 
Jacques’s work at a later stage of my research.  
45 In Giving an Account of Oneself, op cit., Butler uses the ‘scene of address’ or ‘space of address’ 
interchangeably to situate the process of being addressed and addressing an Other. 
46 David Campbell. (1998). Why Fight: humanitarianism, Principles and Post-structuralism. Millennium 
Journal of International Studies, Vol 27, No. 3, pp. 497-521, p. 520. 
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why a decision to intervene is better than a decision not to or vice versa, but 
rather how is it that we arrive at a decision.47 This thesis attempts to argue that 
the global ethical responsibility we find within R2P and the discourse that 
supports its concept emanates from a ‘foreclosing’ structure of address. Such a 
foreclosing structure fails the promise of protection at an inter-subjective/intra-
subjective level and transforms global ethical responsibility into a project of 
governance, management and control. This vantage point is one on which the 
‘international community’ of liberal international law and legal cosmopolitanism 
projects a self-assured self and fails to account for the limits of its own self-
understanding, irresponsibility and violence. Even though both liberal 
internationalist and legal cosmopolitan approaches claim a desire to surpass the 
confines of state sovereignty, their visions of universal jurisdiction are severely 
limited by precisely a predilection to individualism and state-centrism, simplicity 
over complexity and “comfort” over “discomfort”.
48
 To sustain this argument, a 
‘notion of irresponsibility’ within and in relation to the responsibility to protect 
concept is developed. Significantly, this irresponsibility is internal; it is the other 
of responsibility and not a state of exception. It is generated from existing social 
modes of organization and of thinking. Such an understanding of irresponsibility 
allows me to re-cognize collective responsibility practices and the moral agency 
of the very nebulous ‘international community’ from which R2P depends. The 
‘notion of irresponsibility’ within R2P works as a “performative contradiction”, “a 
kind of ‘talking back” to its discourse.
 49
 It exposes and acknowledges the ‘limits’ 




47 Orford, 2011, op cit, Costa Douzinas. (2007). Human Rights and Empire: The political philosophy of 
cosmopolitanism, Routledge-Cavendish, Vivienne Jabri. (1998). Restyling the Subject of Responsibility 
in International Relations, Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 591-611, 
Jenny Edkins, Nalini Persram, Véronique Pin-Fat, (eds.). (1999). Sovereignty and Subjectivity, Lunne 
Rienner Publishers. 
48 Christine Schwöbel. (2013). The Comfort of International Criminal Law, Law and Critique, Vol. 24, 
Issue 2, pp. 169-191, p. 169, Danilo Zolo. (1998). Hans Kelsen: International Peace Through Law, 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, pp. 306-324, Nick Vaughan-Williams. (2007). Beyond a 
Cosmopolitan Ideal: the Politics of Singularity, International Politics, Vol. 44, pp. 107-124. 
49 Judith Butler. (1997). Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Routledge, New York and 
London,‘resignification’ according to Butler is “a kind of talking back” to a dominant discourse, a re-
contextualization of words, p. 14. 
50 Matthew Nicholson. (2015). Walter Benjamin and the Re-Imageination of International Law. (2016). 
Law and Critique, Volume 27, pp. 103-129, Nicholson uses ‘re-imagenation’ instead of re-imagination, 




 and representation. The ‘notion of irresponsibility’ presents the 
possibility to draw on meanings that have been excluded from the dominant 
juridico-moral concept of responsibility. The recognition of irresponsibility can 






Each chapter represents a ‘layer’ in the overall critique of R2P that this thesis 
provides. Broadly, the first two chapters frame the body of practice, theory and 
intellectual pedigree, as well as current understandings of the responsibility to 
protect concept.  
 
Chapter 1 draws on the legal debates and historic events that led towards the 
institutionalization of R2P, as well as what the report of the ICISS includes within 
its scope. The historical trajectory of Chapter 1 covers the period from 1945 to 
2011, from the creation of the UN Charter to resolution 1973 which authorized the 
humanitarian intervention in Libya. A survey of post-1945 cases involving 
humanitarian justifications are used to illustrate the post-WWII legal consensus 
on the use of force and state sovereignty. The chapter explores the birth and 
expansion of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations under the office of 
the Secretary General and the Security Council. It also investigates the growing 
willingness of the Security Council to broaden the definition of ‘threats to 
international peace and security’ in order to address gross human rights 
violations as an international matter of concern. Additionally, Chapter 1 looks at 
the legal debates around humanitarian intervention both before and after the end 
of the Cold War. This trajectory facilitates the situating of significant changes of 
approach on the use of military force for human protection purposes of various 
international actors at the turn of the twenty-first century. It is a brief history of 
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Issue 1, pp. 3–29. 
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R2P’s institutionalization and progressive internalization and as such an essential 
‘layer’ and piece of the critique of R2P which this thesis aims to develop.  
 
Chapter 2 looks at the ways in which R2P, liberal internationalist and legal 
cosmopolitan accounts inherit the juridico-moral framework of just war theory.
53
 
The literature used in Chapter 2 is concerned with what is perceived as ‘just war 
theory’, its ethical underpinnings, modes of thinking and how it relates to R2P in 
order to make a primary assessment on the current internal logic of R2P.
54
 
‘Classical’ approaches to just war theory perceive the punishment of wrongdoing 
as a just cause of war under the broader right of punishing violations of the law of 
nature and of the law of nations.
55
 Following the end of WWII, the codification of 
the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and the Nuremberg principles, explicit 
justifications of using military force as punishment were largely banished.
56
 The 
discussion and tension between ‘classical’ and ‘contemporary’ approaches to just 
war theory in relation to R2P, reveal the significant position that just war 
thinking holds as an ethico/political response to mass human rights atrocities 
and the use of force for protection.
57
 In chapter 2, punishment is seen as the 
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‘other’ side of protection. With the help of critical legal literature, this chapter 
argues that liberal internationalist, legal cosmopolitan approaches and 
contemporary approaches celebrating the reinvention of just war theory in R2P 
tend to hide the punitive ethos of just war theory and humanitarianism under the 
rubric of protection.
58
 The use of military force for human protection purposes, 
war crime tribunals and economic sanctions can also be seen as punitive 
practices. However, the punitive ethos and dimension of military interventions 
for human protection purposes has been largely underexplored within the 
discipline of international law. Together, chapters 1 and 2 present the juridico-
moral basis (i.e. the juridical and ethical framework) of the responsibility to 
protect concept. 
 
In chapter 3, the separation and relationship between legal accountability 
(individual) and political responsibility (collective), as well as the agential 
materiality of the elusive ‘international community’, are examined.
59
 Drawing on 
Scott Veitch’s Law and Irresponsibility, I begin to develop the notion of 
irresponsibility within R2P. For Veitch, three main features play a key role in 
producing irresponsibility and are “features of modern social forms of 
organization’ with their “attendant mentalities”.
 60
 These are: (1.) the division of 
labour and the significance of role responsibility, (2.) the meaning and effects of 
processes of individualization and (3.) the transference of responsibilities through 
the distinctions and combination of social systems.
61
 I treat these features as 
signifiers for ‘sites of irresponsibility’ within R2P. I then provide examples and 
work through the manner in which the disappearance of collective, political and 
moral responsibility become possible within R2P. For example, to illustrate the 
significance of role responsibility, I use the story of Francis M. Deng, in his role as 
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59 Toni Erskine. (2003). Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and 
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the UN Representative for IDPs and his later role as the UN ambassador for 
South Sudan. I explore ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ to demonstrate the effects 
and meanings of individualization and turn briefly to the effects of military 
interventions in Iraq and Libya to sustain my argument. Finally, I look into the 
‘transference of responsibilities’ within R2P and I explore the normative 
inconsistencies of R2P, as well as its relationship with the ‘comfort’ that ICL 
provides, with specific emphasis in transitional justice mechanisms placed in 
Libya at the end of the 2011 intervention. Through the analysis of notions of 
responsibility (i.e. social, legal and political), the materiality of the ‘international 
community’ and examples of irresponsibility within the responsibility to protect 
concept, chapter 3 uncovers the internal sites of vulnerability, of misrecognition, 
of violence and of discomfort within the responsibility to protect concept that the 
mainstream discourse around R2P fails to account for. As a result, the chapter 
exposes the ‘irresponsible mentality’ that is an integral part of the concept’s 
structure of addressing mass atrocities. The chapter represents the heart of this 
thesis as it develops and builds a ‘notion of irresponsibility’ integral to 
responsibility practices; the other site, sight and scene of R2P. 
 
Lastly, chapter 4 turns the lens to ‘international political subjectivity’. Such a 
‘turn’ explicates the role of subjectivity in relation to notions of sovereignty, 
accounts of responsibility and approaches to international law. This chapter 
looks at a ‘crisis of representation’ at the heart of legal cosmopolitanism and 
international law.
62
 For liberal internationalists and legal cosmopolitans, inter-
subjectivity/intra-subjectivity produces anxiety and discomfort, as it is at odds 
with the defining moment of international law that being state sovereignty, with 
legal rationality and individual accountability in particular.
63
 Anxiety heightens 
in the face of an increasingly networked, multifaceted, inter-connected, digital 
reality, with multiple sites of command and systemic contradictions. In an effort 
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to control and to maintain the “void”
64
 of international political subjectivity, legal 
cosmopolitans and liberal internationalists rely largely on a progressive history of 
universal reason and of a unified common humanity to advance a cosmopolitan 
legal framework, hoping that the project of universal emancipation and the 
promise of cosmopolitanism still runs at the heart of IL.
65
 Finally, drawing on the 
concepts of responsibility we can find in Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, I 
attempt to think of our resourcefulness for global ethical judgement with Derrida 
and Butler. Butler’s and Derrida’s account of responsibility complement each 
other and “deterritorialize” responsibility.
66
 Their account represents a linguistic 
or aesthetic turn on how one understands moral agency and responsibility. In 
this light, foreign policy, military interventions for human protection purposes 
and representations of the ‘international community’ both within and in relation 
to R2P are processes of constitution and of subject formation. Such an approach 
allows me to view the responsibility to protect concept as a ‘scene of address’ 
with a specific ‘structure of address’ and to assess what kind of global ethical 
responsibility is communicated by R2P in both theory and practice. Chapter 4 is 




64 Peter Fitzpatrick. (2015). Ultimate plurality: international law and the possibility of resistance, Inter 
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FROM HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT  
Introductory Remarks 
This chapter aims to narrate the story of the development of R2P. Hence, the UN 
Charter, which sets the fundamental rules on the use of force among states, is a 
logical departure. The chapter progresses chronologically. This brief historical 
trajectory begins in 1945, from the creation of the UN Charter, and ends in 2011, 
when the Security Council in Resolution 1973 used R2P for the first time to 
authorise member states to take all necessary measures, including military force, 
for the protection of civilians in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.61 
During the Cold War, the responsibility for the protection of individuals and 
their rights was considered an internal matter. Nonetheless, state sovereignty 
even in the early years of the Organization was not a carte blanche. During this 
time, a body of proper practice and guidelines also emerged for the management 
of conflicts through peacekeeping operations and from within the executive 
offices of the UN and the office of the Secretary-General in particular. 
Peacekeeping operations were the invention of the period roughly between 1960-
1988 as a response to the deadlock of the Security Council and the power politics 
of the Cold War. These operations, under the auspices of the UN, evolved from 
being merely operations monitoring borders and observing cease-fires to peace-
enforcement operations. The principles of consent, impartiality and self-defence 
were increasingly being compromised. In the 1990s, the ethico-political claim 
that military action to protect human rights was not only legal but morally 
necessary re-emerged with much greater force and standing. At the same time, 
the disciplines of international law and international relations saw the ‘spring’ of 
liberal/legal internationalism, cosmopolitanism and their discourses. The 
willingness to intervene for the protection of human rights was there both 
																																																								





institutionally and discursively, yet the exact legal/normative justifications were 
lacking. In the aftermath of Kosovo, the issues that the ICISS was called to assess 
were broadly: the tension between the Charter prohibitions and the protection of 
human rights, the threshold criteria for humanitarian interventions, right 
authority and operational principles.  
The chapter begins with a discussion on the provisions of the UN Charter and the 
development of human rights. Both provisions of the Charter and developments 
in relation to human rights are important; R2P is a juridico-moral framework. It 
seeks to provide, under threshold criteria, a ‘right’ to the broader community of 
states under the authority of the Security Council to use military force (juridical), 
in order to protect populations from mass human rights atrocities (moral). 
Roughly, it is an international legal doctrine, which seeks to organize the proper 
conduct of the broader community of states in response to ‘large scale loss of life’. 
In relation to the choice of structure of this thesis, the aim of the first chapter is 
to locate along a timeline, significant changes of approach in relation to the use 
of force for the protection of human rights, and to briefly trace the developments 
that foregrounded the institutionalization and internalization of the 
responsibility to protect concept and its vision.  
a. Dual promise: Rights of States and Rights of Individuals at the end of 
WWII 
The construction of an international institution was thought to be the solution to 
the centuries old impasse around a question namely, how should international 
relations be organised? In the words of former US President Truman, such an 
organisation must be a “mighty combination of nations founded upon justice for 
peace”62. As World War II was coming to an end, there was a perceived need 
within the Allied circle to unite a disintegrated Europe, provide justice for the 
victims, allocate power and agree on fundamental rules governing international 
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conduct and authority. At his address to the opening session of the San Francisco 
Conference, on April 25 1945, former US President Truman announced: 
“Nothing is more essential to the future peace of the world than continued cooperation of 
the nations which had to muster the force necessary to defeat the conspiracy of the Axis 
power to dominate the world. While these great states have a special responsibility to 
enforce the peace, their responsibility is based upon obligations resting upon all states, 
large and small, not to use force in international relations except in defence of law. The 
responsibility of the great states is to serve and not dominate the peoples of the world.”63 
The United Nations, like its predecessor (League of Nations), was to be universal 
in character, but much more inclusive to both its members and the matters it 
took under consideration. It was the second attempt in the history of 
international law to form the much-acclaimed ‘international community’ of 
sovereign nation-states. The creation of the UN Charter in 1945 represents an 
effort to set the rules governing the relations between modern states, in the form 
of a constitution-like document. Truman’s remarks on the ‘responsibility’ of the 
‘great states’ to protect international peace are nowhere more apparent than in 
the composition and form of the United Nations Security Council itself. For the 
‘big three’ – the US, UK and USSR, under increasing nuclear armament, nothing 
was more serious than establishing some codes of conduct between themselves.  
The UN Charter can be seen as an attempt to postulate the state and its 
mechanisms to the forefront of international law.64  Under the Charter, the 
primary responsibility of the nation-state is not to use force except in self-
defence.65 On the other end, the Charter stages the organisation’s commitment to 
the individual and its inalienable freedoms: 
“We the peoples of the United Nations determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small…”66 
State sovereignty and sovereign equality on one end, and the commitment to 
fundamental human rights on the other, can be read as a dual promise. Whilst 
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the former concerns the rights of states, the latter promises to respect the rights 
of individuals.  
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNDHR) in 1948.67 The UNDHR, a non-binding agreement, became the 
stepping-stone for more than eighty international human rights treaties and 
conventions. The principal “organs” of human rights are the UN Commissioner of 
Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights.68 Further central developments of human rights law, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1966 but entered into force in 1976 - have gradually created, along 
with other conventions, what we name today in everyday parlance ‘human 
rights’.69  
Since the end of the nineteenth and until the turn of the twenty-first century, 
peoples around the world would struggle to break free from the yoke of 
colonialism. The legal roots of ‘the right to self-determination’ rest with the 
Mandate of the League of Nations at the end of World War I, to manage the 
transformation of the colonies into modern independent states.70 The modern 
sovereign state was increasingly realized as a space “for the achievement of ‘ideal’ 
or good political and social arrangements.”71 The ‘right to self-determination’ 
drove the uprising of national liberation movements, which frequently took up 
arms to free themselves from ‘alien’ military subordination. Significantly, even if 
it is broadly considered a human right, the right to self-determination is not a 
right attributed to individuals, but to peoples. To this end, it is considered an 
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exception. 72  Some scholars trace the “political origins” of the right to self-
determination back to the American War of Independence and the “popular 
sovereignty” of the French Revolution.73  
Nonetheless, the twenty-first century ‘right of self-determination’ does not 
epitomize independence.74 The right of self-determination was adopted by the 
UN to speed up and advance decolonization and was frequently based on 
ethnic/national or religious identity. The Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) in 1960, was the “first significant contribution” in 
terms of granting and enforcing the right to self-determination.75 Following the 
decolonization period, self-determination was seen as intertwined with the 
universal application of human rights and entwined with the notion of territorial 
integrity, statehood and the principle of non-intervention. Therefore, diplomats 
and lawyers stressed the need to limit the concept of self-determination at its 
“human rights role”, “of empowering individuals and minorities to equitable 
treatment within existing structures of authority”, rather than be seen in 
connection with decolonization and thus support secession.76 A further analysis 
of the antecedents of the right of self-determination, and its changing meaning 
and effects in the course of the twentieth century is a very interesting task, yet 
beyond the scope of this chapter.77  
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The tradition of human rights, or the “intellectual pedigree of human rights” as 
Costas Douzinas observes, was not born out of a single event or mind, but was a 
blend of various events, ideas and traditions.78 As Douzinas argues: 
“classical natural law, Jewish and Christian Theology, the ideas of Enlightenment …major 
events such as the French revolution and the American War of Independence, the 
Russian revolution and its aftermath, the Nazi and Stalinist crimes, the Holocaust and 
the universal revulsion it caused join with ‘less important ones’, like the preoccupations 
and priorities of Western (predominantly American) politicians to create what is called 
today ‘the human rights movement’.”79  
For Charles Beitz modern international human rights practice can be traced back 
to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) in its provisions limiting the sovereign rights of 
the German principalities through a collective guarantee of religious toleration, 
in the anti-slavery movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and 
in “power interventions in the Ottoman Empire to protect religious minorities”. 80 
It follows that human rights practice may also be traced in the Congress of Berlin 
of 1878 (religious liberty), in the Constitution of the International Labor 
Organization, as well as in the post-war “minority treaties”.81 Beitz’s historical 
trajectory of human rights is based upon “measures by which states limited their 
sovereign authority and committed to protect certain interests of individuals.”82 
Nonetheless, in the twentieth century alone perhaps the ‘origin’ of an 
international (yet European) human rights movement can be found in the 
campaigns and advocacy of The Fédération International des Droits del’homme, 
established in Paris in 1922, a campaign advocating consistently for a “bill of 
human rights”.83 
The humanitarian catastrophe of the Holocaust and the events of World War II 
have arguably marked Western consciousness. Even today, reading about the 
death camps of the Third Reich, the systematic and organised intent to 
exterminate the Jewish, Romani and other populations off the face of the earth, 
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as well as the degree to which the institutionalisation of violence took place, yield 
a sense of despair. The traumas of the two World Wars, both physical and 
psychological, together with the obsession of the UK, the US and the Soviet 
Union to try and execute the prominent criminals and leaders of the Nazi regime 
for war crimes, led to the creation of a series of military tribunals, such as the 
Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo Tribunals.84 The Nuremberg Trials was a concerted 
act by the ‘Great powers’ to establish international judicial action, limited to the 
‘punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis’.85 The form and 
procedure that the trials took was considered largely before the end of the War in 
the meetings of Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945) and Potsdam (1945), leading to the 
London Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter or 
IMT), the decree, which operated as the legal basis for the trials. The Nuremberg 
Charter, an agreement solely made by the UK, the US, the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic and the USSR, ‘acting in the interests of all 
the United Nations’, identified three sets of crimes: 
a. ‘Crimes against Peace’: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
b. ‘War Crimes’: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations 
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave 
labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
c. ‘Crimes against Humanity’: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds 
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the 
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foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in 
execution of such plan.86 
Apart from the definition of crimes, the Charter identified the independent 
judiciary of the Court and established the ‘due process’ of the trial, including the 
defendants’ rights to counsel.87 The codification of these crimes was based upon, 
and essentially developed, the customs and laws of war of the Hague Conventions 
of 1899 and 1907, which combined with the Geneva Conventions (drafted in 1949), 
became part of ‘international humanitarian law’.  
According to Danilo Zolo, the most important innovation of the Geneva 
Conventions was “universal jurisdiction”, under which any party to the 
Convention could try individuals “irrespective of their nationality, the nationality 
of the victim, or where the crime was committed.”88 While crimes during war 
were, “normally considered less serious than the crime of aggression were 
prosecuted relentlessly and in some cases punished with great harshness”, the 
crime of the war of aggression “has been systematically ignored.”89 For Danilo 
Zolo, it is the Great powers and their recourse to both “political” and “military 
force” that enabled them to criminalize and punish warfare; they “insisted that 
individuals, cited by name” be held responsible for acts of international 
aggression.90 According to Zolo, the punishment of ‘war criminals’ was a key 
feature of the universal jurisdiction of the Holy Alliance, the League of Nations 
and the United Nations.91 However, it was not until after the end of WWII that 
individuals were to be prosecuted under international institutions. For legal 
cosmopolitans such as Hans Kelsen, ‘individual penal responsibility’ and 
international criminal courts are necessary developments for the achievement of 
a credible cosmopolitan organization for the maintenance of peace.92 Hence, in 
Kelsen’s vision the maintenance of peace is dependant upon the idea of making 
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both states and individuals subjects in international law.93 Richard Falk argues for 
three important ‘messages’ of the Nuremberg Trials with regards to the future of 
international law: (1.) the “procedural fairness” of the trials, (2.) evasions of 
victor’s criminality, and (3.) the “Nuremberg Promise”: “a commitment in the 
future” for the prosecution of individuals under international law.94  
The Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, which 
was passed by a General Assembly resolution in 1948, defines genocide “in times 
of peace and in times of war”, as the “…acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” establishing 
‘genocide’ as an international crime.95 The Convention arguably represents the 
first institutionalised departure from state practice and the concept of sovereign 
immunity. It entered into force in 1951 and lists, as of today, more than 140 
parties. 96  The concepts of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘genocide’ were 
instrumental to the creation of the Statutes of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (1993), the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda 
(1994) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) during 
the 1990s.97  
These pivotal developments in international human rights, humanitarian law and 
international criminal justice were part and parcel of events, intellectual 
traditions and existing structures of authority; narrowed down to the 
practicalities of acquiring consensus and of securing at least a working world 
organization with universal jurisdiction on the justifications of the use of force 
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b. The UN Charter, the use of force and the ‘right of humanitarian 
intervention’ 
The rules governing the use of force in international law are predominantly 
derived from the concept of sovereignty in Western legal jurisprudence. The 
Peace of Westphalia (1648), a chain of treaties between European powers, ended 
the Thirty Year’s War. In both international relations (IR) and international law 
(IL) theory, it is widely thought, that the Peace legally installed a system of 
independent European nation-states. According to Leo Gross, it was an attempt 
“to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of states exercising 
untrammelled sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated to no earthly 
authority [the authority of the pope].”98 For Gross, the Peace solidified the claim 
that for the “existence of the Law of Nations” the “preservation of a balance of 
power” is “a necessary condition”.99 In this sense, the Peace is considered as the 
endpoint of imperial authority and anarchy, and the origin of the modern state 
system. However, for Stephen Krasner, Andreas Osiander and Benno Teschke, 
this understanding is a ‘myth’.100 For Teschke, the disciplinary affinity to the 
Peace of Westphalia resembles a “constitutive foundational myth” of modern IR. 
In Teschke’s revisionist interpretation of the development and dynamics of the 
European state-system, Westphalia was “the culmination of the epoch of 
absolutist state formation” and dynastic polities but not the birth of modern 
international relations or modern international law.101  
Through this lens, pinpointing the ‘origin’ of the modern-state system can be a 
rhetorical activity in itself. Likewise, a lot of the accounts which attempt to 
pinpoint the ‘origin’ of humanitarian intervention, do so in order to prove the 
existence of a customary ‘right of humanitarian intervention’, or of an ethical and 
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normative revolution in international relations and so ground a “future direction 
of internationalism” or “some final meaning of sovereignty” in relation to 
intervening to save strangers. 102  However, given that the intentions of the 
interveners can never be proven, the ‘origin’ of such a ‘right’ will always be 
contested. What seems to matter is how interventions were represented, that 
being the justification given by interveners. For example, while most accounts 
trace the origins of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to the interferences in the 
Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century,103 Piirimäe suggests that the Swedish 
contemplated justifying their intervention in the Thirty Years War on 
humanitarian grounds, among other justifications, but decided eventually to take 
another route. 104  As the aforementioned accounts that are sceptical to the 
mainstream claim that the modern state-system emerged in Westphalia show, an 
attempt to locate the ‘origin’ of a ‘right to humanitarian intervention’ is also 
contestable. If we move the lens from state sovereignty, and substitute 
sovereignty with moral and political authority more broadly, we are presented 
with a wider historical trajectory of ‘humanitarian interventions’, humanitarian 
justifications and rationales. For example, Peter Hilpold suggests that the 
“challenge” of humanitarian intervention is much older than “the concept of 
‘humanitarian intervention.”105 This is one reason that ‘humanitarian’ claims of 
the Just War tradition are discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, which arguably 
precedes the concept of ‘state sovereignty’. The intention is not to prove a 
definition, or even a thesis, but to explore the juridical and moral connections 
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between R2P and just war theory. Now, in terms of the linguistic emergence of 
the term ‘humanitarian’, according to Simon Chesterman, ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ appears to have been used first by William Edward Hall in 1880.106  
Since we are focusing on a ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention the UN Charter is 
a logical departure. The UN Charter includes fundamental principles governing 
the use of force in international relations and sets out the principal organs of 
international authority. This is also the constitutional significance of the Charter. 
The authority to determine ‘a threat to peace and security’ and to decide on the 
proper application of the use of force in the relations between states is vested in 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the veto powers of the P-5. 
Article 103 of the UN Charter states: “In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of Member States and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” With the 
creation of the UN Charter, the fundamental regulations enshrined in it, acquired 
a customary character in international law given the degree of acceptance by 
states, called opinion juris.  
The most controversial, yet fundamental, article of the UN Charter prohibits the 
use of force in international law. Article 2 (4) provides:  
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  
In a similar fashion, Article 2 (7) provides:  
“Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but the 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII.” 
Adam Roberts notes that the wording of Article 2 (7) (i.e. no intervention in 
internal affairs) is partly a result of British insistence.107 According to Roberts, the 
																																																								
106 Simon Chesterman. (2003). Just War or Just peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law, Oxford University Press, p. 24. 





British feared that the Charter would intensify the pressures to dismantle the 
British colonies.108  
Article 42 of Chapter VII (the ‘enforcement’ Chapter) offers discretion to the 
Security Council, if all other peaceful measures (Article 41) are inadequate to 
remove a threat to international peace and security upon its determination on 
such a threat and to authorize such use of force ‘as may be necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.’ The collective security system is premised upon 
the idea of centralising the control on the threat or use of force to the United 
Nations Security Council. The Security Council is the only organ that can 
determine a threat, breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the only 
exception being Article 51, which recognises the “inherent” right of self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs.109 
Christine Gray argues that states broadly agree to the strict prohibition not to use 
force. The ban on the use of force in international relations contained in Article 
2(4), “is not only a treaty obligation but also customary law and even ius cogens, 
but there is no comparable agreement on the exact scope of the prohibition 
[emphasis my own].”110 In other words, the limits of the prohibition are unclear, 
however the prohibition acquired the status of fundamental character. 111  Ius 
cogens or jus cogens, is a Latin term that translates to ‘compelling law’ and 
denotes a set of peremptory norms of international public “policy” from which “no 
derogation is permitted”.112 Various resolutions reiterated the prohibition on the 
use of force, for example the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
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concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter.113  
Nonetheless, the primary role that the Security Council holds or its special 
functions do not exclude International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction over 
cases on the law of the use of force.114 The cases of Corfu115 and Nicaragua116 before 
the ICJ are two such examples, in which the Court considered questions 
pertaining to a ‘right of intervention’ and the scope of the right to self-defence. In 
Corfu and Nicaragua there was no argument or justification put forward by either 
applicants, for a ‘right to humanitarian intervention’. Yet, in both cases, force was 
used and justified in order to ‘protect’. The Court, in both cases, was unwilling to 
widen its view of the scope of self-defence or of the prohibition not to use force.117 
Corfu was the first ICJ case concerned with the use of force. Here, the UK 
demanded compensation for the explosions on October 12, 1946 from mines laid 
in Albanian waters, which subsequently damaged two British destroyers the 
Saumarez and the Volage which had come to its rescue, causing the death of 45 
British officers. A month later, the British Navy performed a sweep of the 
Channel in Albanian waters, which had been swept and cross-swept before, to 
secure the mines as quickly as possible for fear they should be taken away by the 
Albanian authorities.  
The Court considered two questions with regards to alleged violations and 
obligations under international law, and one regarding procedural and 
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compensational issues. The first question considered the argument presented by 
the UK, which alleged that Albania was responsible for the explosions that 
occurred on October 2 within the territorial sovereignty of Albania. The Court 
agreed that Albania was responsible because it failed to execute its duty to warn 
the ships proceeding through the Strait, which was considered “innocent” and 
thus “in times of peace” states “have a right to send their warships through straits 
used for international navigation.” 118  Albania denied that the passage was 
innocent and alleged that the British warships “showed an intention to 
intimidate.”119 The second question the Court considered was whether the UK 
violated international law by its acts both when the explosions occurred in 
October and when the British Navy performed a sweep of the area in November. 
The Court held that while on October 2 the UK did not violate any international 
law by passing through the channel and into Albanian waters it did so on 
November 12/13, when it performed the sweep of the channel which was 
considered already cleared and had no responsibility to perform either. The court 
did not accept “a special application of the theory of intervention”, namely, that 
the UK was “acting to facilitate the task of the international tribunal”, or as a 
method of self-protection or self-help’120, by unilaterally performing a sweep of 
the area. The Court furthermore stated: 
“The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only regard the alleged 
right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, 
given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still 
less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it 
would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the 
administration of international justice itself.”121 
The Court decided that by its actions on November 12/13, the British Navy used 
force in violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty in international law. If 
the UK had tried explicitly to argue that its acts on November 12/13 were 
performed for the interests of peace and security, falling under the general 
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purposes of the UN Charter, the Court would not have considered that as an 
accepted defence. 
In the case of Nicaragua, the government of the United States carried attacks on 
various fronts in Nicaragua including oil installations, military and naval bases; it 
had also supported the contras, paramilitary organisations which desired the fall 
of the government of Nicaragua including factions loyal to the former dictator, by 
training, arming and financing them.  
The US government argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction due to its 
reservation with regards to multilateral treaties under the Statute of the Court. 
The Court dismissed the argument and affirmed its jurisdiction by considering 
customary international law as the applicable law.122 The US further justified its 
conduct as an exercise of the right of collective self-defence in response to the 
alleged assistance of the government of Nicaragua to combat insurgents in El 
Salvador.123 However, the Court affirmed that one of the central tenets of the self-
defence justification requires the government under ‘armed attack’ to issue a 
declaration requesting outside help.  It also rejected their defence by establishing 
that the concept of an ‘armed attack’ does not include assistance to rebels both in 
the form of supplying weapons or logistical support, and considered the 
assistance to armed forces, which opposed the authority of their government and 
wanted to overthrow it, as an intervention in Nicaragua’s internal affairs. 
“The Court finds it clearly established that the United States intended, by its support of 
the contras, to coerce Nicaragua in respect of matters in which each State is permitted to 
decide freely, and that the intention of the contras themselves was to overthrow the 
present Government of Nicaragua… It therefore finds that the support given by the 
United States to the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by 
financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, 
constitutes a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention.” 124 
The Court focused on the prohibition of the use of force as stated in the UN 
Charter in Article 2(4) and as inferred by customary international law, deducing 
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opinio juris particularly from resolution 2625 (xxv), the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States.125 It also invoked the principle of non-intervention and considered that 
intervention is unlawful as far as it involves that use of force in order to coerce, in 
the form of direct or indirect military action or in the form of direct support for 
subversive activities, within the sovereignty of another State. It also noted that 
state practice “does not justify the view that any general right of intervention in 
support of an opposition with another state exists in contemporary international 
law.”126 Furthermore it added: 
“The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of 
intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for 
some particular ideology, or political system. Furthermore, the Respondent has not 
advanced a legal argument based on an alleged principle of ‘ideological intervention’.”127 
Notably, the Court suggested that human rights violations could not be 
monitored or ensured by using force. The Judge presiding the Court, Judge 
Nagendra Singh, insisted in a somewhat poetic character that:  
“The contribution of the Court has been to emphasize the principle of non-use of force as 
one belonging to the realm of jus cogens and hence as the very cornerstone of the human 
effort to promote peace in a world torn by strife. Force begets force and aggravates 
conflicts, embitters relations and endangers peaceful resolution of the dispute.” 
He further added: “The principle of non-intervention is to be treated as a 
sanctified absolute rule of law.” 128 Ultimately, both decisions demonstrate that a 
legal interpretation of the Charter cannot incorporate any special application of 
the right of self defence, or to consider a justification for the use of force in order 
to protect human rights or a de facto government that is in conflict with non-
state actors within that state as a valid legal defence. 
c. Legal debates on the use of force in the midst of the Cold War 
Those that viewed the creation of the Charter as the dawn of new international 
relations guided by rules of non-intervention were devastated by the realities and 
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events of the Cold War and of the effects of rapid decolonisation. Not only did 
Article 2 (4) proved to be a sort of a “dead letter” of sorts, but it also revealed the 
inherent politics of international law.129 The indeterminacy and incoherence of 
the collective security system of the Charter became much more evident during 
the Cold War period and thus stretched and transformed the boundaries of 
international legal defense. Gray writes that the veto of the P-5 under Article 27 
(3) was used 279 times between 1945 and 1985.130 Through this lens, the language 
of the Charter and its principle of non-interference, as jus cogens, were too firm 
for the superpowers. Having little wiggle room, they attempted repeatedly to 
justify their proxy wars through the Charter.  
The legal debates concerning the appropriate time to use force in international 
relations is structured around the Charter. Diplomats and international lawyers 
played with the meaning and wording of the Charter. Should Article 2 (4) be seen 
as a strict prohibition not to use force, or could it be interpreted under the wider 
Purposes of the UN Charter? Should human rights, the right to self-
determination, or despotic and undemocratic regimes, be considered legitimate 
reasons to warrant intervention? As discussed earlier, the approval of related 
resolutions at the Security Council is said to generate, in time, customary 
international law and legal precedents. Or, simply put, if states carried out and 
successfully justified their interventions as ‘humanitarian’, perhaps, a ‘right’ of 
humanitarian intervention could be created. Indeed, during the very early years 
of the UN’s existence, the prevailing tendency among lawyers and diplomats was 
that unless an armed intervention was a necessary and proportionate application 
of military force in another state for reasons related to self-defence, any other use 
of force was generally deemed illegal. Quincy Wright stated in 1957 that “…self-
help to rectify wrongs is a remedy only to the strong against the weak, and so is 
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itself an injustice. Furthermore, the Charter puts peace before justice.”131 For 
Wright, intervention does not gain in legality by being multilateral as opposed to 
unilateral.132  
Nonetheless, within ten years from the creation of the UN Charter and indeed 
just ten years after the end of World War II, lawyers would increasingly stretch 
the international legal argument on the use of force and attack the morality of 
the prohibition rules in the name of human rights. Such a development 
showcases that the Charter was a necessary treaty for the Great Powers to 
regulate the use of force between themselves at that particular historical juncture 
and not some broader ‘conscious’ realization about the nature of violence and the 
suffering of war. The interventions of India in Pakistan (1971), Vietnam in 
Cambodia (1978) and Tanzania in Uganda (1979) were predominantly justified on 
grounds of self-defence; all of them, however, involved humanitarian rationales. 
According to Wheeler, India’s and Tanzania’s interventions were not condemned 
by the Security Council and Vietnam was only condemned because of the 
regional rivalry between Vietnam and China.133 Michael Reisman had stated in 
1984 that the prohibition of “Article 2 (4) was never an independent ethical 
imperative of pacifism”.134 If it were not for the politics of the Cold War, the UN 
would have collectively enforced international protection from the ‘international 
community’ and would have “obviated” unilateral uses of force.135  
As early as 1967, Richard Lillich, argued for a right to ‘forcible self-help’ as a 
response to human rights violations, and that such a right to flow from post-
charter customary international law and respect for human dignity. In arguing so, 
he identified a gap in the Charter, Lillich argued that until an agreement on the 
use of force for the protection of human rights was reached, “states with the 
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capability for action can be expected upon occasion to resort to the traditional 
right of self-help”.136 The legitimacy of the resort to force should be based upon 
criteria such as immediacy and proportionality.137 Whilst he accepted that “other 
motives” may be present in deciding whether to resort to force, “if the overriding 
motive is the protection of human rights”, forcible self-help should be a 
legitimate right. 138 Proponents of a right to humanitarian intervention often 
argue that the choice to resort to force is a choice between two extremes, namely, 
unilateral action or complete inaction. Hence, unilateral action is at least 
legitimate and thus necessary in the face of Security Council inaction, under 
certain threshold criteria such as those proposed by Lillich.139 Nonetheless, there 
were also those international lawyers that continued to defend the non-
intervention prohibition, especially in the midst of Cold War power politics and 
rhetoric. For Oscar Schacter, such normative adjustment allows superpowers to 
use force to overthrow governments “unresponsive to popular will”, claiming that 
such an interpretation of Article 2 (4) “… is not, will not, and should not be law”, 
“for interstate violence in a period of superpower confrontation and obscurantist 
rhetoric are ominous.”140 
In 1989, the US invaded Panama (Operation Just Cause) in order to remove 
Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. Noriega was the military ruler of Panama 
from 1983-1989, with whom the CIA had collaborated extensively before his 
coming to power. Noriega was found to have engaged in money laundering and 
drug trafficking. He was also accused of ‘stealing’ the 1989 elections and of 
murdering protestors. Among the justifications given for the invasion was the 
protection of democracy and human rights; other justifications were the 
protection of US citizens and combating drug trafficking. Antony D’ Amato 
argued that the response to the abuse of human rights in Panama under Noriega, 
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was not only legal, but “morally required”, hence responsible. For D’ Amato, 
‘tyranny’ is the monopoly of the use of force, and its use against “their own 
people” necessitate intervention; “human rights law demands intervention against 
tyranny”.141 In contrast, Louis Henkin maintained that the invasion of Panama 
was a violation of Article 2(4).142 The creation of the Charter for Henkin indicates 
that the post-charter customary international law failed because of wars in the 
name of ‘vital interests’ and ‘just causes’. If, then, we legitimize pro-democratic 
invasions this would “…push back the law where it was long ago, as if the Second 
World War had not been fought and the United Nations Charter had not been 
written.”143 Nonetheless, five years later, Louis Henkin would argue: “sovereignty 
is a mistake, indeed a mistake built upon mistakes, which has barnacled an 
unfortunate mythology”.144  
d. Blurring the line: Peacekeeping, peace-enforcement or humanitarian 
intervention?  
The initial idea of the founders of the UN Charter was to form a standing UN 
army for collective security purposes as provided in Article 43, to maintain peace 
and security around the globe and bring the authority to decide the ‘just’ 
implementation of force under the Security Council and the Charter. However, 
the major powers could not agree on a UN military force. The UN adjusted 
quickly to the realities of Cold War power politics and decolonization and relied 
on member states to provide the means on a voluntary basis when reacting to 
international crises.145 Peacekeeping is an improvisation of Cold War bi-polarity, 
the Charter was supposed to deploy collective peace-enforcement operations.146 
Traditional peacekeeping, unlike ‘enforcement measures’, is mainly the result of 
																																																								
141 Antony D’ Amato. (1990). The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 84, pp. 516-524, p. 519. 
142 Louis Henkin. (1991). The invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross violation, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 29, pp. 293-312, p. 295. 
143 Ibid., p. 312 
144 Louis Henkin. (1996). Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 31-45, p. 31. 
145 Marrack Goulding. (1993). The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, International Affairs, Vol. 
69, Issue 3, pp. 451- 464, p. 455. 
146 Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles 





institutional breakthrough in response to the deadlock of Cold War politics and 
the effects of proxy wars, between 1960 and 1988. These operations involved the 
monitoring of borders, observing cease-fires, and sometimes incorporated other 
civil society support mechanisms, aimed at “settling or defusing conflicts.”147  
Traditionally, the primary characteristics of this type of involvement are the 
principles of consent, neutrality/impartiality and the non-use of force, except in 
cases of self-defence. Peacekeeping operations have been called firstly ‘Chapter 
Six and a Half’ operations; because they fall in between Chapter VI, which is 
concerned with the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and Chapter VII, which 
includes the authority of the Security Council to take coercive measures to 
maintain peace and security. According to the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNPO) the legal basis for peacekeeping operations are Charters VI, 
VII and VIII, not only Chapter VI. The feature of consent follows the rule of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, according to the UNPO, 
though the line between “robust” peacekeeping and peace-enforcement may 
appear blurred at times, peace-enforcement may involve “the use of force at the 
strategic or international level”, normally prohibited under Article 2(4) while 
peacekeeping allows the use of force at a tactical level’.148  
Yet, according to Orford, even if guided by impartiality, consent and the non-use 
of force, during the early years of peacekeeping activities, the UN clearly affected 
the internal struggle in the Congo (ONUC, 1960) by “recognizing particular 
authorities as collaborators”.149 The political vacuum created by decolonization, 
coupled with the meddling of former colonies, led to violent ethnic/religious 
clashes that revealed the complications of keeping peace and taking decisions in 
the midst of conflict. As Orford observes, the Secretary-General in the Congo was 
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to decide between claimants to Congolese authority.150 The Secretary-General 
thought proper to support the central government, which represented a turn in 
practice; the UN otherwise prevented both outside actors and did not favour 
either rebels or state authority.151 The relationship of the UN and the government 
of the Congo was ruined, as the UN refused to provide military assistance to the 
government, which looked to end the “Belgian-backed secession”.152 A year later, 
Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, stated that the UN had remained true to its 
principles and was guided by the interest of the Congolese people and by their 
right to decide freely for themselves.153 According to Orford, in the aftermath of 
operations, Hammarskjöld avoided the most pressing and difficult questions 
pertaining to the power of UN executives to impose or dictate a future for the 
peoples of decolonized territories. 154  According to Orford, Hammarskjöld 
“characterized intervention as a temporary measure and administration as a form 
of rule with no effect on internal politics.”155 Orford’s analysis points to the 
argument that even in the early years of peacekeeping, its ‘traditional’ principles 
(impartiality, consent and the non-use of force) could be practically and 
strategically compromised.  
According to Shasi Tharoor, during the Cold War, peace-keeping was successful 
and it had found a way to work within the limitations imposed upon it by Great 
power contention. 156  It had worked “well enough, at any rate, to win the 1988 
Nobel Peace Prize.”157 The United Nations constantly refrained from providing a 
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definition for the exact form of its peacekeeping activities. As Tharoor states: “to 
define peace-keeping was to impose a straight-jacket on a concept whose 
flexibility made it the most pragmatic instrument at the disposal of the world 
organization.”158 It is interesting to note that superpower contention became a 
positive element for the internal management of peacekeeping activities early on. 
In fact, it seems that, because the nature of decision-making in the midst of 
conflict is such that requires promptness, Great power disagreement on an 
overall strategy in response to mass human rights violations was the condition for 
such administrative and managerial clarity from within. It was the increasing 
willingness of the Security Council to enforce the peace (i.e. ‘no fly-zones’, ‘safe-
areas’, ‘punitive actions against warlords’, NATO-declared ‘exclusion zones’) that 
would blur the lines between peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and 
‘humanitarian intervention’ and compromise the “body of practice” that 
peacekeeping had developed.159 Through Tharoor, it was the decisions made by 
the Security Council in the 1990s, which produced major normative and 
conceptual problems. Therefore, the argument goes, if peace-keeping activities 
were to be left to the executive and inner administration circles of the UN, the 
body of practice would be able to transform in accordance with the demands of 
each case. According to Tharoor, writing in the aftermath of the NATO bombing 
in Bosnia in 1995:  
“The irony of the “back to basics” appeal is that the United Nations had already moved 
successfully beyond the basics… Namibia… Cambodia… El Salvador… Mozambique were 
all multi-dimensional efforts that demonstrated the effectiveness of a broader concept of 
peace-keeping – one that combined military functions with a variety of largely civilian 
undertakings to bring about change and fulfill the objectives of the operation.”160 
From this point of view, Tharoor reinforces Orford’s analysis of the gradual 
increase but also broadening of the decision-making powers at the UN’s 
disposal.161 
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For Weiss, what should be distinguishing about ‘humanitarian interventions’ are 
the “explicit” and “prominent” humanitarian rationales.162 Yet, are not all military 
interventions supported through some humanitarian rationale? Further, are not 
all operations, in one form or another, interventions in the internal affairs of 
states? According to Adam Roberts ‘humanitarian intervention’ is “coercive action 
by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without 
the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread 
suffering or death among the inhabitants.”163 If such operations are granted 
authorization under Chapter VII (threat to the peace) they are widely considered 
peace-enforcement operations, which allow the use of military force. Arguably, 
through this lens, peace-enforcement and ‘humanitarian interventions’ are not to 
be seen as separate.  
Between 1944 and 1988 only thirteen peacekeeping operations had been deployed, 
as opposed to the period between 1988 and 1994, where twenty-one such 
operations took place. The number amounts to the deployment of 79,9478 
peacekeepers between 1988 and 1994, in contrast to 12,000 during the period 
between 1944 and 1988. These numbers exclude the 10,000 troops involved in 
‘Operation Restore Democracy’ in Haiti (1994).164 From 1992 until 1996 alone, “it 
is no exaggeration to talk of ‘the militarization of the international relief 
system’”.165 As such, a conceptual problem that actually becomes a practical issue 
is the blurring of relief operations with military interventions for human 
protection purposes, through the language of protection. In other words, to 
march under the same banner (of protection) blurs the lines between the 
deliveries of aid (i.e. medical personnel, medical/food/shelter supplies) and the 
use of military force in the internal affairs of states for the purpose of protecting 
part of the population.166 If both government and anti-government factions use 
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violence and armed force, the distinction between combatants, non-combatants 
and civilians is very difficult, if almost impossible.   
In 1992, the “veto-free” Security Council, commissioned then Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali to provide recommendations for the strengthening of UN 
conflict management.167 The result was the Secretary-General’s report An Agenda 
for Peace, in which the “right” of the UN and its Security Council, under Chapter 
VII, to protect populations from mass human right violations was emphasized 
and reaffirmed: “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has now 
passed”. 168 All of these developments led to a period of humanitarian 
experimentation – Somalia, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Angola – peacekeeping in the midst of civil wars and violence, increasingly 
ignoring and violating the three fundamental principles of peacekeeping: consent, 
impartiality and the minimal use of force.169 Another significant development of 
the period was the launching of peacekeeping operations under the military 
command of a particular state or coalition and not under the UN itself. Such were 
the operations in Somalia (UNITAF) under the command of the US and the 
operation in Rwanda (Operation Turquoise) under France.170 Arguably, these 
developments during the 1990s are to be considered momentous in relation to 
the emergence of R2P in the 2000s.  
Today, UN peacekeeping operations from within the UN are called: 
“multi-dimensional … and may involve a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities … 
helping to fill the security and public order vacuum that often exists in post conflict settings… 
[and] play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict.” 171  
Significantly, the self-defence and consent component of ‘traditional’ 
peacekeeping were compromised over the years both from within the UN (peace-
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keeping) and with regards to resolutions of the Security Council (peace-
enforcement) and the use of ‘all necessary means’. 
e. The 1990s, the collective security system and the use of force for 
protection  
Most scholars who have written on humanitarian interventions in the twentieth 
century agree that at the end of the Cold War a new dawn of international 
humanitarianism under the umbrella of the United Nations emerged. 172 
According to Adam Roberts nine cases between 1991 and 2000 showcase that the 
understanding of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a distinct conceptual category 
was largely doubted.173 In all of these cases, the use of force seemed the only 
alternative to accumulative violence; significantly, it is individual states and 
coalitions that deployed such military capacity.174 These were the cases of (yet not 
limited to): Northern Iraq (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), Somalia 
(1992-1993), Rwanda (1994), Haiti (1994), Albania (1997), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), 
Kosovo (1998-1999) and East Timor (1999). In most of these cases host-state 
consent was given reluctantly; in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo there was no 
consent. Even if host-state consent were given, intervening forces would 
knowingly side-step agreements and take measures beyond those agreed.175 For 
Roberts, “this is a record of activity going far beyond anything in the first forty-
five years of the UN’s existence.”176 
Over the course of three years, between 1990 and 1993 alone, the Security Council 
passed more than 250 Resolutions on the matter, in contrast to the overall 250 
resolutions of the period between 1945 and 1990.177 From this perspective, we can 
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surely establish an increasing willingness from the Security Council (often 
equated as the willingness of ‘the international community’) to use its functions, 
and in cooperation with UN peacekeeping administration, to manage crisis 
situations, to morally condemn and punish gross human rights violations that the 
Security Council brought to its attention. The Security Council between 1990 and 
1993 attempted recurrently to “coerce target state behaviour”.178 This is only after 
the Security Council, under Article 39 of the Charter, determines “a threat to 
international peace and security.”179  Arguably, this remains to this day the most 
crucial and fundamental function of the Security Council’s moral and political 
international authority and security system. Between 1990 and 1993, the Security 
Council determined Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990) as a breach of international 
peace and security and the repression of Iraqi nationals as a threat to the peace.180 
It declared that the escalation of conflict in Yugoslavia (1991) and violence in 
Somalia (1992) were also a “threat”. 181  To this end, the Security Council 
increasingly considered gross human rights violations as such ‘threats’, therefore 
signifying a change in previous practice. According to Murphy, the concept of the 
‘threat’ has progressed from its restricted reference to military violence, to a 
broader definition of threat. 182  During the same period, Security Council 
resolutions included among other actions, the creation of specific zones as ‘safe 
areas’ which would become ‘safe havens’, and the supervision of aerial space 
which would become ‘no-fly zones’. Additionally, resolutions included actions 
with “legal effects”, “such as declaring the annexation of a territory null and 
void.”183 
Peacekeeping operations and experiments during this period, especially with 
regards to Somalia, where peacekeeping converted into peace-enforcement, 
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developments created the impression that, not only the lines between 
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement were distorted, but that peacekeeping 
“may gradually make a partial or total shift away from being a global community 
function to more of a major power function.”184 In May 1993, and after the highly 
controversial experiment in Somalia (the US withdrew and UNOSOM2 was found 
to be unable to control armed gangs and rebels), the Security Council issued a 
statement which effectively advocated for a “return” to peace-keeping founded on 
the principles of consent and impartiality. Nonetheless, it significantly retained 
its “right” to authorize all means necessary for UN forces to carry out their 
mandate when it sees fit.185 As a result of the looming threat of the use of air force 
in order to contain the conflict in Bosnia (1995), the ideas of peace-enforcement 
and humanitarian intervention as ‘forces of good’ re-emerged.186 However, the 
normative/legal justifications and concept to support “the overall strategy behind 
each new mandate” were still missing. 187  This was thought of as being a 
detriment to the UN’s overall credibility, as well as moral and political authority.  
The ‘spring’ of liberal/legal internationalism  
Within the discipline of international law, following the tradition of legal 
internationalism of scholars the likes of Hans Kelsen, Abraham Chayes and Louis 
Henkin, new theories of international legal practice developed. These theories, 
according to Anne Marie Slaughter, prioritized research that pinpointed on the 
ways law shaped state behaviour and pursued these objectives.188 For Slaughter, 
like realism, liberalism must be thought of as “a comprehensive theory of the 
international system.”189 This form of liberal internationalism builds upon the 
idea of liberal peace - liberal states are far less likely to go to war.190 These states 
are the democratic ones: they have a market-economy, are based on private 
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property rights and constitutional protections of civil and political rights.191 
Likewise, according to this thesis, in the international realm, states and 
international lawyers should pursue more institutionalization, more 
centralization, while embracing the ‘human rights movement’ of international 
law. Some of these scholars pursued unapologetically “a world of liberal states” 
and the “disaggregation” of state sovereignty.192 Accordingly, this vision required 
a “redefinition” of state sovereignty. For Slaughter:  
“The world of liberal states …is a world of individual self-regulation facilitated by states; 
of transnational regulation enacted and implemented by disaggregated political 
institutions – courts, legislature, executives and administrative agencies – enmeshed in 
transnational society”.193  
This idea of an international legal order is supported by the ‘relative’ autonomy of 
individual states. Here, international administration mirrors domestic 
administration in the regulation of human life and activities. Other international 
lawyers who ascribe to this vision are Fernando Téson and Thomas Franck.194 
According to Téson: “the gradual dilution of state sovereignty is not just one 
historical phenomenon, one more stage in the unfolding of blind Laws of History 
over which we lack control. It is, rather, a moral imperative.” 195  Liberal 
internationalism in this sense rationalizes and naturalizes the universal 
administration of human activity and life. In the discipline of IR a similar wave of 
liberal ‘institutionalism’ had been gradually taking hold of the discipline.196 
‘Cosmopolitan’ theorizing emerged around the same time.197 It is an invitation 
and a vision from the polis to the cosmopolis, embracing, more or less, the same 
axioms and visions as their legal counterparts. 
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The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is perhaps the most significant in 
terms of demonstrating the debate over the legality and legitimacy of the use of 
force for human protection purposes. This is mainly due to the fact that there 
was no explicit Security Council authorization for such an intervention and it was 
the first ‘humanitarian intervention’ declared as such by the interveners. 
However, as we shall see, it was also tacitly accepted. The humanitarian 
catastrophes of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, among others, were confronted, 
especially from liberal/legal internationalists, with anger; stressing the need for 
more ‘active’ and effective approaches to mass atrocities.198 From within the UN 
the general sentiment was that of increasing ‘distrust’ towards the UN’s capability 
to respond to human rights violations and mass atrocity crimes around the 
globe.199 At least this is how Secretary Generals Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan 
translated the ‘international opinion’ to be as evidenced in their progress 
reports.200 
In March 1998 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, demanded that the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
work towards a political solution, ordered an arms embargo and sanctions, and 
remained seized of the matter.201 The situation deteriorated substantively with 
heavy civilian casualties and displacements. In September of the same year, the 
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Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (1998) describing the situation as a 
‘threat to international peace and security’. The Council further demanded a 
cessation of hostilities, a ceasefire, an improvement of the humanitarian situation 
and that both parties enter immediately into negotiations. If no progress were to 
be made, the Security Council would consider further action.202 Following the 
resolution, NATO stated that if FRY does not comply with the Resolutions, it was 
prepared for airstrikes against Yugoslavia. In addition, two agreements were set 
up between the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and 
FRY, NATO and FRY. The former included the establishment of a Kosovo 
Verification Mission (KVM) in order to observe compliance and the latter a 
NATO aerial surveillance mission.203 Resolution 1203 adopted in October 1998 
endorsed these missions and demanded prompt implementation.204  The six-
nation Contact Group (UK, US, France, Germany, Russia and Italy, established at 
the 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia) agreed to continue the 
efforts for the creation of a peaceful solution to the conflict and to convene 
urgent negotiations. Nonetheless, the Serbian delegation failed to sign the 
proposed peace agreement and the efforts failed to prevent a stalemate.205 The 
Serbian forces intensified their offensive against the KLA and the OSCE mission 
withdrew from the region, following attacks on 20 March. Four days later the 
NATO air campaign (Operation Allied Force) commenced and lasted until 10 
June 1999.  
On 24 March, at the Security Council meeting, the United Kingdom justified the 
commencement of the air campaign “as an exceptional measure to prevent an 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”206 Other NATO states, such as the US, 
Canada and the Netherlands, also relied upon humanitarian justifications.207 On 
26 March 1999, the Security Council voted against the Russian demand to end the 
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use of force against Yugoslavia.208 In June 1999, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1244 (1999) under Chapter VII and included among other decisions: 
an endorsement of the agreement of the G-8 Foreign Ministers on 6 May 1999 to 
end the conflict, provided for the deployment of international security presence 
under the auspices of the United Nations with substantial NATO participation 
and decided that an agreement should be reached for the establishment of an 
interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo shall enjoy 
substantial autonomy. This would provide “transitional administration”, while 
“establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo.”209 In effect, these were the provisions for the temporary 
territorial administration of Kosovo until recognition of its independence.  
The Resolution did not include any condemnation for the NATO bombing 
campaign but reaffirmed the commitment of all Member States to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and of states of the region; as if 
the NATO campaign never occurred. China abstained from the vote and asserted 
that NATO seriously breached Charter principles, undermined the authority of 
the Security Council and hence, established a very dangerous precedent. A 
similar view was expressed by Costa Rica, Brazil and Mexico.210 
The Legal Debate on Kosovo 
According to Christopher Greenwood, the NATO’s resort to force was a 
legitimate action “recognized by international law” and “consistent with Security 
Council resolutions”.211  For Greenwood: “Kosovo was not a case in which the 
Security Council was passive and NATO acted entirely on its own initiative.”212 
NATO acted in opposition to “the objectives of the international community”, yet 
only to “further” them.213 The non-intervention prohibition, respect for state 
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sovereignty and the values of human rights, upon which the international legal 
system is founded, Greenwood argues, are of equal importance.214  
Bruno Simma asserted that there was only a “thin red line” between legality and 
illegality.215 The intervention was morally legitimate, but the Kosovo campaign 
should remain an exception. Reflecting on the ‘synergy’ between NATO and the 
UN, Simma argued, NATO implemented the policy “formulated by the 
international community/United Nations… filling the gaps of the Charter… in a 
way that is consistent, in substance, with the purposes of the United Nations.”216 
Antonio Cassese also claimed that NATO’s official declarations demonstrated the 
humanitarian and “exceptional” character of the intervention.217 However, since 
the proper application of human rights had been increasingly understood as an 
erga omnes obligation, in opposition to Simma, the campaign could not have 
been considered as an exception of the Charter anymore.218 From this perspective, 
both Greenwood and Cassese argued that the moral imperative for action in the 
face of gross human rights violations was such to legitimate the intervention. 
Thomas Franck also suggested that there is a need to find “ways out of the 
conundrum” (i.e. legality/legitimacy).219 For Franck, the situation reflected the 
“excessive chasm between law and the common moral sense”. 220  The view 
supported by Thomas Franck, Cassese and Greenwood was that the campaign 
was morally right but unlawful. However, paradoxically, even if the act was illegal, 
the NATO campaign “produced a result more in keeping with the intent of the 
law… - and more moral – than would have ensued had not action been taken to 
prevent another Balkan genocide.”221 From this point of view, Kosovo represents 
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the western consensus on the use of force for human protection purposes and the 
initiative to change the law on the use of force according to that consensus. 
Critical of such a perspective, Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman stated: “the 
views of the international society of states are, in our opinion, a much more 
important factor in the development and change of international law than many 
Anglo-American authors believe them to be.”222 Indeed, many states underlined 
the illegality of the NATO campaign.223 The NATO campaign was not only 
controversial among international lawyers in relation to its legality/illegality. 
While for some, the NATO campaign “was effective in stopping the slaughter”,224 
for others, “the NATO action did not stop the commission of widespread grave 
violations of international criminal law.”225 According to Charney:  
“the military campaign itself was not tailored to protect Albanians in Kosovo, but, rather, 
had the broader objective of undermining the FRY Government to force its capitulations, 
together with the collateral objective of freeing some or all of Kosovo from FRY control 
by partition or independence.”226 
 
In response to the NATO campaign, Yugoslavia brought a case before the 
International Court of Justice against the ten NATO members participating in the 
operation, claiming that the campaign was in breach of international law. 
Yugoslavia argued the bombing was not proportionate, was an intervention in its 
internal affairs (coalition forces trained and military equipped the KLA) and was 
a violation of the Genocide Convention under which it is illegal to impose life-
threatening conditions to a particular national group.227 In its letter to the Court 
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requested, an indication of provisional measures, and in explaining its reasons, it 
wrote that, “enormous damage has been caused to schools, hospitals, radio and 
television stations, institutions and cultural monuments, as well as to places of 
worship.” 228  The Court rejected the application of the FRY on grounds of 
jurisdiction, pursuant to a reservation of the US to Article XI of the Genocide 
Convention, which declares that a US “specific consent” is needed before any 
dispute is submitted to the ICJ.229 
The Kosovo intervention exposes the internal conflict and paradox in 
international law between human rights and state sovereignty - the rights of 
states and the rights of individuals. It also demonstrates that for most 
international lawyers, even if unlawful, humanitarian intervention that fulfils 
certain criteria, such as ‘proportionality’, is to be preferred over, allegedly, no 
action at all.230 Christine Chinkin’s remarks, on the aftermath of the NATO 
campaign, summarize the controversy and anxiety among international lawyers 
on the use of force for humanitarian purposes at the end of the twentieth 
century: 
“I have found it challenging as an international lawyer and as a person to formulate my 
response to the Kosovo intervention. I have found the debates and media coverage 
sobering, especially seeing what we discuss and what we exclude, and the language we 
use for discussion. The many contradictions have made it problematic whether, in the 
words of the British Press, the substance, processes and institutions of international law 
had a “good” or a “bad” war: what are the implications of these events for international 
human rights, the emerging exercise of international criminal jurisdiction, and the role of 
international institutions and legal argument? Can any of these questions be separated 
from those of geopolitics, military strategy and economic interests?”231 
Looking back at the Kosovo operation today, from the moral justifications given 
to its ‘collective’ component and the tacit acceptance of the operation by at least 
the majority of states of the Security Council (in contrast to Russia and China), 
Kosovo was the first of a new wave of ‘humanitarian interventions’. Nonetheless, 
the investigation in this chapter so far has demonstrated that Kosovo was not a 
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blunt and unexpected breach of international law, nor does it represent a novel 
management of conflict. The Kosovo operation should be seen as: (1.) the 
culmination of the transformations of peacekeeping operations, (2.) the 
culmination of interventions of the 1990s (peace-enforcements) and the body of 
practice for the management of conflicts that emerged during the same period, 
(3.) the result of pro-humanitarian activists, lawyers and the general discourse of 
the liberal peace movement that wished to institutionalize and naturalize the 
moral adherence to human rights, and (4.) the militarization of human 
protection practices and subsequent rationalization. Whether we agree or 
disagree with the Kosovo operation, Kosovo was the beginning of the intellectual 
and hands-on rationalization of military interventions for what will become 
linguistically the ‘responsible protection’ of human life. 
f. The institutionalization of the Responsibility to Protect framework 
(1999-2011) 
From Dual Promise to Dual Responsibility 
Amidst rising tensions in East Timor (1999), in a controversial article to The 
Economist, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out, that neither 
Kosovo nor Rwanda are “satisfactory” as “precedents” for the new millennium.232 
Annan urged the broader international community to respond “consistently” and 
“holistically” to humanitarian crises. According to Annan:  
“The choice must not be between council unity and inaction in the face of genocide – as 
in the case of Rwanda – and council division, but regional action, as in the case of Kosovo. 
In both cases the UN should have been able to find common ground in upholding the 
principles of the charter, and defending our common humanity.”233  
Further he stated that, “the charter requires the council to be the defender of the 
‘common interest’. Unless it is seen to be so – in an era of human rights, 
interdependence and globalization – there is a danger that others will seek to 
take its place.”234 NATO, allegedly, is the most strategically and militarily fit body 
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to execute such an intervention. Annan stated that sovereignty is not only about 
states protecting their integrity and independence from outside intervention and 
insurgents, but it is rather about serving the people and individuals under its 
authority.235 These are the two faces, or as Annan conceived it, the “two concepts 
of sovereignty.”236 Furthermore, he added: “When we read the charter today, we 
are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, 
not to protect those who abuse them.”237 Yet, the Charter is the same piece of 
document today as in 1945. Annan does not make clear why ‘we’ are able to 
understand the aims of the Charter today but could not in 1945. In other words, 
how is it that human rights are more important than state sovereignty today than 
in 1945? The investigation on the international right to protect human life so far 
has shown that the changed attitude to the Charter prohibitions and the right to 
intervene was, rather, a gradual institutional, executive and intellectual 
development. 
Annan’s article was presented at the General Assembly. His remarks and 
emphasis given to the dilemma of action or inaction exposes the following, now 
commonplace, conviction: some action is better than no action at all. 
Significantly “inaction” here may very well suggest, as Annan states, “doing too 
little, too late.”238 The appalling scenes of horror from Srebrenica and Rwanda 
generates an urgency to immediately intervene to stop or deter the brutality; it 
creates a sense of responsibility. Yet, where does this responsibility come from? Is 
always some action better than none? Or how is it productive to talk about action 
or inaction in abstraction and without the merits of a specific context? Why is it 
that the answer to the many complications of humanitarian intervention is more 
or less action and not what kind of action/inaction? 
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It was after Annan’s repeated pleas that the Canadian government formed the 
ICISS.239 Significantly, the report was published three months after the 9/11 
attacks in New York. However, in the Foreword of the report, Gareth Evans said it 
was largely completed before the appalling attacks. The Commissioners were 
brought together to forge a new consensus or a common ground on how to 
approach these issues. In the aftermath of Kosovo, Canada announced at the 
General Assembly the creation of an ad hoc committee to review the 
circumstances that give rise to ‘humanitarian intervention.’ The ICISS was 
comprised of 12 professionals, including lawyers, politicians, diplomats, 
academics and a former General.240  It was Co-Chaired by Gareth Evans an 
Australian politician, academic and president of the Brussels-based International 
Crisis Group and Mohammed Sahnoun, the UN diplomat and politician who was 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia in 1992. The 
Commission was asked to deliver a policy report “that would help the Secretary-
General and everyone else find some new common ground.”241  
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) recognizes that genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity are not to be considered only as internal 
but international, the state has an obligation to uphold basic human rights. The 
conduct of the state towards its entire people becomes a criterion for its 
legitimacy. The state is no longer completely free to its domestic affairs; its 
sovereignty becomes conditional. According to the ICISS, sovereignty nurses a 
“dual responsibility”: an external one “to respect the sovereignty of other states” 
and an internal one “to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the state.”242 While the Commission provided in the report an exegesis of 
its redefinition of sovereignty, it also reaffirmed that the principles of non-
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intervention and the rules of the prohibition not to use force are “organising 
principles of the UN System.”243  
The antecedent of the responsibility to protect concept is considered to be the 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ concept, first formulated in the work of Francis M. 
Deng and his colleagues of the Brookings Institution, who focused on conflict 
management in Africa. 244 Their work emphasised on internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). According to Deng and his colleagues, a responsible and ‘legitimate’ state, 
must “demonstrate responsibility, which means at the very least ensuring a 
certain level of protection for and providing the basic needs of the people.”245 
This is the idea behind the responsibility to protect concept, “from sovereignty as 
control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external 
duties.”246   
Mass atrocity crimes and gross human right violations are defined more precisely 
as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.247 The question then posed 
to the ICISS was, how are these ‘shock-emitting crimes’ to be dealt with? The 
concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ within R2P, entails that when a state is 
unable or unwilling to protect its population its sovereignty is “taken up” by the 
international community. 248  The responsibility to protect concept seeks to 
provide, under certain criteria, a legal authorisation for other states to intervene 
collectively using military force to protect populations at risk.249 These criteria 
are separated into (1.) The Just Cause Threshold, (2.) The Precautionary 
Principles, (3.) Right authority’ and (4.) Operational Principles. As I will discuss 
in the next chapter, this framework/criteria builds upon the juridical and moral 
claims of the Just War tradition and contemporary just war reasoning. This is 
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broadly the second pillar of R2P, ‘the responsibility to react’. The concept is not 
limited to military intervention, it is a ‘three pillar’ strategy, including a 
responsibility to ‘prevent’, ‘react’ and ‘rebuild’; it is the responsibility to react using 
military force that produced the most forceful debates between academic, 
diplomatic and executive circles, but the other two are equally important.  When 
academics and diplomats refer broadly to ‘R2P’ they, more often than not, refer to 
‘the responsibility to react’ and the above four central ‘criteria’. 
To Prevent 
The ICISS report and Gareth Evans, academic and member of the ICISS, suggest 
that prevention is one of the central tenets of the responsibility to protect: 
“prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to 
protect.”250 The responsibility to prevent establishes both long-term and short-
term measures, depending on the necessities of each case, when the state is 
‘unwilling or unable’ to fulfil its obligations. According to Evans, over the years, a 
‘prevention toolbox’ has been developing to respond to such crises.251 Imagine 
two “trays”, two main objectives, “structural prevention measures” (which tend to 
be long-term measures) and “direct operational measures” (short-term). Now 
each of these trays has four “sub-compartments”: (1.) political and diplomatic, (2.) 
legal and constitutional, (3.) economic and social and (4.) security sector 
measures. For example, a direct political measure would be the threat of political 
sanctions, while an economic structural long-term measure, would be the 
encouragement of larger economic integration policies.252 The responsibility of 
the ‘international community’ to prevent begins only after the actual 
humanitarian catastrophe has arisen, since in order to consider a case as 
‘exceptional’ there must be ‘actual or apprehended’ large scale loss of life and the 
state must be ‘unwilling or unable’ to help itself; the initial question is if these 
measures are actually preventive. Nonetheless, what can also be observed is that 
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R2P imagines a wider managerial and institutional approach to international 
crises. 
To React 
The responsibility to react entails coercive measures, such as extensive economic 
sanctions, and if appropriate, military intervention. So when is it ‘right’ to 
intervene? In effect this is R2P’s main criteria referred to above.253 The ‘Just Cause 
Threshold’ provides for ‘military intervention’ if ‘serious and irreparable harm’ 
occurs of:  
(a.) large scale loss of life: actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, 
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect, or inability 
to act, or a failed state situation, and  
(b.) large scale ethnic cleansing: actual or apprehended, whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.  
The ‘Precautionary Principles’ are: (a.) right intention, (b.) last resort, (c.) 
proportional means, and (d.) reasonable prospects (i.e. reasonable chance of 
success).  However, this is to be done after the Security Council has determined a 
‘threat to international peace and security’, and by acting under Chapter VII 
authorising states to use all necessary means if the state is unwilling or unable to 
cooperate.254 This is broadly what the criterion of ‘Right Authority’ provides.  
The criterion ‘Operational Principles’ is a mix of general objectives such as ‘clear 
and unambiguous mandate at all times’, ‘acceptance of limitations’, ‘protection of 
population, not defeat of state’, ‘rules of engagement which fit the concept and 
involve total adherence to international humanitarian law’ and so on.255 In case 
the Security Council turns out to be deadlocked by the veto powers of its 
members, and fails or rejects a proposal for intervention, there are two 
alternative options: (a.) consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in 
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an Emergency Special Session under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure or, (b.) 
action within the area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent 
authorization from the Security Council.256   
It can be argued that an intervention for protection purposes will often be 
contributing to some sort of regime change, whether that is to implicitly support 
a case of self-determination based on ethnic identities, such as Kosovo, or of a 
‘democratic movement’, as it happened recently in Libya and contributed to a 
complete regime change with the fall of Qaddafi. The effects and ‘meanings’ of 
such interventions are concerns that I hope to answer. 
To Rebuild 
The responsibility to rebuild is the last pillar of R2P and one could argue the most 
neglected and obscure of all three. According to the Report the transfer of 
authority should be made as soon as possible (i.e. transition to a newly formed 
government). Here the Commissioners envisage a transition to UN command in 
liaison with de facto civilian authority. Those authorities are to be elected, or a 
‘National Council’ under the auspices of the UN is to be devised. The Report 
stresses that there should be “genuine commitment to helping build durable 
peace”, promoting “good governance and sustainable development.” 257  The 
objective is to create “political processes which require local actors to take over 
responsibility both for rebuilding their society and for creating patterns of 
cooperation between antagonistic groups.”258 What appears here is a process of 
“dissolution” of international responsibility; responsibility is transferred back to 
local authorities.259  
Nonetheless, as past case experience has shown, the transferring of authority or 
the selection between competing claimants to authority presents a lot of 
difficulties, especially if both competing parties have been accused of mass 
																																																								
256 Ibid., p. xiii 
257 Ibid., p. 39. 






human rights violations.260 Considering the possibility of such operations to be 
increasingly carried out from the air, to secure ‘no-fly zones’ and not to put ‘boots 
on the ground’, as Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) for Libya provided, the 
interveners are seen to be presented with two options, either assist anti-
government ground forces or contract special forces employed by private military 
companies. 261 Either way they will have to support a claimant to authority. R2P 
leaves open these fundamental aspects. In addition, the post-intervention phase 
often entails an influx of previously frozen accounts or money in the form of aid, 
transferred back to the newly established authorities. Under what conditions 
should these decisions be made and by who? 
Subsequent Developments 
The 2004 Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, articulated the priorities of the ‘international 
community’ and attempted to examine the challenges the world faces concerning 
peace and security. This can be seen as the identification of structural problems 
or systemic conditions. Significantly, the Panel endorsed the R2P report by the 
ICISS.262 The sixteen-member panel was comprised of former Secretary-Generals, 
politicians and professionals. The panel emphasized that globalization has 
transformed the traditional boundaries of states. For example, it suggested that a 
major terrorist attacks anywhere in the industrialized world would have 
devastating consequences for the wellbeing of millions in the developing 
world.263 It identified six clusters of threats: (1.) war between states, (2) violence 
within states including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses and genocide, 
(3.) poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation, (4.) nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons (5.) terrorism (6.) transnational 
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organized crime.264 The report highlighted the Millennium Declaration (2000) 
and the Human Development Report (1994), underlining that development is the 
“indispensable foundation of a new collective security system.”265 The ‘primary 
responsibility’ of the governments in organizing development is “a conducive 
environment for vigorous private-sector-led growth and aid effectiveness.”266 
Furthermore, the report called for a “credible collective security system” under a 
“shared responsibility” and urged the UN to work with national authorities, 
international financial institutions, civil society organizations, and the private 
sector “to develop norms governing the management of resources for countries 
emerging from or are at risk of conflict”.267 
At the 2005 World Summit, the representatives of states agreed to adopt the 
responsibility to protect concept.268 However, they did not adopt the whole 
document as such. Particularly, they did not endorse the ‘Just Cause threshold’ 
criteria. It was rather a limited adoption, or as others who wanted to see a more 
robust approach to R2P pointed out, the reform documents as incorporated in 
the World Summit Outcome Document (SDO) have been “emasculated”.269 
Nonetheless, in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the SDO the broader community of 
states embraced the notion that the ‘international community’ “should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility”, and 
further “the international community … has the responsibility to use appropriate, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and 
VII”.270 Of course, this is a ‘lighter’ version.  
Since 2005, eight regional and international organizations have founded the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP). The purpose of 
the coalition is mainly to encourage the promotion of the Responsibility to 
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Protect as a norm and press international actors to ‘strengthen capacities’ for its 
implementation.271 There was also, in 2008, the creation of the Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect to “catalyse action”. 272   In addition to all these 
developments has been Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s report in 2009. Ki-
Moon urged the international community to “implement” the decisions of the 
2005 World Summit “in a fully faithful and consistent manner” and not to 
“reinterpret or renegotiate the conclusions.”273  As discussed, the ICISS does 
include a redefinition of sovereignty in relation to the use of force, however Ki-
Moon stated that “the responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, 
the legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the use of force except in 
conformity of the Charter.”274  The Secretary-General posed that part of the 
problem was conceptual, humanitarian intervention presented a “false choice 
between two extremes’; hence, the responsibility to protect is a “commitment” of 
the international community with the “cooperation among Member States’, 
‘regional and sub-regional organizations”, “civil society and the private sector’ 
and ‘the institutional strengths … of the United Nations.”275 
The ‘Concept note’ of the Office of the President of the General Assembly which 
was presented together with the abovementioned Report of the Secretary General 
admits that the Outcome Document of the World Summit is “very cautious when 
it comes to responsibility to take action… they are prepared to do this ‘on a case 
by case basis’, which precludes a systematic responsibility.”276 According to the 
Concept note, none of the five documents articulating the responsibility to 
protect are sources of binding international law in terms of Article 38 of the 
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Statue of the ICJ, which lists the classic sources of international law. 277 
Concerning the reaction phase of the responsibility to protect concept, the 
Concept note stressed that its elements “are far more problematic” than those of 
prevention.278 All the issues concerning the actual decision to use force were 
emphasized: the veto powers of the Security Council, the inability of the General 
Assembly to change a Security Council decision once votes have been casted, the 
unwillingness of the Security Council to transfer its powers in determining an act 
of aggression to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and that under the 
Charter the Security Council has authority only to determine and act against a 
threat to peace and security and not to violations of international legal obligations 
or human rights and humanitarian law. These needed to be “seriously 
reconsidered” if the adoption of the responsibility to protect is to become at least 
workable.279 With regards to the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty, which is the 
bedrock of R2P, the Concept note identified that it is a “contradiction” to the 
unequal authority evident in the veto powers of the P-5. According to the 
President of the GA, “the erosion of globalization strengthens the Westphalia 
paradigm as against the individual rights centred paradigm of responsibility to 
protect.” 280  The Concept note represents the controversy of the subsequent 
debate in the General Assembly, where all members agreed with paras. 138 and 
139 of the Outcome Document and the need for debate on how to implement the 
responsibility to protect, but many also posed fears as to how R2P can also fail.281  
Considering the above points, there were instantly two aspects that the 
Commissioners could not deal with: firstly the composition of the Security 
Council itself and its special discretionary powers and, secondly, that a re-
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number of states.282 For example, the Representative of Sudan stated: “To give the 
Security Council the privilege of being an executor of the concept of the 
responsibility to protect would be tantamount to giving a wolf the responsibility 
to adopt a lamb.”283 A common question posed by representatives of states was: 
Can a decision ever be reached to intervene in the domestic affairs of China, 
Russia or the US? According to Gareth Evans: “And there will be some countries 
for whom such measures will never be a practical option – a fact of life with 
which we simply have to live in many different international contexts.”284  
Today, the responsibility to protect concept is arguably the dominant medium of 
inquiry with which international actors and organizations assess their response 
to mass atrocities and mass human rights violations and the dominant juridico-
moral framework used to justify intervention for human protection purposes.  
Officials and diplomats do not speak about a ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ 
anymore but of a ‘responsibility to protect’. In Security Council Resolution 1674 
(2006), the Council reaffirmed what the SDO endorsed “the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”285 In 2007, R2P was used in Resolution 1769, which authorised 
the deployment of peacekeepers to the Darfur region of Sudan (UNAMID); and in 
2011, the Security Council in Resolution 1973, used R2P for the first time to 
authorise member states to take all necessary measures, including military force, 
for the protection of civilians in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.286  A previous 
UNSCR 1970 (2011) referred the situation to the prosecutor of the ICC, imposed 
an arms embargo, asset freezes and travel bans to individuals linked to 
Qaddafi. 287  As Carsten Stahn notes, “the situation in Libya marks the first 
precedent in which the ICC’s intervention was coupled with the invocation of the 
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responsibility to protect.”288 Coalition forces of the US, France, UK, Italy and 
Canada began enforcing the UN-authorised no-fly zone (Operation Odyssey 
Dawn) and carried air strikes on tanks and military facilities around Benghazi 
and Tripoli under Resolution 1973. On 31 March 2011, the operation was passed 
over to NATO and named Operation Unified Protector. The seven-month 
Operation ended on 31 October 2011 signalled by Qaddafi’s capture and 
subsequent killing, by anti-Qaddafi fighters on the ground (20 October 2011). It 
was this authority that was challenged yet tacitly accepted in Kosovo.  
The long history of the twentieth century is also a history of exploitation and 
inequality, and the remnants of this history are deeply embedded in the everyday 
lives of those people in danger. Has, what we name the ‘international community’, 
become ready to take on such a responsibility and carry the promise? The 
intervention in Libya became a cause for celebration for pro-R2P advocates.289 
For supporters of the concept, such as Catherine Powell, the use of the R2P in 
UNSCR 1973 (2011), showcases that international law has “travelled” a long way 
and that today the rights of individuals are not only the concern of individual 
states but of the ‘international community’.290 The use of the word ‘travelled’ by 
Powell, might also signify a vision that Powell ascribes to. For Powell, the Libyan 
case represents “a multilateral constitutional moment” in the history of 
international law, akin to that of 1945.291 It paves the way, “along a timeline”292, 
for the legal enforcement of a collective responsibility “to assist individual states 
for meeting their obligations… and to respond to serious threats to citizens when 
individual states are unwilling or unable.”293 Contrary to such forward-looking 
accounts, which see a normative shift (i.e. that international law has ‘travelled’), 
scholars such as James Turner Johnson see in R2P a ‘return’ to a presumption 
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against injustice, and therefore, a ‘return’ to the use of just war theory, conceived 
as a theory of justice and ethics on the use of force.294 The next chapter, will 
explore the relationship between R2P and just war theory, as well as the 
relationship between responsibility for protection and responsibility for 
punishment. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter located historically, and in reference to specific cases, the approach 
of the UN (and of the Security Council in particular), of international lawyers and 
of other international actors on the use of military force for the protection of 
human rights. It demonstrated that the assumption of military intervention in 
defence of human rights was considered both legitimate and necessary even from 
the early years of the Charter, however Cold War power dynamics did not allow 
for its internalization and institutionalization just yet. Intellectually, R2P is the 
result of the active ‘human security’ agenda and of the “moral internationalism” 
of major liberal international institutions and policies.295 More specifically, R2P’s 
protracted emergence can be viewed then, as the culmination of the processes of 
naturalization and rationalization of the militarization of human protection 
practices. The discretionary powers of the Security Council were fundamental to 
the furtherance of this dominant emerging discourse on mass human rights 
atrocities and the bureaucratization of its practices. As such, R2P must be viewed 
as part of a broader movement that connects the moral adherence to human 
rights to the notion and obsession of criminalizing and punishing the 
perpetrators of mass human rights atrocities under international law’s courts and 
to the ‘body of practice’ produced from within the UN. This model of ‘protection’ 
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Chapter 1 narrated the story of the development of R2P, the literature used in this 
chapter is primarily concerned with just war thinking 296 , its ethical 
underpinnings and how it relates to the responsibility to protect concept. Since 
the Just War tradition is a discussion on the ethics and bracketing of war that 
spans more than five centuries, the chapter concentrates on just war theory’s 
major moral claims and themes at play. The chapter is not a historical account of 
the Just War tradition but concentrates on the broader ethico-political claims of 
just war thinking so that the conventional/mainstream wisdom which underpins 
current R2P frameworks is unravelled. It is an attempt to pinpoint how is it that 
the ethical framework of just war thinking has become adapted and reinvented in 
current frameworks of the responsibility to protect concept.  
 
Broadly and popularly perceived, the Just War tradition aimed to protect the 
innocent from gross injustice and social evil and argued that the demands of 
charity, justice, love and human dignity be respected. It has been claimed that 
‘classical’ just war thinking differs from contemporary just war reasoning.297 
Classical just war theory regards the punishment of wrongdoing as a just cause of 
war. Protecting innocent aliens was justified through Christian love and 
vindictive justice and was also part and parcel of the broader right of punishing 
violations of the law of nature and of the law of nations. To understand this claim 
this chapter revisits the classical idea of just war through the eyes of James 
Turner Johnson. It highlights some of the transformational moments under 
which contemporary just war thinking emerged and considers/evaluates the kind 
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of moral and legal axioms/beliefs contemporary just war theory upholds. 
Specifically, contemporary just war thinking, which places emphasis on 
using/reading just war theory within the limits of international law and universal 
jurisdiction, tends to hide the punitive ethos of just war thinking under the 
rubric of protection, the authority of legal institutions and laws of war, and the 
primacy of human rights. As a result, the punitive ethos of just war thinking and 
its relationship with the moral claim of protection and of humanitarianism has 
been under discussed. As this chapter argues, punitive practice seems to be a 
deeply rooted element of just war thinking and of customary international law. 
However, the punitive element that we can locate in current frameworks of R2P 
has been largely unexplored. Therefore, this chapter provides an account of the 
paradoxically intimate relationship and regular alternation of protection and 
punishment in the moral/political claims and the theory and praxis of 
humanitarian intervention. In terms of the methodology of the thesis this 
chapter is the second ‘layer’ that builds upon the story of the institutionalization 
of R2P, as developed in chapter 1, and along with chapter 1, becomes the basis for 
the critical assessment of the ethical claims and internal logic of the theory and 
practice of current mainstream responses to mass atrocities.  
 
The chapter argues that the motive of punishment from 1945 onwards was 
institutionalized and therefore, it was also normalized and rationalized. 
Recognizing and realizing the punitive element of protection facilitates the 
theorizing of the legal, ethical and political limits of both protection and 
punishment.298 The recognition of the punitive ethos of the responsibility to 
protect concept presupposes that critical accounts, which highlight the 
foundational violence of international law, its inclusions and exclusions, its 
instances of exploitation, must be part of any ethical framework of a 
‘responsibility to protect’ in international law. As such, critical approaches to just 
war theory, human rights and international law are used to illustrate the 
limitations of just war thinking within R2P. Looking at the reinvention of just war 
thinking and its contemporary use within R2P, points to where our thinking and 
																																																								




theorizing of global ethical responsibility begins, and perhaps ends, regarding 
humanitarian intervention and protecting the Other. 
 
a. De-moralization/Re-moralization and the absence of the concept of 
punishment 
 
Following the end of WWII, rationales of war as punishment had largely been 
banished because of the emergence of the laws of war codified in the UN Charter, 
the Geneva Conventions and the Nuremberg Principles, as well as because of the 
emergence of the broader idea of state responsibility. In other words, the 
normalization and rationalization of the international criminalization of social 
and political violence had also overshadowed the ethics of criminalization per se. 
The international criminalization of social and political violence, the primacy of 
the Security Council in determining a threat to international peace and the ban 
on the use of force except in self-defence, echoed the de-moralization of the 
international order. In reference to the reasons for going to war, the 
phenomenon of de-moralization implies that a ‘just war’ is a war of self-defence 
or justified only if the international authority in the form of the UNSC would 
legitimate it. However, as Alex Blane and Benedict Kingsbury suggest: 
“punishment, retaliation and vengeance all seem to feature in the contemporary 
practice of international relations”; “most episodes of inter-state violence that 
might look like punishment by major states are not described that way.”299 
Anthony F. Lang also noticed that the concept of punishment is “largely absent” 
from scholarly writing. 300  Scholars do describe “things like coercive military 
strategies, sanctions and war crime tribunals” but they “do not describe these 
practices in punitive terms” because of certain assumptions these scholars make 
on what punishment actually means.301 Nonetheless, the punitive dimension of 
protection is evident in both military and non-military practices: economic 
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sanctions, humanitarian interventions, punitive counter-terrorism policy, 
punitive air strikes, detention policies, interrogation and torture. Punitive 
intervention can be defined broadly as “the use of force across borders by a state 
or a group of states aimed at inflicting harm on one or more agents that are 
responsible for violating the rules or norms governing international society.”302  
 
As discussed in chapter 1, for human rights activists the end of the Cold War was 
heralded as a new era in which the protection of human rights was regarded as 
fundamental to international law and security. Complemented by the efforts of 
Kofi Annan, during his office as Secretary-General, human rights became the 
centrepiece of the UN’s security agenda. Following the humanitarian failure of 
Rwanda and NATO’s controversial campaign in Kosovo, the formation of the 
ICISS was a concerted need of the holders of legal authority to reinterpret the 
concept of sovereignty, in order to further institutionalise the moral adherence of 
human rights. According to Eric Hobsbawm, during the Cold War, liberal 
institutions held on to the “temporary moment of their emergence”, the post-
1945 order at the dawn of the ‘Golden Age’ of social and economic 
transformations.303 Their “hinge” was historically the “bizarre alliance between 
liberal capitalism and communism in ‘self-defence’ against fascism.” 304  The 
period of the ‘Crisis Decades’ (1970s – 1991) was a “crisis of all forms of 
organization” and of all universalisms which did not allow a particular form of 
governance to dominate.305 For Hobsbawm, the Crisis Decades “revealed that 
human collective institutions had lost control over the collective consequences of 
human action.”306 An intrinsic feature of the international political scene from 
the 1990s onwards was an excess of power. During the 1990s, the now 
‘unencumbered’ international political and financial institutions were celebrated 
as finally ‘working’. From those distinctive but interconnected international 
institutions, those that can punish a transgression of the law in the name of 
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security and human rights are, at the same time, those who protect the subjects 
of law. According to Janie Leatherman, various disciplinary and punitive 
technologies emerged out of the Cold War: “this system of discipline and 
punishment ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.”307 Yet its end, perhaps, saw the creation of another one.308 At the end of 
the Cold War, the inviolability of the state was furthered challenged, as the 
monopoly of ‘just’ uses of military force was to be dominated by the US and its 
NATO allies. Today, military intervention for human protection purposes 
explicates a desire not to protect the state but populations. What should also be 
noted is the broader willingness to consider humanitarian military interventions 
as ‘forces of good’. For Lang, the current ‘illiberal’ order: “promotes human rights 
in specific contexts and by means of punitive practices but without being nested 
in a broader rule-governed or a constitutional order.”309 For Lang, this ‘illiberal 
order’, as opposed to a liberal one that would promote human rights and 
democracy within the context of a “constitutional order”, individual executive 
authorities exact punishments “rendering it closer to vengeance than true 
punishment” that is retributive or has a deterrent effect.310 However, retribution 
has also been characterized as unjust when it is practiced through military means 
in response to wrongdoing. Retribution and vengeance share the same roots; 
“their root is not concern for future safety”, “but indignation over past 
wrongdoing.”311  
 
Returning to the argument of this chapter, this transformation can be perceived 
further as an attempt to re-moralize the international order. Within this order, 
the primary conceptual problems are those of authority and agency. In this sense, 
re-moralization is perceived as the return to the language of justness and 
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morality - the reappearance of ‘just causes’. Does this re-moralization of 
international order also suggest an implicit return to punishment in relation to 
the protection of human rights? Where do we locate punishment, if punishment 
is considered anachronistic, and is widely absent from the discourse around 
humanitarian intervention and R2P? In turn, what are the risks of banishing 
punishment from the theorizing of responsibility in international law? 
Humanitarian interventions and punitive interventions are commonly considered 
as distinct, one is to halt violations whilst the other is to inflict harm. However, 
both share the punitive ethos: both, that is, are intended to punish those guilty of 
the violation of given norms.312 Punishment for Lang, is not a priori a negative 
element,313 it entails a reordering and a retributive function, (i.e. restoring a sense 
of balance by punishing wrongdoing, as well as serving a deterrent function).314 
The increase of punitive intervention results, for Lang, from the increasing 
deployment of military force by the United States, with an emphasis on the 
protection of human rights and ‘ethical’ foreign policy, the criminalization of war 
and the employment of more punitive responses to violations of war crimes.315  
 
The particular political structure/form of the UNSC, characterised by a consistent 
‘inconsistency’ towards mass human rights atrocities, allows certain forms of 
military intervention to pass in silence.316 In other instances, where politics result 
in ‘consensus’, it authorizes them. Yet what does ‘consensus’ mean under the 
present international societal structure? An example of punitive ‘humanitarian’ 
practice are the air-strikes against Syria on 7 April 2017. The remarkable ease in 
which Donald Trump ordered air strikes against the Shayrat airbase near Holmes, 
alleging that this was the location from which the Syrian forces launched a 
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chemical attack on the rebel-held town of Khan-Sheikhun which killed at least 80 
people, illustrates that this new ‘era’ of working security institutions proclaimed 
in the 1990s was not a juridically equal one. In purely moralising rhetoric Trump 
said the chemical had “a big impact” on him: “A chemical attack that was so 
horrific in Syria against innocent people, including women, small children and 
even beautiful little babies.”317 Such a retaliatory act with punitive connotations 
could arguably be regarded as an act of aggression if carried by a non-western 
state. Apart from a heated debate on the Security Council in which the UK gave 
full support to the US no other significant step was taken, such as a fact-finding 
mission before ordering such air-strikes and as a call to protection. 318 
 
b. Just war and the responsibility to protect: reinventing Just War 
 
The constant use of just war thinking and vocabulary has prompted John Kelsay 
to present just war thinking as a social practice.319 From one point of view, Kelsay 
is correct, to distinguish the just war vocabulary from those of international law 
or ‘strategic doctrines’. However, R2P is arguably a legal concept and is not 
normatively alien to the Just War tradition. In fact, R2P is arranged in form, 
structure and logic as a just war theory.  
 
A just war theory sets a framework for an ethical inquiry on the legitimacy of war. 
Just war theories are therefore theories of justice. They answer two fundamental 
questions, when to use violence and how to use violence. It is not an attempt to 
question the use of force per se, but rather to bracket war. A theory of war ethics 
based on just war theory wants to frame war by placing a set of threshold criteria 
which provide the rights to war (jus ad bellum) and the rights in war (jus in 
bello). Emphasis throughout the chapter will be given to the jus ad bellum, 
though it is important also to discuss jus in bello. The jus post bellum frames 
considerations of the justness of measures taken after a sustained end in military 
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operations. For the sake of brevity, jus in bello and jus post bellum will not be a 
matter of focused discussion. The argument, which foregrounds the 
responsibility to protect as just war theory is that the theoretical framework of 
just cause, proportionality and legitimate authority (now in the form of the 
UNSC) remain in place. The responsibility to protect concept wants to frame the 
right to humanitarian intervention, elaborate on its conduct and establish the 
intentions of post-intervention systems of governance. In this sense, the 
responsibility to protect and just war theories share a common denominator. 
Their intention is to articulate the conditions under which legitimate authority 
triggers the right to use violence.  
 
The intellectual history of the Just War tradition encompasses an enormous 
literature of religious, historical, philosophical and sociological writing. In recent 
years such history emerges through the academic literature on the ethics of war 
oriented broadly in political philosophy and international relations theory. Yet, 
the significance of just war thinking is not confined to that literature alone. Cian 
O’ Driscoll poses that just war is in fact the interpretative and moral lens through 
which we perceive, analyse and debate questions regarding the use of force 
internationally.320 Being the predominant medium of inquiry, suggests that just 
war theory and its thinking were - and are - not only used by academics, 
historians and scholars. It is an ethical language, filled with distinctions, binaries, 
histories and world-views, also used by international political actors and the 
wider international society. It is typical to come across news articles, political and 
legal debates which are characterized by the language and thinking of the 
tradition. On the day the Chilcot report from the Iraq inquiry was officially 
published, Chilcot stated: “We have concluded that the UK chose to join the 
invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. 
Military action at the time was not a last resort.”321 The principle of last resort, a 
criterion of just war reasoning, acquired its status in the professional legal 
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vocabulary of armed force as a result of it being conventionalized through 
statesmen and international actors when they debate the ‘justness’ of the use of 
military force in international relations both in political and in legal terms. This 
adds to the significance of the Just War tradition in the history of ideas as a 
whole. However, according to Nicholas Onuf, reviving an ethical tradition risks 
being a disaster: “Reinventing a tradition is at best a patch-job, at worst a 
delusion.”322 The tradition’s persistence and adaptability as an ethical framework 
for the use of force does not suggest that its system and framework of ethics 
should escape critique but the opposite.  
 
Luke Glanville indicates that the responsibility to protect concept does not 
represent a radical departure from traditional notions of sovereignty.323 The 
mainstream claim, contra Glanville, rests on the assumption that sovereignty in 
its traditional form enjoys an unfettered right to non-interference in its domestic 
affairs. This statist approach of sovereignty has served as an argument against 
humanitarian intervention by oppressive and abusive regimes. Conversely, it has 
been used as a counter-argument by pro-interventionists against all non-
interventionist positions, condemning them of protecting oppressive regimes. 
Glanville supports that sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
entailed both rights and responsibilities, which persisted to evolve through to the 
present day, thus articulating a constitutive and contingent notion of 
sovereignty.324 Glanville’s historical trajectory is valued but it is also a limited 
reading in relation to the concept of the responsibility to protect. If we rather 
substitute sovereignty with moral and political authority more broadly we are 
presented with a wider historical trajectory. Through this lens, the point of 
departure for a critique of the responsibility to protect is the Just War tradition, 
which predates the concept of state sovereignty.  
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A very important element of just war theory is the notion of legitimate authority. 
Just war theories are conventionalized and used to the extent they correspond to 
the morality of the particular political and legal authority for which they become 
a mechanism. Under this understanding, in the present international order, the 
responsibility to protect ‘uses’ the concept of state sovereignty to establish a 
claim for protection that ultimately transcends the state. Military interventions 
are decided collectively and are normatively grounded in one international 
authority - the international community. In this sense, R2P wants to provide the 
conditions under which universal authority takes precedence over state 
authority. However, in another sense, the responsibility to protect includes two 
notions of political and legal authority. Paradoxically its legitimacy is achieved 
through state responsibility and is further enhanced through the rule of 
sovereign equality and state sovereignty.325 Therefore, the notion of responsibility 
in R2P is twofold. There is (a.), the responsibility of the state for ‘large scale loss 
of life’, and also includes (b.), the responsibility of the international community to 
protect whereas a state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to fulfil its responsibility. 
Nonetheless, the responsibility to protect concept is not presented as an attempt 
to provide a concept of international authority. It provides for international 
jurisdiction but not for international moral authority, since political authority 
always resides with the state. The question of political authority in the 
responsibility to protect concept is returned back to the state. This is one of the 
conclusions of the 2005 World Summit in which the limits of universal 
jurisdiction were discussed and the norm of equal state sovereignty was 
reiterated. However, the Summit also agreed to an extensive role of international 
criminal jurisdiction that includes the notion of punishing violations of 
international law.326 Further, the Summit endorsed the broad idea behind the 
responsibility to protect concept. As such, the responsibility to protect derives 
authority from a rather chaotic framework. It attempts to create a functional 
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universal jurisdiction, with the right to use force to protect and punish, that is cut 
off from notions of international authority and specifically from notions of 
international moral authority. In this sense, it is also a normative framework that 
provides the possibility to be interpreted and understood as apolitical and amoral 
– a neutral framework under which decisions to use force can be considered. To 
this end, and to examine the effects of the concept, R2P is better seen in a 
negative fashion as “antipolitical” rather than as mere “political rhetoric”.327  
 
So what kind of authority and what kind of ethics does the responsibility to 
protect concept represent? If the responsibility to protect concept provides for 
universal jurisdiction, can we have a working universal jurisdictional authority 
that is apolitical, non-ideological and amoral? Is not the regulation of the use of 
violence to halt mass human right atrocities already an ethical, moral and 
ideological stance? One of the arguments of the chapter is that the use of 
violence for human protection purposes is a political and moral claim.  
 
As Ian Clark noted, it is impossible to trace just war theory to a single 
foundational doctrine, neither is it possible to establish its emergence from a 
single idea.328 The literature around just war theory is a battlefield. It is occupied 
by a relentless inventory of different interpretations of what the Just War 
tradition is, how just war theory should be read and how it should be used. 
Clarke recommends that we see just war ‘at best’ as a ‘tradition’: 
“a set of themes and tropes that has developed across centuries, and drawing from 
diverse strands of intellectual endeavour, … subject to constant revision and adaptation. 
The specific emphases and the balance between its various components, have remained 
far from constant…[However], it is a living tradition that has demonstrated considerable 
persistence and adaptability.”329  
For example, Alex J. Bellamy in his treatment of the Just War tradition From 
Cicero to Iraq demonstrates that Just War tradition is neither linear nor single in 
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its form. It is an amalgam of connected traditions, at times competing and at 
other times collaborative, drawing a framework under which acts of violence are 
to be judged.330 For Bellamy, the tradition “provides a legitimacy framework for 
war” that encompasses legality, morality and constitutionality through 
respectively positive law, natural law and political realism in historical 
progression.331 Hence, what is to be realised as ‘just’ varies. This insistence in an 
articulation of the historical trajectory of just war thinking, followed by scholars 
of the just war tradition, results perhaps from the understanding that the nature 
of the arguments one can find in just war theory are political and contextual, 
located in historical epochs but also connected with contemporary ethical and 
security dilemmas of the use of military force. However, telling the story of the 
Just War tradition and articulating what is considered just in each historical 
epoch should not be seen as a neutral and apolitical exercise. In fact, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter, the existence of ‘classical’ or ‘contemporary’ 
approaches to just war theory, reveal that the approach one takes is a political 
position. Most of the time a historical trajectory of just war theory will culminate 
into various arguments favouring some causes and forms of war and 
delegitimizing others. In this sense, taking a position as to what is just and what 
just war theory upholds entails is a rhetorical activity. Rhetorical activity, 
especially concerning the use of military force for humanitarian purposes should 
not be an unchallenged and disregarded terrain of socio-legal analysis. For 
example, looking at international law as a rhetorical activity is significant in 
realizing the manufacturing and internalization processes of international rules 
and regulations regarding the rights to and in war. As O’Driscoll rightly states: 
“rhetoric is never merely rhetoric: it establishes the conditions of possibility that 
circumscribe international politics”. 332  It is argued here that just war theory and 
the responsibility to protect concept are primarily rhetorical tools, used as modes 
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of moral argumentation and as a specific discourse of international law on the 
use of force. 
 
c. Punishing wrongdoing: the ambiguous origins of humanitarianism 
 
The Christian approach to the problem of violence and war has been greatly 
influenced by Greek philosophy, most notably by Plato and Aristotle, Roman 
legal thinking and natural law precepts. The Christian and theological approach 
subsequently sustained, intellectually and juridically, the Western conception of 
the use of force. The intellectual pedigree of just war thinking emerges through 
the writings of theologians, such as Augustine of Hippo (St Augustine) and 
Thomas Aquinas. These theologians made great use of notions of good and of evil 
and of justness through faith.333 Medieval philosophy, and in particular medieval 
scholastics, played a significant role in expanding theories of natural rights and 
theories of rights in relation to war. Hence, just war thinking became more 
formally elaborated in medieval Europe and informed the early theories of 
international law during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.334  
 
All of these theologians gave a primary emphasis on war as being a disdained 
ordeal on humanity even if a war is just.335 Aquinas in his Summa Theologica, 
begins his questions ‘On War’ by stressing that all wars are unlawful, and all wars 
are sinful.336 In this light, just war theories can be seen as a compromise between 
aggression and pacifism. Interestingly, throughout the Middle Ages and in the 
High Middle Ages, the crusade - as a juridical institution - was not assimilated 
into just war theories. Both ecclesiastical and scholastic writers were cautious to 
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involve the Church “legally in bloodshed”.337 The crusading activity of the papacy 
was also not accessible as a topic of canonistic jurisprudence; it was passed over 
in almost total silence.338 In contrast, one idiosyncratic element brought forward 
by the theologians of the Middle Ages, as well as the scholastic tradition, was the 
attempt to combine a universal natural law with just war and political theories of 
the common good. The writings of Francisco de Vitoria and the School of 
Salamanca, expanded on the understanding of just war as articulated by Aquinas 
and influenced these early theories of jus gentium (the law of nations). These 
works predisposed a turn towards secular jurisdiction: “Ironically, the real victors 
of the medieval just war were the new monarchs of early modern Europe.”339 The 
notion of justice became assimilated to that of legality.340 For example, the 
Decretalists, under the notion of supreme authority, turned away from 
considerations of just cause and towards considerations of authorities and 
jurisdictions. 341  Just war theories were thus viable to the extent that they 
corresponded to emerging transformations of order, for example to the rise of 
national monarchies.342 Thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, 
connected together various notions of the tradition, forming a Western cultural 
consensus on the use of force in international law.  
 
Most of these seminal works on just war, natural rights and law, became 
celebrated in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the 
advent of international law and the juridical transformation of the post-1945 
international order. Thus, they have also served the function of an intellectual 
basis for modern variants of just war theory and of accounts on the use of force 
for humanitarian purposes in international law. Again, to the extent they 
corresponded to the juridical transformations of historical international order. 
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Dating back to St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, the primary responsibilities of 
the prince were the establishment and maintenance of order, both with regards 
to internal disobedience and external threats: the restoration of justice through 
the punishment of wrongdoing; and to reclaim captives or property that had 
been seized by neighboring armies.343 As Frederick H. Russell notes, Augustinian 
thought persisted and was incorporated in theories of both lawyers and 
theologians. Warfare was perceived “as a function of divine providence designed 
to punish sin and crime.”344 Further, Roman law provided that no one except a 
legitimate political authority could wage a just war under certain legal 
conditions.345 O’Driscoll suggests that in medieval times we find three just causes 
of war: punishment, the righting of a wrong and self-defence.346 This view can 
also be located in Suarez and Vitoria.347 This point is significant because it 
showcases that for those writers punishment was considered as a legitimate cause 
of war and explicitly used as a justification. Ernst Nys also suggests that Vitoria 
returns on this point on several occasions, by appealing to breaches of the law of 
nations which demands an authority able to protect the good and innocent from 
being harmed. Punishment for humanitarian reasons works as retribution.  
 
Legitimacy to use violence for humanitarian purposes is also justified upon a 
feeling of love.348 War against the barbarous was considered unlawful unless 
invoked by a ruler for the purposes of protecting innocent victims.349 Punitive 
war entails the idea of enforcing the law and ridding the world of evil; “non 
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resisting love has sometimes to grapple with evil.”350 In this sense, humanitarian 
intervention is not only permitted it is necessitated. Indeed ‘Christian love’ and 
universalism together with Vitoria’s insistence on treating all peoples equally 
under a judicial system where “princes are posited as judges responsible for 
prosecuting any violation of natural rights on the writ of the law of nations” is 
what led James Brown Scott and others to celebrate Vitoria’s ecumenical 
humanitarianism and internationalism.351 Vitoria became known to international 
lawyers and used in such extent, for his treatment of the Other, in relation to the 
newly found lands of America and its inhabitants.352 These Others occupied 
newfound lands, full of riches and, prima facie, property not belonging to anyone 
and waiting to be claimed.  
 
Las Casas, Sepulveda and Vitoria lived at a time of European expansionism and of 
conquest. The New World was discovered at the time of consolidation of the 
Spanish Empire. The discovery of the New World opened up the imagination of 
the Europeans, who attempted to consolidate early modern theories of natural 
law and rights with the emerging science of international law. It was an event: 
“the greatness of which cannot be exaggerated… the addition of an immense field 
to the theatre of human activity and the inclusion of the whole globe within the 
scope of man’s political activities.” 353  Truthful to the Christian ‘love thy 
neighbour’, princes may carry out wars to protect the barbarians and indeed 
those suffering others from injustice.354 Jean Bethke Elshtain considers the work 
of St. Augustine, rather than Vitoria’s, as seminal for the practice of humanitarian 
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intervention. Yet again, it is through the responsibility of the sovereign to care for 
the innocent.355  
 
The right of punishment (ius gladii) which a majority of scholars trace in Grotius 
is a secular natural law right derived from the individual’s right of 
chastisement.356 States in their capacity as individuals in the international realm 
retained this right.357 Thus, despite the religious connotations we still find in 
Grotius, the right to punish and the duty to protect are natural law rights of a law 
of nations, pertaining to the sphere of natural justice and of morality. It is in 
another sense a universal juridical ordering of the right of punishment and the 
obligation to defend the state, the order and individuals. It is in Grotius, Simon 
Chesterman suggests, that we can trace the origins of what became known as 
humanitarian intervention: “the quasi-judicial police measure of war against the 
immoral and the waging of war on behalf of others.”358 In Grotius we can find in 
part an overt interconnection of punishment and of humanitarian intervention, 
associated with the protection of innocent aliens. According also to Lang: 
“Grotius makes a stronger case for punishment as an action that can contribute to a just 
order by claiming that force can be used to punish those who violate the right of their 
own citizens… Grotius provides us with the first justification for a punitive intervention 
in support of human rights.”359 
Additionally, David Luban notes:  
“the punishment theory of just cause is a corollary of one of Grotiu’s most important 
doctrines: the universal right of individuals to punish violations of natural law, which is a 
doctrine still cited today by proponents of humanitarian military intervention as well as 
of universal criminal jurisdiction.”360  
One needs not to reconstruct the whole Just War tradition, in order to uncover 
the traditions’ elements of protection and punishment. Yet, just war theorists and 
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legal theorists have treated these elements as principles differently. For example, 
early modern theorists have broadly defined similarities yet maintain divergent 
views on the application of such principles.361 There is not one consistent Just 
War tradition carrying both structure and principles to the modern period. The 
difficulty of genealogically mapping such principles lies in the diversity of 
interpretations and treatments of early modern texts by legal and just war 
scholars, who sought to construct them as dialogues between normative 
perspectives found in those early modern texts.362 This is why the notions of love, 
of protection and punishment predominantly are treated here as elements and 
not as principles, as broad notions within rhetoric and language. Their 
advancement and configurations into rigid principles requires a much more 
detailed account which can only be done correctly through the reading of both 
the original texts and the various contradicting interpretations of scholars. This is 
a very interesting task, yet beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, for the early modern writers, the articulation of war as a method of 
punishment was not eccentric.363 Luban asserts that the notion of punishing 
wrongdoing, which allows states to engage in war as a means of retribution, has 
been a constitutive element of Western just war theory since its inception. It was 
only during the last two centuries, Luban suggests, that theorists began to 
distance themselves from this theory of punishment. Most importantly it may be 
argued that the actual rejection of punishment theory did not take place until the 
end of WWII.364 Lest we accept one account over another on the origins of 
western humanitarianism, for the purposes of this argument, there is an essential 
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aspect underlying its practice. In just war theory it is its relationship with a 
punitive ethos, through the responsibility of the sovereign to protect the 
vulnerable, itself and the order.365 Sovereign authority holds both the right to 
protect and the right to punish. This suggests that it is an enduring element of 
any just war theory, whether rooted in divine or secular authority.  
 
State behaviour implies that even with the advent of positivism and the Charter 
prohibitions on the use of force, both humanitarian and punitive practices were 
exercised, albeit not explicitly justified as such by states and parties. Gould 
asserted that international punishment in its Grotian version lost its prevalence 
in international society upon the introduction of par in parem non habet 
imperium. However, he proposes: 
“this is not to say that state behavior changed entirely, but states had to go through more 
contortions to justify punitive action taken against another state, sometimes by 
legislating the other outside the bounds of international society, and increasingly by 
reference to what would become humanitarian intervention.”366  
 
Indeed, the legal tradition of positivism in international law played a significant 
role here in removing an explicit justification of punishment.367 If one is to study 
the historical trajectory of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘punishment’ from a strictly 
positivist and legal perspective, one is to assert that both were excluded or 
overtly limited upon the introduction of rigid conceptions of equality between 
sovereigns. Harry Gould suggests that “international punishment was rooted in 
and legitimated by a particular understanding of sovereignty and specific 
understandings of the source and character of obligation; in their absence, 
punishment could no longer serve to satisfy the jus ad bellum criterion.”368 It can 
be observed that with the creation of international legal institutions there was a 
transition from a broad notion of political authority to a more restricted notion 
of legitimate and legal authority. The notion of sovereignty and equal sovereignty 
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could not logically entail a legal articulation of a right of punishment in its 
Grotian formulation.369 It seems that it is exactly the institutionalization of 
punishment in international criminal justice together with the Charter 
prohibitions, which made any reference to punishment as a just cause of war 
inconceivable.  
 
What international law on the use of force post-WWII succeeded in doing was to 
further separate the jus ad bellum from jus in bello. Whatever the reasons for 
going to war (jus ad bellum), whether the war is just or unjust, its rules of conduct 
(jus in bello) always apply. Of course, this further distinction had profound 
consequences in international law post-1945. It cultivated the emergence of 
international criminal trials and the indictment of leaders for the commission of 
international crimes, as well as the creation of international humanitarian law. 
Significantly the majority of leaders, which were indicted by the ICC so far, are 
African.370 Nevertheless, the stricter separation of the rights to war and in war 
had another important ramification. Jus ad bellum considerations were 
significantly put aside. With the creation of the UN, its Charter and further with 
the establishment of the UNSC as the decision-making body on the use of force, 
the questions of right intention and just cause became entwined together with 
the last resort criterion. They were to be found legally in the resolutions of the 
UNSC. In practice this phenomenon pushes states to justify unilateral violence 
claimed on ‘security threats’, by stretching the meaning of the right to self-
defence. Whereas the justification involves the defence of peoples in other 
countries, and whereas collective mechanisms are defective, the result fluctuates 
between an ex post facto legitimation or a condemnation.371 International law is 
discredited irrespective of either the former or the latter result. These practices 
are most of the times straightforwardly punitive. The justification entails 
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rationales of preventive protection, either for the state, the order, or individuals. 
An example of such justification was claimed by the US in 2003 against Iraq and 
Saddam Hussein in particular for the possession of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs). R2P broadly covers under one rather incoherent concept of 
international authority such uses of force. Thus, it also internalizes and 
institutionalizes the practice of punishment in such a jumbled framework. It is 
relevant to say here that in the case of an abuse, misuse or even non-use of R2P, 
its unfulfilled responsibility will not be taken as a result of state action but the 
result of the actions or inactions of the ‘international community’. Blane and 
Kingsbury asserted:  
“the idea of forcible punishment of states and peoples is for good reason regarded by 
most international lawyers, if they think about it at all, as an awful one. At its extremes it 
might seem to countenance annexation and annihilation of states, genocide and 
ethnocide of peoples, terrorism and arbitrary violence without any trials, and self-
appointed thugs adding a sheen of legality to their violent imposition of their own values 
and power… [however] …standard political logics of international relations recognized by 
international lawyers lead toward a logic and indeed a practice of punishment.”372 
 
Through this lens, it is the language of punishment as a rhetorical justification 
that has been banished and not the notion of protection through punishment. 
Instead, the punishing of wrongdoing through protection in the form of 
humanitarian interventions was also, in this sense, institutionalized. Further, if 
the logic and practice of punishment is carried out in a legal framework but 
becomes articulated through it as practices of protection, how do we define or 
describe punishment? Who is being protected and who is being punished? Is it 
the state, the order, or the individual?  
 
Protection in defence of rights, whatever these rights may be, can transform into 
a war punishing violations of order. In this sense what seems to be important is 
the moral and legal framework of order. In fact, there are two important things to 
notice. First, the enduring criterion of legitimate authority makes a just war 
theory an end in itself. It begins and finishes in authority even if others are its 
occasional beneficiaries. So different variations of just war thinking as applied 
ethical techniques of weighting justness may differ yet the role and power of 
																																																								




authority to exact punishment and deliver it as protection within the order 
remains intact.  Secondly, it is the practice of war and the use of violence to deter 
or avenge a wrong committed that amounts to punishment.373 Thus, it is not only 
intention or motive that makes war as punishment. The criterion of legitimate 
authority is perhaps much more important. Perceived in this form, the practice of 
humanitarian intervention is what comes closer to policing. The imposition of 
justified moral or legal violence in military form, exacted through international 
institutions, can be seen as a method of disciplining and punishing. Rationales of 
protection turn out to also be acts of either disciplining or punishing. The 
interplay of protection and punishment is not a juridical phenomenon of a 
particular historical epoch, it is an element rooted in notions of political and legal 
authority - of power more broadly. International authority promises to maintain 
peace and security. These claims need to be understood as moral claims of 
protection and punishment, not merely as claims of protection. 
 
d. ‘Classic’ vs. ‘contemporary’ approaches to Just War 
 
According to Johnson the ‘unified common tradition’ of the Augustinian and 
Thomist theories with a ‘coherent and systematic form’ broke apart at the 
beginning of the modern period. 374 Johnson distinguishes a classical form of just 
war theory from contemporary reinventions, which begins with Grotius and the 
secular application of various terms of just war thinking and natural law. He 
distinguishes a second stream with writers such as Pierino Belli dealing with the 
conduct in war. Further, a third stream, in the “realm of secular philosophy, 
eventuating in the ‘perpetual peace’ movement of the enlightenment era and 
“effectively losing contact with the just war idea as reflecting perennial 
necessities of statecraft.”375 Johnson’s historical view of the tradition assumes that 
it only serves its ethical purpose when it is applied as it was conceived in its 
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‘classical form’. The shift from a presumption against injustice to a presumption 
against war (1945) represents for Johnson a discontinuity in thinking, a divorce in 
our thinking between ethics and responsible statecraft. Johnson primarily wants 
to read the tradition in its classical formulation because he believes that ethical 
praxis is the result of its application, the application of the ‘authentic’ Just War 
tradition.  
 
The presumption against injustice for Johnson means a couple of things. Firstly, 
that just war should be read primarily as Christian, rooted in Aquinas.376 Proper 
authority in this case is related to the conception of the Aristotelian good of the 
community and of order. Authority in this sense is further interlinked with the 
idea of the Augustinian ‘tranqullitas ordinis’, which can also be traced to Aquinas 
and his Summa Theologica. 377  Under this order of peace, transgressions of 
international peace should be met and wrongdoing punished. Evil should be 
accountable to justice. In Johnson’s hands, Christian love draws together the 
writings of Ramsey, Suarez, Vitoria, and Augustine, and serves as a key thematic 
line in the historical development of the Just War tradition.378 For O’Driscoll: 
“Crucially, it is presented as producing a strongly interventionist ethic that does 
not distinguish between neighbor and stranger.”379  
 
Just war thinking, in Johnson’s eyes, historically and explicitly allows for war as 
punishment, including ‘humanitarian war’. This thinking contradicts both 
cosmopolitan and liberal internationalist accounts of just war, which claim that 
the essence of the just war theory framework is the regulation and delimitation of 
war with the exceptional cause of protecting human rights. The underlying 
element in the presumption against war rests on the moral claim that peace 
cannot be brought by war. It rejects violence as a means of achieving justice. 
Following Paul Ramsey, Johnson suggests that the twentieth century 
presumption against the use of force, except in self-defence, that is reflected in 
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Article 2(4), is “alien to the Just War tradition properly understood.”380 The 
presumption against the use of force and thus the formulation of exception is a 
‘middle ground’.381 Johnson claims that the international legal position against 
preemptive use of force takes justice out of the jus ad bellum. Further, that the 
aggression-defender model (i.e that the first use of force without an armed attack 
shall always be prohibited), protects the current international order at the 
expense of justice. For Johnson the legal decision-making institution on the use 
of force, the Security Council in its present form, is unable to fulfill the demands 
of international justice. Thus, Johnson regards international authority as 
presently ineffective. Hence, responsibility for moral judgments in defence of 
order, peace and the common good can be fulfilled by individual sovereign states. 
The responsibility in defence of order and of the common good of community 
extends from the domestic realm to the international. In such a world, 
punishment is of elementary importance. It is both the position of Jean Belthke 
Elshtain and Johnson that power carries more responsibility. Thus, the United 
States considering its powerful position can be the guarantor of international 
peace and security. Such accounts aim to return exclusive authority to use 
violence to the state, and not just any state.382  
 
Significantly, Johnson’s critical stance towards the ‘aggressor-defender’ model of 
international law, that is, as he suggests a pre-1999 doctrine, shifted with the 
introduction of the responsibility to protect concept. He particularly interpreted 
the concept as a return to the just war framework and hence, a return to a 
presumption against injustice. In his own words: “In 2001 The Responsibility to 
Protect (…) appeared, using (without identifying it) a just war framework to 
justify actions that override state sovereignty in the name of fundamental 
justice.”383 For Johnson it seems that the concept of the responsibility to protect is 
not problematic, quite the contrary. Rather, Johnson’ s issue is rather who has the 
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right to use it. Johnson’s historical treatment is useful in disclosing the 
persistence of intertwined themes throughout the tradition - of ‘vindictive justice’ 
and of ‘Christian love’, of punishment and protection. Johnson’s treatment also 
reveals that the responsibility to protect perhaps emerges through a presumption 
against injustice. As we shall see, his treatment works as a counter-claim to 
contemporary just war thinking and their uncritical insistence on treating the 
Just War tradition as a resource for a neutral and unproblematic juridico-moral 
framework on the use of force for human protection purposes. As already 
discussed, the explicit use of war as punishment did not banish because of an 
ethical transformation of the role and application of punishment in 
contemporary society but because it was assimilated into the centralized 
authority of collective security institutions. In this sense punishment became 
naturalized and rationalized. The argument made here is that the echoed de-
moralization of the post-1945 order was either superficial or temporary. It lasted 
as long as the transition of the former colonies into sovereign states lasted and as 
long as communism challenged the domination of capitalism.   
 
Alex J. Bellamy, a proponent of the responsibility to protect concept and a 
contemporary just war theorist, is unhappy with Johnson’s historical claim.384 For 
Bellamy the prudential criteria drawn from the Christian Just War tradition are 
not incompatible with the rules of the use of force of the post-1945 order.385 
Instead, the question of recourse to war is correctly located in the mandates of 
the Security Council. Its consensus-based decisions tackle the serious problem 
inherent in the Just War tradition; namely, unilateral uses of force based upon 
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individual just causes and unilateral conceptions of justice.386 Bellamy’s position 
is one shared by ‘juridical’ just war thinkers of a cosmopolitan character 
(hereinafter, ‘legal cosmopolitans’), by pro-R2P proponents and by liberal 
internationalists.387 This strand of juridical just war combines international law, 
the authority of UNSC and ethics as just war theory. This position is the most 
prominent among both academics and policy-makers - it is the UN’s position. For 
this strand, just war theory represents more of a concern with the legitimacy of 
the use of force, and less of a reflection on the use of force as such.388 It is a 
method of casuistry and does not question the moral claims of the theory. The 
thinking of the juridical/cosmopolitan just war theorists is similar to that of 
liberal institutionalists. Some examples are Robert Keohane and Allen 
Buchanan. 389  The ideal scenario for pro-R2P supporters is to further 
institutionalize the responsibility to protect concept and establish a broader 
consensus. Pro-R2P supporters tend to show quite surprising levels of faith in the 
decision-making powers and nature of the UNSC and to international institutions 
broadly. The difference between Johnson/Elshtain and Bellamy, the 
juridical/cosmopolitan just war and liberal institutionalist camp, is not so much 
the distinction between a presumption against war and a presumption against 
injustice. It is their conceptions on proper authority that differ; in other words 
their distinction is on agency. It is more a procedural distinction than an ethical 
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Louise Arbour’s position on R2P helps to illustrate that the distinction is 
procedural rather than moral. She explicitly links the responsibility to protect 
concept (humanitarian war) to war as punishment. 390  Her position can be 
situated in the legal cosmopolitan camp. Arbour suggests that both the 
Convention on the prohibition and punishment of Genocide and the Genocide 
case represent “a recognition of genocide as part of international law deserving of 
punishment,” 391  and that the elements of R2P, including the element of 
punishment, flow from the established rules of the criminalization of genocide. 
In relation to the Genocide case, she furthermore argues: “the key legal lesson in 
the Court’s opinion is that the prevention of Genocide is a legal obligation, and it 
is a justiciable obligation that one state effectively owes to the citizens of another 
state, outside its own territory.”392 Arbour makes her case in support of the norm 
as a “duty of care” by focusing upon the established ICISS pillars of the concept, 
that is to prevent, to react and rebuild. She grounds her argument on the legacy 
of the Genocide Convention, as part of a “collective toolbox”, a blueprint for 
action, which for her furthers and boosts this new vision of human security. She 
remarks that the concept is about creativity and flexibility and “should not 
become a conceptual – and operative – straightjacket”. 393  She has faith in 
strategies and mechanisms such as “early-warning development”, “fact-finding”, 
“good office diplomacy”, “sanctions”, “institution activation”, “resource 
allocation”, and an overall conviction that the “UN are equipped to help States 
implement the doctrine”.394 She seems to be willing to accept that the bad days 
are gone and that a bright future of working international institutions will pave 
the way, of not only reacting to, but preventing mass atrocities and being capable 
of engaging in post-conflict reconstruction: “it presents itself with intellectual 
clarity, political usefulness, and I hope, eventually legal enforceability.”395 Her 
conviction for the soundness of the doctrine and its legal quality is grounded on 
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the belief that the norm embraces the victim’s point of view rather than 
questionable state-centric motivations. It does so, by configuring a permanent 
duty to protect individuals against a state’s criminal behaviour. Arbour’s hope is 
more centralization, more universalization, more institutionalization.  
 
In contrast, Carsten Stahn, also a lawyer, explicitly cautions against the use of 
R2P as a punitive tool and against folding criminal justifications with 
justifications for military intervention for human protection purposes. For Stahn 
this understanding becomes possible if we attend to the “semantics of 
intervention”, that being how the intervention was morally justified.396 In the 
context of the Syrian conflict, the moral justifications of humanitarian protection, 
punishment and deterrence on the threat or use of military force were all 
asserted at the same time. In September 4, 2013 Barack Obama stated: 
 
“We have been very clear to the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground, 
that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving 
around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my 
equation.”397  
 
Between August and September in 2013, military air strikes were considered as a 
response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government 
against civilians but were averted through a political and diplomatic settlement 
under Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013). Stahn claimed that rationales and 
justifications of criminal law should not be used in relation to the threat or use of 
force. In other words, the criminal language of deterrence, punishment and 
accountability should remain within the scope of individual criminal 
responsibility and should not transgress into the area of state responsibility. 
According to Stahn: “humanitarianism was invoked as entitlement to justify 
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action that is ‘punitive’ in nature, outside the realm of self-defense or collective 
security.”398 Further, he suggests: 
 
“under a practice of humanitarian logic, safety and protection must take precedence over 
accountability interests… discourse in military intervention turned this logic on its head 
and used protection as a means to achieve accountability through military force.”399  
 
Stahn makes an attempt to ‘save’ the concept from overarching abuse by 
attaching to R2P a less coercive attribute: “R2P has never been purely an enabling 
tool to facilitate intervention. It serves as a constraint to unilateral action.”400 
Stahn’s remarks are noteworthy and expose the contradictory logics inherent in 
R2P. However, the ICISS did not ban unilateral action, it tacitly accepts and 
morally justifies such military actions by ‘coalitions of the willing’.  
 
To make a point, the linking of authority and protection, says Orford “is 
presented as a solution to the problem of creating political order in situations 
where such order is non-existent”.401 The fact that Bellamy, Johnson, Arbour and 
even Stahn can find consensus under R2P is worrying. Because they claim to 
occupy such different positions in relation to thinking about war, there 
consensus indicates that R2P can fulfil different functions for diverse actors. 
Their agreement highlights the inadequate and contradictory ethical, political 
and security claims which underpin the concept, and confusion over conceptions 
of proper authority. This is perhaps the result of adapting and reinventing a 
tradition in a rather uncritical manner.  
 
e. Walzer’s ethics and R2P 
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Michael Walzer’s theory of just war has been incorporated into the U.S Military 
Academy as a standard text and subsequently it became a key text for a variety of 
military conferences and lectures on the morals of war. It has also served as the 
basis for a new generation of moral accounts on just war, humanitarian 
intervention and the responsibility to protect concept. As Orford stated: “R2P is 
the logical end-point of the arguments made in Just and Unjust Wars and more 
broadly by the pro-humanitarian activists of the 1990s.”402 Walzer’s theory of just 
war is one that is espoused by a wide spectrum of academics and policy makers. 
As such, both broad and narrow accounts of just war find their home in Walzer’s 
just war theory. Most importantly, Walzer’s theory can be deployed both as a 
restraint to the conduct of war but also be used as a strategic tool to justify 
violence. Walzer’s just war theory is not an attempt to minimize violence and 
conflict but rather to naturalize the use of force.  
 
Walzer’s work was not the first attempt to revive just war theory during the post-
WWII period. In 1968, Paul Ramsey had already suggested that the moral claims 
of going to war and of conduct in war, based on Christian and theological just 
war reasoning traced back to St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, produce 
prudential statecraft and responsible use of force. 403  Johnson followed Paul 
Ramsey closely. Walzer’s original input however, was his own declared 
detachment from theologically oriented Just War. Just and Unjust Wars made 
little reference to classic just war thinkers. Walzer posed that the moral 
arguments made in Just and Unjust Wars are part of the common language we 
use in arguing about war. The account of justice expounded in Walzer’s just war 
is ontologically grounded in morality, reason and human rights. Walzer produces 
a rights based just war theory, which he suggests sits between the apologetic 
realist argument, “all’s fair and natural in war”, and the insufficient ‘legalist 
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paradigm’ of positive international law.404  Rengger calls Walzer’s theory the 
“compassionate view”, that war must sometimes be necessarily fought but it must 
also be possible to fight it justly and well.405 From this lens, Walzer’s attempt is 
reminiscent of the scholastic tradition and of early modern theorists that ended 
up in forming a Western cultural consensus on the use of force combining 
elements of natural law, just war and the emerging laws of nations. Likewise, 
from the same lens it overlaps with contemporary just war approaches such as 
Bellamy’s. 
 
Walzer’s disclaimer, written as an introduction to the book, represents a 
reference point for his methodological approach and offers some insights into his 
moral thinking on war more broadly. It is Walzer’s claim that he is writing as a 
political activist and a partisan. He is concerned: “precisely with the present 
structure of the moral world”.406 The argument of the book, he states, is “a 
comprehensive view of war as a human activity and a more or less systematic 
moral doctrine.”407  Even though Walzer claims to be introducing as to the 
“common language” of just war, he also describes a constituting, historical and 
contextual nature of war. Specifically, he says: “At particular points in time, it 
takes shape in particular ways, and sometimes at least in ways that resist ‘the 
utmost exertion of forces.’ What is war and what is not-war is in fact something 
that people decide (I don’t mean by taking a vote).”408 The constructivist account 
of war, which Walzer provides here, contradicts his major claim of an ethics of 
just war of an ecumenical character with transcendental appeal.  
 
Appealing both to broad and narrow accounts of just war reasoning, suggests an 
appeal to broad and narrow just causes of war. Additionally, appealing both to 
broad and narrow conceptions of use of force point out to flexible categories of 
‘crimes’ and ‘wrongs’. As Walzer claims: “the argument of justice incorporates 
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prudential considerations.” 409  Nonetheless, he does not have a problem in 
admitting the casuistic character of his theory. Walzer’s historical illustrations 
open up a forum of argumentation in which the theorist, the philosopher, or the 
individual can then incorporate their own political thesis on a particular case, 
without nullifying Walzer’s elementary just war principle – the defence of life and 
liberty. It is not hard to think, then, why Walzer’s theory is attractive to so many 
audiences. In his own words: “the formula is permissive, but it implies 
restrictions that can be usefully unpacked only with reference to particular 
cases.”410 The historical illustrations presented in the book are opening up a 
territory of competing claims and are an open field for revision and expansion. 
Walzer here suggests open-endedness in terms of the possibilities of both 
revision and of the moral judgments we are to make.411 Constraints are only posed 
through the case studies as casuistic and reflective judgments on the merits of 
each case. Here, Walzer makes an appeal to reason. Reading history and telling a 
narrative in which particular claims to justness are made is a political act. It can 
be both revolutionary, to open up new possibilities for present dilemmas, but it 
can also preserve certain ethical understandings.412 Therefore, using historical 
cases to provide constraints or criteria in relation to war is not unproblematic or 
neutral. It justifies the politico-ethical aims of the narrator. In this case, it 
satisfies Walzer’s aim in revising the ‘legalist paradigm’.413   
 
Both in the introduction and throughout the book, Walzer indicates that the 
vocabulary of international law is an insufficient account of ‘our’ moral 
arguments. Equating international law with the UN he says: “its decrees do not 
command intellectual or moral respect”.414 This vocabulary and language, “the 
legalist paradigm”, is grounded on the theory of aggression, which derives its 
essence from the domestic analogy, however “sometimes” this analogy for Walzer 
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is not sufficient. 415  States or ‘political communities’ retain their rights to 
territorial integrity and political independence, as individuals possessing rights 
and duties within a state. Even though Walzer declares that he wants to depart 
from legalist accounts, in great extent he grounds his version of humanitarian 
intervention in legal terms, and particularly to a state-centred conception of 
rights. The rights to life and liberty represent for Walzer the elementary rights of 
collective living. The moral standing of a state depends upon the protection of 
both individual life and liberty and ‘shared’ life and liberty. “Given a genuine 
contract”, he says, “it makes sense to say that territorial integrity can be defended 
in exactly the same way as individual life and liberty.”416 Walzer does not consider 
regime change as a just cause, yet, he understands that in such cases intervening 
states have a mandate for political but not for cultural transformation. In 
addition, prolonged and sustained regime change, (in the form of trusteeships 
and protectorates), is to be preferred than a short intervention, and democracy as 
the system of governance. It is not hard to see the difficulty here in a mandate for 
political but not for cultural transformation.417 The line that separates the cultural 
from the political realm is a very thin one, arguably marginal and perhaps even 
fictional.  
 
One of the most curious features of Walzer’s account, is a continuous oscillation 
between the particular and the universal. It is an account of justice grounded 
both on the diversity of individual cultural and political communities and in a 
universal rights theory. This oscillation mirrors the concept of authority in the 
responsibility to protect concept. Both responsibility and political authority 
oscillate between the state and the international. This phenomenon can be 
described as a tension between moral authority and universal jurisdiction.  
 
Arguably, both the humanitarian element in Just and Unjust wars and the appeal 
to justice and morality, transforms Walzer’s arguments into a presumption 
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against injustice and not a presumption against intervention. In ‘Arguing about 
War’ published in 2004, Walzer becomes even more permissive: “I haven’t 
dropped my presumption against intervention but I have found it easier and 
easier to override the presumption.”418 In Walzer, one can trace the ‘right to 
humanitarian intervention’, a right which is based upon the notion of ‘crimes 
that shock the conscience of the mankind’.419 In fact, Walzer poses: “… the 
doctrine I shall expound is in its philosophical form a doctrine of human 
rights.”420  The paradoxes and inquiries of rights (intention, violence to halt 
violence, war to end war) are ‘subsidiary’. Humanitarian intervention is for 
Walzer what comes closer to law enforcement and police work. Thus, as 
discussed in the previous section, humanitarian rationales are here explicitly 
linked with punitive ones. If a government is engaged in massacres it is a criminal 
government, in such a case intervention is morally justified and any state that is 
capable of stopping the slaughter has a right to do so.421 In one sense, Walzer was 
ahead of his time in terms of valuing the rights of individuals and human rights 
as the centre of a just international order. This is not to suggest that arguments 
favouring intervention in defence of human rights were not already taking shape. 
While Walzer claims that international lawyers were only concerned with the 
letter of the law, lawyers were also already addressing the moral arguments 
against the blank prohibition to non-use of force.422 Sovereignty was increasingly 
being comprehended as contingent upon compliance with certain moral 
universal standard of human rights.423 For example, David Luban advocated for a 
reworked version of Just War and jus ad bellum and for a redefinition of the 
concept of legitimacy and of the definition of aggression. In his view, a 
redefinition of sovereignty should be read as follows: “A legitimate state has a 
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right of aggression because people have a right to their legitimate state.” Luban 
also asserted that: “the concept of sovereignty is morally flaccid, not because it 
applies to illegitimate regimes but because it is inconsistent to the entire 
dimension of legitimacy.”424  
 
Under the present definition, both legitimate and illegitimate states are protected 
from foreign intervention and this is what, for Luban, is morally and legally 
problematic. Illegitimate states should lose their right to non-intervention. 
Consequently, jus ad bellum and just war theory should be directly defined with 
reference to human rights while discussions regarding states are deemed 
unnecessary.425 An illegitimate state shall be legally estopped from international 
protection. Luban criticizes Walzer (and John Stuart Mill) by claiming that both 
Mill and Walzer are wrong to evaluate legitimacy on grounds of self-
determination and horizontal consent,426 and advances a theory of sovereignty 
grounded upon the protection of, what Luban calls, “socially basic human rights” 
attached to the principle of proportionality, as the minimal criterion for the 
state’s legitimacy.427 Luban rests his case on what he considers successful regime 
overthrows and interventions, such as the Nicaraguan revolution in 1978 against 
the Somoza regime, Tanzania’s aggression towards Uganda and the conquest of 
Cambodia by Vietnam. He further regards the juxtaposition of the rights of states 
on the one hand, and socially basic human rights on the other, as 
“incommensurable”.428 These arguments are similar to the arguments made by 
the lawyer Fernando Tesón, however Tesón also adds that this thinking is the 
liberal case for humanitarian intervention and is self-consciously Kantian.429 
When there is “overwhelming evidence” that the state enjoys no legitimacy, 
proved by “active and virtually universal struggle against it” an intervention is 
“morally justified, even in the absence of massacre and slavery” and subsequently, 
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the jus ad bellum, should be “casuistically stretched” to correspond to moral 
judgment.430  
 
Even though Luban and Tesón criticize Walzer at several points, their arguments 
are not starkly different, however, Luban and Tesón propose a slightly more 
flexible theory on the use of force in defence of human rights. All reflect the 
position in support of humanitarian interventions where other states or the 
‘international community’ have a moral reason to intervene; for Walzer the life 
and liberty of individuals is defensible and for Luban and Tesón some socially 
basic human rights must always be upheld. Nevertheless, the historical context in 
which Walzer and Luban wrote did not allow for the ‘re-moralization’ of 
international order just yet. Cold war dynamics and the involvement of powerful 
states in intra-state conflicts, the arms race and the fear of nuclear annihilation 
suggested that for international law and the UN in particular it was safer to stick 
to the non-intervention prohibition.431  
 
Ronan O’Callaghan suggests that Walzer’s ethics are ‘auto-effective’.432 It is an 
ethics based on similarity rather than alterity: “ethical responsibility begins with 
the coherent communal subject and responsibility is defined in terms of the 
relations between members”.433 The existence of a coherent self-determining 
subject makes the inter-communal rules of war possible. For O’ Callaghan, who 
uses Derrida’s concept of subjectivity as critique, Walzer’s autopoietic 
understanding of subjectivity, community, as well as meaning, is ontologically 
insufficient.434 This O’Callaghan suggests is a form of ‘secular theology’, since the 
discourse on rights provides Walzer with a universal structure through which the 
latter is able to theorize morality in war.435 In Walzer’s own words: “What we 
ought to do when we face outward is determined by divine or natural law, or by a 
conception of human rights, or by a utilitarian calculation in which everyone’s 
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interest, and not those up and down the hierarchy, must be counted.”436 The 
extent in which Luban, for example, differentiates with Walzer, is not 
ontological. In fact, the origin of their ethical responsibility is quite similar. 
Instead of attending to an idea of a coherent self-determining subject, Luban, 
Tesón and Bellamy, begin with a coherent ‘international’ subject and then 
responsibility is defined in terms of ‘their’ shared values, as liberal and equal 
members. This version of ethical responsibility is still an ethics based on 
similarity rather than alterity. It is not the place here to discuss the implications 
of a global ethical responsibility towards the other, through an ontology that 
begins with a coherent self, this will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4. What needs 
to be emphasized here, is Walzer’s appeal to a language of rights as the 
foundation of his just war theory. Rengger also suggests that: “to structure an 
account of the tradition on the basis of rights language and social contract theory 
inevitably slots into the form of modern political vocabulary that engages in 
‘rights talk’, and what follows from that”. 437 Walzer in effect re-moralizes the use 
of force and fixes the terms of critique and debate: “Indeed, how can imperial 
warfare be criticized if not in just war terms? What other language, what other 
theory, is available for such a critique?”438  
 
f. Cultural hegemony and liberal international law: structural punishment 
as critique 
 
The correlation of medieval international law to those of Roman Law, says Carl 
Schmitt, was not to be found in the precepts themselves but in the ‘concrete 
orientation’ to Rome.439 Nomos, for Schmitt, are laws whose: “content is the inner 
measure of concrete order and orientation”, and should be divorced from all 
other legal enactments. Nomos in the Schmittian account contains the initial 
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distribution of land and the appropriation of the concrete’s order space.440 The 
only “corrective” modern definition of nomos is the concept of legitimacy.441 The 
nomos of a historical spatial order, we can argue, manifests as an intellectual tool 
that helps us visualize and identify the sovereign power and its dimensions and 
spaces, its political sphere of dominance.442 Medieval international law was to 
end with a new spatial order that is the sovereign state, grounded not in a secure 
orientation, but in a balance or equilibrium. The epoch of inter-state 
international law, as Schmitt notes, lasted from the sixteenth century to the end 
of nineteenth century, in which European powers sought to limit and bracket 
war. This epoch was one of increased secularization, or as Schmitt notes, of the 
“detheologization of public life and the neutralization of the antitheses of creedal 
civil wars.”443 This bracketing of war, or war proper, took place only between 
sovereign states, by “distinct personae morales, who contented with each other 
on the basis of the jus publicum Europaeum, because European soil had been 
divided under their aegis.”444 This ‘humanization’ of war, to prevent wars of 
annihilation between European powers, transformed the basis of justness: “the 
justice of war was no longer based on conformity with the content of theological, 
moral or juridical norms, but rather on institutional and structural quality of 
political forms.”445 Some jurists still considered the importance of ‘just cause’, as 
formulated from the scholastic tradition, in Schmitt’s opinion at the expense of 
any consideration of the juridical ordering of the sovereign states.446 According to 
Schmitt:  
“this spatial order and its concepts of balance was the essential presupposition and 
foundation upon which the European Great Powers based their practical policy of 
colonial expansion into the free spaces of the globe from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth century. Their balance theories allowed them to disregard the theoretical 
implications of the basic problem of their global spatial structure: the relation of free and 
non-free land.”447  
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Under that orientation, a specific character was given to those who had “no jura 
belli”.448 In fact, their mere existence, treatment and labelling as ‘traitors’, ‘rebels’, 
and ‘pirates’ (see ‘rogue’ states), legitimized the political, cultural and legal 
registers of that specific world-system. If that system was unequal and violent, 
international law naturalized it.  
 
The right to appropriate and use the land of the ‘barbarous’ was established 
through arguments advancing a just war.449 Schmitt writes: 
“In terms of international law, just war provided the legal title for occupation and 
annexation of American territory and subjugations of the indigenous peoples. There were 
additional grounds for just war by Spain, against the Americans that, in modern parlance, 
would warrant ‘humanitarian intervention.’ Such grounds gave Spaniards rights of 
occupation and intervention if they were interceding on the part of people in their own 
country being suppressed unjustly by barbarians.”450  
The Schmittian narrative of international law is well known in critical 
scholarship. Schmitt’s perspective on international law highlights the colonial 
history, the mechanisms of sovereignty and provides for an alternative concept of 
international authority. It is an account which legal cosmopolitans or juridical 
just war theorists are not comfortable with. It implies that the concept of moral 
authority is interlinked with a specific orientation, an order that produces 
‘Others’. Their exclusion naturalizes that specific order. Drawing on the 
Schmittian concept of authority and legitimacy, the responsibility to protect 
concept can be seen as an attempt to sustain and protect a homogenous legal, 
moral and institutional order through morality or reason. However, this is 
achieved by means of the exclusions of those who do not ascribe to the same 
universal project, the civilized from the uncivilized, the European from the non-
European and so on. Any state, which does not meet these standards, risks de-
legitimization. As Anne Orford claimed: “Institutions that represent international 
criminal law or economic liberalization exercise a form of jurisdiction that is 
based upon a claim to represent the truth.”451 Orford’s analysis emphasizes the 
ways in which protection works to delegitimize appeals to de jure authority. The 
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claim to protection marginalizes the question of authority. In other words, the 
question and paradoxes of both state and international authority can sabotage 
the already existing structure of executive decision-making. According to Orford: 
“their capacity to govern depends not upon control over territory, but upon the 
success of their officials (experts on human rights, development economics, 
conflict studies, or genocide prevention) in spreading the beliefs underlying 
Western legality throughout the world.”452 Universal jurisdiction is intimately 
associated with such ‘truth’ claims. The truth claim in the responsibility to 
protect concept is that it promises to minimize suffering by stopping mass 
slaughter or that it can halt mass atrocities and violence. Conversely, if the 
responsibility to protect produces suffering, or is a punitive tool, then it risks 
discrediting itself as an institution of protection. The conceptual distinction 
between protection and punishment, if one turns critically to the question of 
international authority, sovereignty and moral/ethical agency, seems significantly 
paradoxical and problematic. It is associated with what liberal international law 
promises to be and what it actually is.  
 
In the same vein, Gerry Simpson narrates the story of the development of the 
international legal order since the naturalization of the sovereign state as the 
foundational aspect of international law.453 Simpson argues that the ‘flexible’ 
concept of ‘juridical sovereignty’, since 1815, is marked by: “the languages of Great 
power prerogatives, friends and enemies (or outlaws) and sovereign equality.”454 
It is important to note that, for Simpson, all these three are to be seen as 
languages. Furthermore, Simpson argues that the structure of the international 
order is best understood by the oscillation between what he calls a pluralist order 
and an anti-pluralist one. A pluralist order is one that subscribes to a universal 
morality that is attached to equality. An anti-pluralist order is one that 
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encompasses the stronger and equal states of the order and the ‘outlaws’, the 
ones that cannot fit morally, constitutionally or politically, within the established 
‘international legal life’ or order. Through this analysis, the international order is 
characterized by normatively opposing orders. Simpson develops the concept of 
legalized hegemony, that being the production of new legal regimes “in moments 
of constitutional crisis” as the Great Powers see fit.455 The existence of ‘outlaws’ 
and ‘outsiders’ of the international order negatively validates their juridical 
equality.456 Those outlaws are, according to Simpson: “subject to a repressive 
international criminal law and denied the benefits of full sovereign equality.”457 
There are plenty of examples of such states with varying degrees of ‘criminality’ 
depending upon their potentiality of being a hazard to the order in place or 
exclusively to powerful states.458 States that acquired the ‘intolerant’ status since 
the nineteenth century, include, to state the obvious cases: Napoleonic France, 
Ottoman subjugated Greece between 1821-1832, Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s 
Commune, the ‘Taliban-troubled’ Afghanistan, Hussein’s Iraq, Qaddafi’s Libya in 
2011 and now Assad’s Syria. Such states are denied participation as equals on the 
basis of “some moral or political incapacity.” 459  According to Simpson, 
‘civilization’ since the middle and late nineteenth century was a key term:  
“One attribute of civilization was a liberal or at least pseudo-liberal legal order in which 
alien (read Western) nationals would be afforded full liberal rights. Those entities 
excluded from the system were thought incapable of ensuring this level of protection and 
were thus deprived of certain sovereign rights and jurisdictional immunities in ‘unequal 
treaties’ and capitulations.”460  
What matters for the argument made in this chapter, is that international law 
and its international legal order, as historically observed by Simpson, is 
structured upon a systematic exclusion of some ‘Others’. The exclusion of the 
immoral, ‘failed’, or rogue other, validates the morality and legal institutional life 
of the democratic and peaceful republics of the rest.  
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For Mark Neocleous, the idea of ‘civilization’ was intimately linked with the birth 
of police. 461  According to Neocleous, both push towards a legislative and 
administrative regulation of an internal life:  
“At the heart of pacification, then, are the practices we associate with the police power: 
the fabrication of social order, the dispersal of the mythical entity called ‘security’ 
through civil society and the attempt to stabilize the order around the logic of peace and 
security.”462  
It is the exercise of security practices as also policing, which I wish to emphasize 
here. Neocleous suggests that pacification is itself a form of war, and war is in fact 
a central element of the post-WWII legal order. I assume that this is what 
Neocleous means when he says, “war proper is peace proper”.463 Through this 
lens, the risks of banishing punishment from the legal vocabulary or not reading 
the Just War tradition for what its central elements are, namely, the punishment 
of wrongdoing and the protection of order, blurs the distinction between military 
interventions for human protection purposes, humanitarianism (the work of 
international organizations, such MSF or the Red Cross) and international 
policing (unilateral or collective punitive interventions). Against scholars such as 
James Brown Scott, who in the reading of Vitoria see a determinate humanitarian 
and cosmopolitan ethos, Neocleous situates Vitoria’s contribution to an emergent 
discourse of political economy centred on commerce and accumulation. 
Koskenniemi also makes this reading, and it is an important critical point, against 
the perception of R2P (and just war theory within R2P) as a neutral and non-
ideological juridico-moral framework. 464  Neocleous argues that primitive 
accumulation and colonialism had served the pursuit of territorial security and 
justified intervention, subjugation and annexation of foreign lands.465  
 
For Tarik Kochi, contemporary accounts of just war theory, like those of Walzer 
fail because of their “uncritical reliance upon a number of assumptions about the 
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nature of ‘morality’, ‘justice’ and ‘reason’, accounts which take as a given the 
morality of human rights and deify them as the moral panacea of our times.”466 
Through Vitoria, Kochi shows how humanitarian, or “well-meaning approaches 
to war” as he suggests “can end up an apology for aggressive violence, war and 
conquest.”467 Via natural law or human rights, and through casuistic reason 
which frames what is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’, ‘natural’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’, human security 
makes up an ethics of war and violence for which moral rhetoric can serve a 
binary and often contradictory end. The lines that separate oppression from 
emancipation and protection from punishment or exploitation are obscure. 
According to Kochi:  
“In Vitoria’s time, the so-called ‘universal truth’ preached was really one version or 
interpretation as enunciated by one Christian sect, Catholicism (albeit with degrees of 
internal divergence within the Catholic framework). Today, while universal concepts 
such as ‘freedom’, democracy and human rights are invoked by Western political leaders 
and their lawyers, what is being preached and often violently inflicted upon the world, is 
only one particular interpretation of these concepts – an interpretation which is 
fundamentally limited and shaped by a system of modern capitalism. To this extent 
contemporary humanitarian just wars are often as unholy and ungodly as those waged by 
the Spanish conquistadors against the Amerindians, or by the earlier Christian Crusaders 
against the empires of Islam.”468 
To this end, Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system analysis allows us to visualize 
the wide network of forces that constructively create and re-create the world-
system we live in. It is the normative conditions we need to seek and understand. 
Concepts, for Wallerstein, are comprehensible only within the social and 
historical framework of their times.469 World-analysis allows us to see actors and 
structures as part of a process; part of a systemic mix out of which they emerged 
and upon which they act. Under this understanding actors: 
“act freely but their freedom is constrained by their biographies and the social prisons of 
which they are part. Analyzing their prisons liberates them to the maximum degree that 
they can be liberated. To the extent that we each analyze our social prisons, we liberate 
ourselves from their constraints to the extent that we can be liberated.”470  
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Wallerstein’s analysis represents an exegesis of the connection between the 
different forces at play within the world-system of global capitalism circa 1500. 
Wallerstein emphasizes the inequalities produced within the international 
system focusing on long-term (the long duree) expansion. He traces the 
beginnings of the modern world-system in the sixteenth century, in parts of 
Europe and the Americas. This world-system is a world-economy based upon a 
division of labour 471, and the exchange and flows of commodities, capital and 
labour.472 Capitalism is the system’s systematic expectation towards the constant 
and ‘endless accumulation of capital’.473 According to Wallerstein:  
“The powers that be in a social system always hope that socialization results in 
acceptance of the very real hierarchies that are the product of the system. They also hope 
that socialization results in the internalization of the myths, the rhetoric, and the 
theorizing of the system.”474  
The internalization process is based upon the coexisting relationship of on the 
one hand universalism and on the other anti-universalism. In part, Wallerstein’s 
exegesis can be seen as similar to Gerry Simpson’s narrative of the development 
of international order (i.e. pluralism/anti-pluralism). For Wallerstein, 
universalism improves the ability to accumulate capital by ensuring an efficient 
competent working world-economy (and a working world-system) and anti-
universalism highlights the struggle of the ‘inferior classes’ and of the excluded 
ones (the terrorists, the barbarians, the infidels, ‘rogue’ states).475  
 
A basic feature of the world-system is its core-peripheral state system.476 Weak 
states, in Wallerstein’s analysis, are those of which the production processes are 
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peripheral and accumulate less wealth through economically productive 
activities, or wealth is substantially concentrated to some barons and warlords 
that monopolize production. 477  Within this world-system, strong states are 
pressuring weaker states:  
“to keep in power persons whom the states find acceptable, and to join the strong states 
in placing measures on other weak states to get them to conform to the policy needs of 
the strong states…, weak states …buy the protection of strong states by arranging 
appropriate flows of capital”.478 
The ‘balance of power’, in Wallerstein’s interpretation, can be seen as the 
competition between strong states in realizing dominance. 479  The European 
world-economy emerged in late fifteenth and early sixteenth century and 
attained its strength by the attempts of the authorities to create relatively 
homogeneous societies at the core of empires, using the imperial venture as an 
aid, perhaps an indispensable one, to the creation of national society.480 The 
kings, for example, says Wallerstein, used four mechanisms to strengthen 
themselves: bureaucratization, monopolization of force, creation of legitimacy, 
and homogenization of the subject population.481 Furthermore in moments of 
‘crisis’ the capitalistic forces of the world-system cannot prosper, since the flow of 
capital and labour is uncontrollable. 482  These forces would then reassert 
themselves by engaging in other activities, cultural, legal or economic, that would 
enhance their status and control.483 Wallerstein’s definition of ‘geoculture’, is the 
power of hegemony over the line which divides the excluded from the included; 
the included society represents the good society.484  
 
The epitome of liberalism, according to Wallerstein, in defining the geoculture of 
the modern world-system would not have taken place if it were not for the legal 
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underpinnings of liberal state institutions.485 The hegemony of legal rationality 
and of international law, as critique, even it may not provide a blueprint for a 
better system, does nonetheless bring to light the inherent inequalities of the law, 
its anti-universalisms and law’s incoherent and selective application. Hegemony 
can be seen as the ‘organizing principle’: “an entire system of values, attitudes, 
beliefs, morality, etc. that is one way or another supportive of the established 
order and the class interests that dominate it.”486 Agreed law has the power to 
induce “passive compliance in large measure through its function as constitutive 
of social ontology. It provides rules for the proper construction of authorized 
institutions and approved activities.”487 The cultural hegemony of law is a “code 
that replicates the social ontology in much the very same way that a genetic code 
replicates a biological organism.”488 It forms in part our ‘objective reality’. For 
Antonio Gramsci: “the establishment of a worldview requires the mechanisms of 
universalization, naturalization, and rationalization.”489 Domination extends in 
all spectrums of life, both private and public, in the same way structural 
inequalities and power relations penetrate through the public and private spheres 
of life. In this respect, the role of law is to perform, in part, “a non-repressive 
function of leadership and direction by suggesting a mode of life as ‘legal’, as 
approved by the state.”490 Scholars such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, 
in an effort to break away from Orthodox Marxism and class as the single unit of 
oppression, developed a broader conception of power as diffused at multiple 
sites.491 Broadly, the internal ideology of the dominant group is maintained 
through the network of social institutions and practices. As Litowitz notes, for 
critical legal theory, the postmodern era shifted the operative terminology from 
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‘class/exploitation’ to ‘discourse/marginalization’. It is a move towards an 
understanding that focuses on the pluralism of domination forces and how they 
infiltrate the law, its social institutions and social relationships.492  
 
According to Beate Jahn, liberal hegemony rationalized various policies, which 
were based on domestic liberal assumptions and attempted to internationalize 
them. One such assumption is that democracy provides the means “of managing 
and resolving domestic conflict and competition”. 493  However in practice, 
‘democracy promotion’ carries with it liberalization policies, the protection of 
private property, free markets and free trade and has enabled the creation of 
‘illiberal states’.494 Since the responsibility to protect is arguably to be carried out 
by mostly western liberal states, the universalization claim inherent in the 
responsibility to protect rationalizes these liberal policies. Subsequently, the 
claims of security and of protection of human rights become intertwined with the 
ideological discourses of liberalism.  
 
The emergence of the institutionalization of human rights as a result of the 
unipolar global order has been described as a return to ethics and to natural 
law.495 Costas Douzinas pointed out that, human rights are in fact a morally 
invested ideology.496 The common denominator of human rights and natural law 
is their universality; “they are supposed to be above politics, a neutral, rational 
discourse, natural discourse and practice and a ‘moral trump card’ that brings 
conflict to an end.”497 As a language they carry an emancipatory aspect, since the 
emergence of natural law and natural rights constituted a direct confrontation 
and eventual (albeit partial) overcoming of the irrational impositions of 
tradition.498 Yet, their universality and their institutionalisation was also the 
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beginning of their demise, their ‘end’. The promotion of such rights by Western 
states often creates contradictory results: on the one hand it may serve to protect 
particular individuals yet it may also hamper political resistance.499 Antonio 
Hardt and Michael Negri also have stated that the institutionalisation and 
universalization of human rights is a characteristic of “Empire”.500 Used, as a 
strategic tool and language by politicians and diplomats, human rights and 
democracy, can be both revolutionary and anti-revolutionary, both anti-militant 
and militant, both violent and non-violent. Perhaps as a tool of authority human 
rights lose their emancipatory potential.  
 
In essence, just war theory and the responsibility to protect are moral and highly 
politicized doctrines. They represent certain beliefs and claims, which the de 
facto legitimate authority holds. Historical events, epochal changes and 
transitions in power are therefore the conditions, and perhaps the only 
conditions, which alter the moral claims inherent in these doctrines. The 
uncritical appeal to a rights-based language or to ‘reason’ and human rights (see 
Bellamy’s and Walzer’s claim that just war theory is a “common language”) 
located in much of the contemporary accounts of just war theory and pro-R2P 
arguments, conceals the constitutive role of legal institutions in the production 
of a wider juridico-liberal framework tied up to a particular historical moral 
vocabulary and to a specific socio-political and economic world-system. The 
responsibility to protect concept, needs to be understood through this lens, so 
that its normativity can be acknowledged. The presumption against war, which in 
Johnson’s eyes, echoed the de-moralization of the order, seems to be a superficial 
distinction. In practice, just causes were still asserted, to justify both unilateral 
and collective military intervention for human protection purposes.  
 
Whilst someone like Johnson or Elshtain make aggressive claims and broaden the 
just cause threshold, as opposed to the more restricted moral claims of Bellamy 
or Walzer, their conception offers us a counter-claim to the “common language” 
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of Walzer and Bellamy. Johnson’s claims can be seen as outright political and 
moral claims, whilst Walzer and Bellamy camouflage the inherent political 
nature of their arguments. The rationalization of international constitutionalism, 
the ‘war convention’, natural law, positive law (its rules and entities) works to 
legitimize the juridico-moral framework of just war theory and to overshadow the 
concepts of international authority, moral hegemony and power per se.  Through 
this lens, the ethical landscape of the Just War tradition adapts and stretches, 
reinventing a concept of authority, of sovereignty and of responsibility, which fits 
the specific conditions of the world-system. Yet it achieves that by bypassing or 
not adequately investigating the problem of authority, of discipline and 
punishment, of inclusion and exclusion, or of institutional violence more broadly. 
The return to just war theory, in the form of the responsibility to protect concept, 
ignores some of its deeply rooted elements and their interplay in the 
contemporary rhetoric of political and legal authority. The conditions and ethical 
vocabularies that make exclusion possible should be addressed and assessed. 
Here, Kochi’s argument is illuminating, he says:  
“If just war theory cannot incorporate the critique of reason into its intellectual discourse, 
then we are probably better off setting the theory aside. A mode of theorizing about war 
which does not or cannot consider how competing concepts of justice and authority, and 
the desire of empowerment and realization within human rationality, together, underlie 
violence, conflict and war, is not an adequate theoretical approach. Opposed to the 
inadequacy of just war tradition, theoretical approaches that pursue these significant 
questions need to be developed.”501 
According to Jahn, the failures of liberal policies have to be attributed to the 
incoherencies of liberalism itself. As such, it is not liberal practice that failed 
liberal policies but its liberalism’s failure to ‘grasp’ the dynamics of liberal 
practice and of the world-system it creates and re-creates.502 Accordingly, the 
responsibility to protect should be understood not as a failed liberal practice alone, 
but as part of liberalism’s failure to attend to the wider dynamics of its world-
system. Further, the non-recognition of the punitive ethos of the responsibility to 
protect should be understood as the failure of liberalism to ‘grasp’ liberalism’s 
exclusions and inclusions. In terms of law, to realize that liberal international law 
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is also the result of the violent history of colonialism and European exploitation, 
that came about through the rhetoric of universal ethics and liberal political 
culture. As Orford states:  
“At the heart of the establishment of international law, was, and is, the legitimacy of the 
violence exercised as sacrifice or punishment against those constituted as law’s savage, 
barbaric, others. In this sense the international community shares something with those 
national or ‘tribal’ communities against which it constitutes itself – the wounding and 
killing of its others as an organic and necessary part of its foundation.”503  
Through this lens, the punitive element of protection is not only exercised 
through practice, but it is also structural/foundational. Further, a notion of 
ethical responsibility that takes structural violence as its point of departure, 
perhaps begins to ease the tension between what international law promises to 
be and what it is. In other words, it goes into some distance to curtailing the 
problem of a theoretically emancipatory international law but in practice 
hegemonic. This is not to discredit international law, in fact, international law is 
being discredited when incoherencies and failures are not recognized as such but 
are covered under the rubric of rights and of just collective security institutions. 
It is to push towards a radical understanding of responsibility on human suffering 
that accounts for its own failures and for its complicity in violence. The 
institutionalization of human rights and the subsequent emergence of a new 
security agenda, which made conceivable the introduction of the responsibility to 
protect concept, became promising upon the defeat of communism as a claimant 
of international legal and political authority against capitalism. Therefore, what 
most of contemporary juridical and liberal accounts of just war often over-look, is 
the constitutive relationship of just war and of morality to a particular geo-
political, economic world-system. Their persistence suggests a failure to account 
for, or an indifference to engage with critical approaches to international law, 
which are particularly helpful in identifying the inherent paradoxes in 
international law and the systematic exclusion of some Others. Critical 
approaches to international law and international security, is an expanding 
literature, which comprises of post-colonial literature, feminist approaches and 
socio-historical accounts of international law. These accounts tend to highlight 
																																																								




the inequalities of international society against its formal, promised or professed 
legal equality, most of the times through history, and through international law’s 
constitutional moments. Whereas protection and punishment become entwined 
and are institutionalized, it is only through these critical accounts that we can 
perhaps see who is being excluded, why and how. Therefore, an understanding of 
how is it that liberal moral authority and international legal authority naturalizes 
and masks discourses of exclusion is fundamental, if we are to attend to some of 




This chapter argued that the punitive ethos of protection post-1945 was not 
abolished but became naturalized and rationalized. Through this lens, the 
international criminalization of social and political violence under international 
legal institutions and its main security institution (the Security Council) are not 
to be seen only as institutions of protection, they are also institutions of 
punishment. The responsibility to protect concept, and the reinvention of just 
war theory within R2P should therefore be seen in this light, in order to grasp its 
ethico-political claims and effects. The wider dynamics and paradoxes of the 
relationship between protection and punishment is an underexplored 
phenomenon. The chapter argued that ‘critical accounts’ to liberal international 
law, just war theory and human rights are able to uncover some of the internal 
contradictions and paradoxes of approaches that take as given, respectively, the 
juridical equality of international law, the ‘rationality’ of the juridico-moral 
framework of just war theory and the moral adherence and respect for human 
rights. By highlighting the non-recognition of the binary and coexisting 
relationship of protection and punishment, both in just war thinking and in the 
responsibility to protect concept, this chapter aimed to provide three distinct but 
connected directions which underpin current frameworks of R2P. Firstly, to 
examine in ‘classical’ and ‘contemporary’ manifestations the moral claims of just 
war theory. Secondly, to investigate the extent to which just war theory, as the 




meet the demands of an ethical inquiry on legitimate uses of violence for 
protection purposes. Thirdly, to make a primary assessment of the kind of 
ontologies, world visions and what kind of international law is imagined through 
the responsibility to protect as just war theory. The next chapter turns the lens to 
the internal and structural conditions of the responsibility to protect concept, in 











Chapter 1 told the story of the development of R2P, the process of its 
institutionalization and internalization. The previous chapter (2), untangled the 
relationship between the concept of the responsibility to protect and the moral, 
political and juridical claims of just war thinking. As such, the chapter 
highlighted the limitations, inherent problems and contradictions of just war 
thinking that become part of the concept of the responsibility to protect. It aimed 
to show why the revival of the juridico-moral framework of just war thinking in 
the responsibility to protect concept, particularly by pro R2P supporters, liberal 
internationalists and legal cosmopolitans is at best an uncritical appraisal. The 
central argument in the previous chapter was that just war theory and the 
responsibility to protect, as juridico-moral frameworks of international authority 
and as security institutions, work as techniques of both protection and 
punishment - that the theory and practice of humanitarianism hides a 
particularly punitive dimension. It argued that the ‘non-recognition’ of the 
punitive dimension of humanitarianism is part of liberalism’s failure to recognize 
its exclusion practices within protection practices and structural punishment as 
an integral part of its existence. This failure is not a coincidence; it is a political 
and ethical choice. In this sense, the liberal internationalist assumption proceeds 
by overshadowing R2P’s punitive dimension under the rubric and language of 
protection.  
 
The responsibility to protect concept implicates us primarily to recapture agency 
and authority within the contemporary post-Cold War structure. To the extent 
that one realizes that international law is liberal with a European (western) 
orientation, formulated on the inclusion and exclusion of forms of life, R2P is a 




responsibility to protect populations from human rights atrocities is in part a 
critique of the liberal juridico-moral concept of responsibility. R2P entails the 
responsibility of the ‘international community’ to protect populations from mass 
atrocities and large-scale loss of life, if the state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to fulfil its 
responsibility. The term ‘international community’ indicates that it possesses 
moral agency.504 Yet, the ‘international community’ is an elusive subject. I am 
interested in exposing the structure of answerability towards mass human 
atrocities and its subjects, that is why my intentions in this chapter are: (1.) to 
understand the agential materiality of the international community, (2.) to 
explore modes of organizing responsibility/irresponsibility within R2P and (3.) to 
make some primary assessments of the meanings and effects of the sites of 
irresponsibility within R2P. To this end, the juridico-moral framework of R2P is a 
rhetorical activity. To the extent that “vocabularies act as ‘ideologies”, this 
chapter exposes the “strategic choices that are opened” through the concept, in 
the midst of growing global security apparatuses and complex international 
life.505 Broadly, this chapter is about the irresponsibility of the responsibility to 
protect. 
 
An insight of chapter 2, was that legal cosmopolitan appeals to universality or 
liberal appeals to morality and vice versa, seek to elevate the just war vocabulary 
and the language of the responsibility to protect and ‘fix’ there the terms of the 
debate. In other words, we become witnesses to the furtherance of a dominant 
discourse of security and protection. This chapter builds upon the conclusions of 
chapter 2 and aims to explore some of the forms of organizing this discourse. To 
understand and explore the meanings and effects of ‘responsibility’ within R2P I 
turn to irresponsibility. For Derrida, as Jack M. Balkin proposes, “we discover that 
each legal concept is actually a privileging in disguise, of one concept over 
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another”. 506  In this light it feels important to bring to light the history of 
suppression of the opposite or the other. According to Scott Veitch 
irresponsibility is the result of mechanisms that organise responsibility. 507 In 
organizing responsible protection practices, sites of irresponsibility are produced 
and organized at the same time. Irresponsibility here is the other of 
responsibility. For Veitch, three main features play a key role in producing 
irresponsibility and are ‘features of modern social forms of organization’, with 
their ‘attendant mentalities’. These are: (1.) the division of labour and the 
significance of role responsibility, (2.) the meaning and effects of processes of 
individualization and (3.) the transference of responsibilities through the 
distinctions and combinations of social systems. I treat these ‘features’ as 
signifiers for ‘sites of irresponsibility’ within R2P and then I provide examples and 
work through the manner in which the disappearance of collective, political and 
moral responsibility become possible through these modes of social organization. 
In other words, this chapter aims to show the patterns of thinking that fabricate 
such sites within R2P and the attendant ‘mentalities’ of these three features of 
modern social organization, as manifested in the international setting and with 
regards to theorizing responsibility in international law and responding to mass 
atrocities.  
 
One of the arguments of the chapter is that the extensive focus on individual 
accountability, blameworthiness or culpability evades the more important 
questions of structural, social and collective responsibility. Christine Schwöbel in 
The Comfort of International Criminal Law highlights the preference of 
professionals, politicians and the academic market in the certainty and ‘comfort’, 
which the discursive framework of international criminal law provides, against 
the ‘discomfort’ of international human rights law. 508  As she explains, this 
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preference is grounded “on a contemporary desire for certainty over contention, 
action over discourse and simplicity over complexity…: in short, a preference of 
comfort over discomfort.” 509  In the preference of comfort over discomfort 
something is lost. The notion of irresponsibility within R2P presents the 
possibility to highlight sites of exclusion and meanings that have been largely 
marginalized from the discourse around R2P and by standard arguments in 
support of military intervention for human protection purposes. In this sense, 
irresponsibility embodies the critique of responsibility. The recognition of 
‘irresponsibility’ can also be seen as a site of discomfort: of “intellectual 
restlessness”.510 If responsibility is irresponsibility and vice versa, what would be 
the effect if it were to enter our lexicons? 
 
a.  A notion of ‘irresponsibility’? 
 
Attempts to formally define what responsibility means in international law often 
end in disagreement among legal professionals. 511  As Jennifer Welsh said, 
responsibility “is one of the most powerful moral and legal terms in 
contemporary international politics.”512 Yet the dominant concern among legal 
and security professionals in relation to R2P is on the threshold criteria of R2P 
and whether there should be more expansion or narrowing of the criteria. In 
other words, mainstream literature around R2P, circles around the effective and 
strategic application of the norm. One can argue, within the legal literature, the 
notion of responsibility as answerability towards the ‘Other’ is undervalued, 
perhaps overshadowed by ‘calls to action.’ Furthermore, the discourse around 
humanitarian intervention and R2P gives added emphasis to the question of 
action or inaction. As such, analysis of the responsibility to protect concept 
“adopts a particular temporal focus” (i.e. on the effective and strategic application 
of R2P) and fails to account for the actual effects and meanings of humanitarian 
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intervention or to account for the role law plays in assigning and justifying such 
interventions. 513  The ‘international community’ already intervenes in those 
conflict-ridden countries and regions in varied ways. The question of 
responsibility of the ‘international community’ is much broader, persistent and 
complex than the temporary question of action or inaction in the face of man-
made humanitarian catastrophes.514 According to Orford: 
“the focus is always on the moment when military intervention is the only remaining 
credible foreign option… The assertion that this is the only moment which can be 
considered renders it impossible to analyse any other involvement of the international 
community or to think reflexively about law’s role in producing the meaning of 
intervention.”515 
The ‘truth’ claims of the responsibility to protect are multiple: for fighting ‘evil’, 
‘ending impunity’, ‘maintaining peace and security’, ‘protecting populations’, 
halting ‘large scale loss of life’. These are not temporal claims, even if they are 
momentarily reinvigorated to enable international ‘consensus’ and ‘action’. I 
begin to explore the question of international responsibility with one 
acknowledgment: I view claims to security and protection not as temporal but as 
persistent elements of the rhetoric and language of political authority and in this 
case, of global governance. 
 
The issue of accounting for large-scale harms, such as mass human atrocities, has 
largely been preoccupied by the cognitive and discomforting philosophical 
dichotomy between ‘answerability’ and ‘culpability’. Rather than limiting our 
horizon within a particular understanding of responsibility as ‘blameworthiness’, 
it makes sense to discuss R2P as a structure of answerability. The notion of 
irresponsibility pushes us to see ‘responsibility’ more broadly as a political 
concept and not only strictly as legal accountability. As Veitch suggests: 
“responsibility needs to be understood as a term covering a range of different techniques 
and purposes, the appearance of which in different social institutions and conditions and 
locations is thus better thought of in the plural, as ‘responsibility practices’.516 
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This understanding involves recognition of the ‘symbiotic’ or the co-constitutive 
relationships between law, ethics (or morality) and social institutions. Legal or 
juridical ‘responsibility practices’ influence morality and politics, and in some 
ways moral or political ‘responsibility practices’ influence the meaning and effect 
of legal responsibility. The responsibility to protect concept can be regarded as 
one such ‘responsibility practice’, with its own specific context of emergence and 
distinctive features of agency or identity. Yet, it is tied up normatively with the 
discourse of the broader liberal juridico-moral concept of responsibility. This 
does not suggest a single notion of ‘responsibility’, “a timeless analytical 
concept”517 which we can pinpoint. Rather, that certain forms and practices of 
‘responsibility’ dominated legal and moral theory which frame more or less the 
normative framework of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept.  
 
Citing Alasdair MacIntyre, Veitch explains, that there are no ‘primordial’ moral 
responses or commitments, ‘separable from social systems’. Instead, there is a 
“mutually constitutive relation between moral philosophies (and hence by 
extension, moralities themselves) and the empirical conditions within which they 
exist or which they seek to bring about.”518 The significant point here is that we 
should perhaps think of ‘responsibility’ within the responsibility to protect as a 
‘normative device’ and/or a ‘discursive framework’; within and through which 
international political authority responds to mass atrocities and regulates the use 
of military force for protection. Furthermore, it can be argued that ‘responsibility 
practices’ as moral claims of particular historico-juridical orders appear as 
processes, in this sense, they are not fixed practices but dynamic. The dynamic 
and rhetorical component of ‘responsibility practices’ can also make them prone 
to manipulation and management. As techniques of governance, ‘responsibility 
practices’ can dominate discourses and normalize moral behaviour. According to 
Veitch: “it is only by treating ‘responsibility practices’ as part of ‘power practices’ 
that we would be able to understand their actual roles for what they are.”519 In 
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this light, R2P should also be treated as a power practice. This was also one of the 
claims of chapter 2. In order to read the responsibility to protect as just war 
theory, one should treat the concept as a power practice. The responsibility to 
protect concept, as an ethico-political claim and power practice reflects the 
international community’s framework of the use of violence. It is by treating the 
‘responsibility’ within the responsibility to protect as a rhetorical technique that 
we can begin to articulate the broader moral and political edge of the concept. 
Therefore, we should take note Veitch’s primary proposition regarding the 
relation between individual subjectivity on one hand and the various systemic 
forms that produce meaning in which the individual finds oneself on the other. 
According to Veitch:  
“The modern fixation with responsibility, freedom, intention and liability devolves on 
human relations as encountered through individual understandings and responses, but 
only as these are the mediated products of the totality of modenity’s institutional and 
disciplinary mechanism.”520  
A primary insight we gain from Veitch’s statement, is that to inquire broadly on 
‘responsibility’, we need firstly to understand morality as a social product. This 
product, as Zygmunt Bauman suggests, can be perceived further as the 
imposition of society’s: 
“own substantive version of moral behaviour; and concurs with the practice in which 
social authority claims the monopoly of moral judgement. It tacitly accepts the 
theoretical illegitimacy of all judgements that are not grounded in the exercise of such a 
monopoly; so that for all practical intents and purposes moral behaviour becomes 
synonymous with social conformity and obedience to the norms observed by the 
majority.”521  
In this sense, responsibility practices as power practices can also be seen as part 
of the cultural hegemony of law, as discussed in chapter 2, and understood as 
practices of naturalization and rationalization. It is by treating morality as a 
product that we come to understand ‘responsibility practices’ as techniques of 
governance.  
 
Veitch’s main proposal in Law and Irresponsibility is that “legal mechanisms 
operate as much to deflect responsibility suffered as they do to instantiate it… in 
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many instances, legal mechanisms in fact play a key role in organising 
irresponsibility and that they do this as they determine responsibility.”522 This is 
based on the proposition of an ‘irresponsible mentality’:  
“through all of the varied concepts and categories, distinctions, systems, institutions and 
disciplines in which the modern individual exists and operates can be found the modern 
tools for disconnecting effect and cause, liability and suffering, murder and death.”523  
Due to the varied ‘disaggregation of responsibility’ that takes place, which 
disconnects harm from cause, great suffering occurs which apparently no one 
accounts for or responsibility does not materialise as promised. Furthermore, the 
greater the suffering, says Veitch, the less responsibility is established for it. This 
causes ‘asymmetry’ between suffering and establishing responsibility for it. In 
contrast to a conventional understanding of law and of legal institutions as 
organising responsibility, Veitch suggests, through a series of cases how normal 
and legalized structures and practices are implicated in the production of large-
scale harms and thus organising ‘irresponsibility’. For Veitch, ‘irresponsibility’ is 
“a disregard for consequences in the name of upholding the law”.524 In other 
words, in the course of discharging a legal ‘responsibility’ or obligation, one can 
also enter ‘a zone of non-responsibility’.525 In this sense, irresponsibility appears as 
the necessary ‘other’ of responsibility. As Veitch suggests: “to an increasing 
degree, the juridical form permeates, structures, and organises the available 
range of normative understandings, expectations and responses in the wider 
society.”526 Because the ‘juridical form’ presupposes a claim to correctness it can 
also foreclose the possibility of responsibility. Veitch investigates the continuing 
harms and suffering associated with the ‘amnesia’ of colonial history, the inability 
of the law to rule out a nuclear holocaust and an environmental large-scale 
destruction by way of examining the Nuclear Weapons case and the UN sanctions 
regime imposed on Iraq in the 1990s.527 By way of analogy with regards to the 
responsibility to protect concept I am interested in the ways in which 
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responsibility is dispersed and disavowed through and within the responsibility 
to protect concept. For example, the ambivalence between individual and 
collective responsibility in international criminal law serves as an example of how 
is it that international ‘legal mechanisms’ can produce under normal working 
conditions sites of ‘irresponsibility’, while at the same time professing 
responsibility. This is the particular irony of the responsibility to protect concept, 
that in the name of its promised responsibility, we can expose its sites of 
irresponsibility. The reference and analysis of some aspects of post-war 
reconstruction in Iraq and judicial complementarity in Libya facilitate the same 
argument. The intention here is to see past culpability, in an attempt to open up 
to the broader concept of ‘responsibility’ as ‘answerability’, and to understand the 
varied meanings of the moral claim of security and protection within the 
responsibility to protect concept.  
 
Sites of ‘irresponsibility’ occur “in particular through the compartmentalization, 
demarcation and limiting of responsibilities within and selectively across specific 
institutional settings.” 528  This results in the disappearance of responsibility. 
Veitch posits that three main features play a key role in producing 
irresponsibility. These are not limited to the juridical form but are features of 
‘modern social forms of organisation’ including their ‘attendant mentalities’.529 
These features influence the way we think about our responsibilities and organize 
communal life. According to Veitch, these are: (1.) the division of labour and the 
significance of role responsibility; (2.) the meaning and effects of processes of 
individualisation and (3.) the transference of responsibilities through the 
distinctions and combinations of social systems.530 On the latter feature, Veitch 
turns his attention to the relation between the economic and the political system 
and how, by treating these systems as different ontological universes, results in 
‘forms of responsibility transference’, through which causes and harms become 
detached so that great suffering does not register as such. As he notes, this 
																																																								






‘transference of responsibility’ arises also within the juridical field itself, as a 
result of the ‘compartmentalization’ of responsibility in distinct legal 
responsibilities and under different legal fields. I hope to demonstrate how 
elements of these interrelated forms of social organization influence the 
disappearance of collective, political and moral responsibility in response to mass 
crimes under the protection practices of legal cosmopolitanism and liberal 
international law. I treat legal and political responsibility as two different forms. 
Legal individual accountability can often overshadow the complexity and 
significance of structural and collective responsibility. The discussion that follows 
seeks to explore issues of agency. Overall, my hope is to explain how thinking 
about ‘irresponsibility’ helps us to understand ‘responsibility’ within the 
responsibility to protect. 
 
b. Agential materiality and the ‘international community’: ruling the ‘void’ 
and mastering uncertainty  
 
Tony Blair delivered two separate speeches at the Chicago Economic Club – one 
in 1999 as British Prime Minister at the height of the crisis in Kosovo, and one ten 
years later, in 2009, focusing on the issue of terrorism. The ‘doctrine of the 
international community’ - the title of both speeches - manifests for Blair through 
commitments on a shared policy. In his 2009 speech, Blair sought to extend on 
what the ‘international community’ shares and is committed to. Blair advocated 
enthusiastically for an interventionist ethic of military humanism. This is what 
the ‘doctrine of the international community’ is. According to Blair, “our job is 
simple: it is to support and partner those Muslims who believe deeply in Islam 
but also those who believe in peaceful coexistence, in taking on and defeating the 
extremists who don’t.”531 Initially, there is a sense of hesitation in a simplistic 
articulation that sees the political role of Islam as the primary setback in securing 
peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, it is also, at best, unclear how Blair’s militarist 
humanism can provide an end to such conflict by distinguishing ‘good’ or 
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‘peaceful’ from ‘bad’ Muslims. I will return to these issues and claims further in 
the thesis. Nevertheless, in Blair’s speech, the responsibility of the ‘international 
community’ is discharged through commitment on the ‘war on terrorism’ and to 
the interventionist ethic. The members of the Chicago Economic Club are CEO’s 
of global corporations, managing partners in leading law, accounting and 
consulting firms, executives of top technology, financial, healthcare and 
insurance and media companies, the leaders of Chicago’s major cultural and 
educational institutions, and the heads of local and charitable foundations and 
civic organizations. Such an ‘international community’ is far from specific. 
However, what is suggested is that the opinion of these bodies on foreign policy 
planning mattered for Blair, or perhaps for any head of state.  
 
Kofi Annan in The meaning of the international community, also in 1999, 
described what the international community is by reference to a moment of 
decision, albeit a temporal one, of a ‘coming together’.532 Annan indicates that 
what binds the international community is a vision of a better world. According 
to Annan, the international community is a ‘work in progress’. It is manifested in 
its calls for action or in its failures to attend to crises. It is also evident in its 
constitutional moments such as the creation of the International Criminal Court. 
The ‘international community’ seems to be not something we can pinpoint but a 
pool of agents and networks in constant change and motion.  
 
Both speeches reveal an implied intention to define what the ‘international 
community’ means. Further, they show an intention to designate agency and to 
assign distinctive features of identity to the ‘international community’ according 
to one’s political vision. In Blair’s speech the ‘international community’ precisely 
becomes a community through the audience to which its doctrine is being 
articulated and part of its identity is given to it through the military 
interventionist ethic he proposes in response to terrorism. Similarly, Annan 
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designates agency and identity through his ‘vision’ of a ‘coming together’ and of 
progress. The ‘international community’ is in this respect a non-homogenous and 
elusive entity whose agency is assumed through the course of both speeches. A 
difference however can also be established. Blair not only assigns agency but 
delimits identity. His interventionist ethic of military humanism provides a 
specific content through which those agencies are to carry out the dream of 
peaceful coexistence. In Annan’s speech, meaning and identity hides behind 
‘consensus’ and global institutions of governance. The content of this vision 
makes Annan’s ‘international community’ much more elusive and mysterious 
than Blair’s. The use of Blair’s and Annan’s speeches here suggests an initial 
‘performative’ dynamic inherent in articulations of the ‘international community’, 
to which I will return in detail in chapter 4.  
 
The dream of a better world, of a coming together, this fantasy of a bright future 
ad infinitum for international law and for humanity, does play an important role 
for Annan. Martii Koskenniemi calls this vision of the ‘emerging’ better world 
‘messianic’.533 For Koskenniemi, drawing upon Tom Franck’s The emerging right of 
democratic governance,534 the messianic vision identifies what it is by what is yet 
to be. It is rooted in a future. This future is however both certain and predictable. 
For Franck it emerges through democratic governance. According to 
Koskenniemi, Franck’s subject of rights is a coherent autonomous individual who 
identifies itself through a particular (national or ethnic) community, but also 
shares something with the universal communion of the cosmopolis. 535  This 
subject has an international coherent self that waits to be realized through and 
within democratic peace.536 This narrative is shattered, says Koskenniemi, when 
the individual does not share or cannot identify with what the universal shows to 
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be. 537  This in part explains the ‘fall and rise of international law’. 538  When 
individuals cannot identify with the promised materialization of the universal 
cosmopolis of present international law, international law ‘falls’. On the contrary, 
when there is identification with what international law promises of being, 
international law ‘rises’ again.  According to Koskenniemi, “the great narrative 
[and fear] of cosmopolitanism is that its cosmopolitanism will show itself to be 
false – a façade for particular interests. This was Rousseau’s critique of Grotius, 
Hegel’s critique of Kant and Morgenthau’s critique of liberalism.”539 Further, the 
calls to ‘a better vision’ or ‘emergence’ avoid comprehensive critique of the 
present because what is coming has not yet arrived. In another sense, the present 
materialization of international law and its violence, struggle and diversity are 
not taken seriously since the Kantian cosmopolitan ‘dream’ of global security has 
not yet arrived but is nevertheless already ‘on the way’. One can argue, the call to 
‘a better future’ appears as a method of managing the uncertainty and struggle of 
the ‘political’ through a partial disregard of the political present.540 Here, Derrida’s 
distinction between venir (future) and a-venir (“to-come”) is useful in 
maintaining a difference between a calculated, in a sense, programmed future, 
and a future as unpredictable and as an indefinite process.541  
 
There is a close relationship between Franck’s legal cosmopolitanism, Walzer’s 
ethics as explained in the last chapter, and the ways in which their distinct but 
related cosmopolitanisms avoid to realize the foundational violence of liberal 
international law. Further, as the first legal professionals of the Institut de droit 
also believed, this insistence on an emergent brighter future should not remain 
only a spirit: it should become normative. 542 Those expansive universal rights and 
responsibilities should be codified and be given form. Furthermore, Franck’s legal 
cosmopolitanism, Walzer’s communitarian beings and their attendant visions 
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initially appear as unpolitical. As said by Koskenniemi, liberalism “claims to 
provide simply a framework within which substantive political choices can be 
made”.543 However, the discursive framework one uses to justify moral doctrines 
is precisely “materially controlling” the structure of international moral and legal 
argument, which in turn provides for “material consequences for international 
life.” 544  “Modernity’s preference”, says Wendy Brown, “for favoring norms 
epistemologically over deciding them politically means that we are inclined to 
believe that the construction of normative frameworks can resolve political 
questions.”545  
 
For Peter Fitzpatrick, the reference to ‘international community’ is a reference to 
a ‘deific presence’.546 The challenge that the ‘inter-national’ posits (the prefix 
‘inter’ denoting that in between) is the realization of that ‘something’. 547 
According to Fitzpatrick: “if we cannot accept the abstracted completeness of the 
nation-state or the evasive transcendence of this ‘international community’ then 
we have to account for the coherence of international law in other terms.”548 In 
another sense, that ‘something’ is demanded in order to provide for the political 
authority of universal jurisdiction. The reference to an international community, 
or ‘inter’-national law itself then, is characterised by a ‘void’ for which there is 
great insistence that we name, frame and order in specific ways. 549  The 
ecumenical character of international law needs always to move beyond the 
particular site of its emergence – beyond the jurisdictional law of the European 
sovereign states of the sixteenth century and past its spatial and historical 
‘nomos’ in which each state ‘recognises’ another as a legal sovereign entity. The 
performativity of recognition is in this sense what made and perhaps makes 
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‘international community’, or in fact, what is being materialized is a complex and 
political process, through and in which the international community realizes 
itself and its prospective responsibilities. Through this lens, the reference to the 
‘international community’ entails a universalising and an inventive process. The 
self-reference in the articulation of the ‘international community’ is an act of self-
constitution.550 To understand the ‘international community’ as an act of self-
constitution is also to recognise that the ‘responsibility’, which it carries, is also 
an act of self-constitution. Whereas the ‘international community’ is something 
other than it was before, ‘responsibility’ also changes. For example, the 
‘international community’ is not understood today as the ‘international 
community’ of the Cold War period. Whereas international institutions are 
thought to be ‘finally working’ in the post-Cold War period, the meaning of the 
‘international community’ is defined as something other than what it was during 
the Cold War. Understood in this sense, both ‘international community’ and 
‘responsibility’ open up to alternative and varied interpretations and meanings as 
many really as the spaces and sites in which they are manifested and realized. 
One of the main arguments of legal cosmopolitans, including the authors and 
supporters of R2P, is that in order to be useful and effective, rights and 
protections have to be delegated and managed through formal international 
political authority. Only then we can take action as ‘international community’. 
However, given the impossibility of universalisms, the inherent injustice of law 
and “the suffering that is produced by social normality”,551 international law’s 
community never achieves concreteness. Instead, the reality of international law 
seems to be one of conflict, struggle and diversity. Legal cosmopolitanism cannot 
“on its own assumptions, consistently hold to its objective-formal character, 
[and]… have to resort to material principles which it will leave unjustified.”552  
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Koskenniemi’s work on The Gentle Civilizer of Nations is in part a narrative of 
modern international law as cultivated by the legal professionals of the later-
nineteenth century onwards and towards the formalism of figures like Kelsen and 
Lauterpacht.553 It is an account of modern international law, which explains how 
these professionals wished to normatively codify universal principles akin to a 
global public law. According to Koskenniemi, the distinctive feature of this 
‘international sensibility’ “was not only its reformist political bent but its 
conviction that international reform could be derived from deep insights about 
society, history, human nature or developmental laws of an international and 
institutional modernity.” 554  These men were the cosmopolitans (‘mouvement 
cosmopolite’), they sought to delegate formal political authority to the 
international setting. These dreams, shattered by fascism, were to be reinstated 
at the end of WWII and subsequently at the end of the Cold War. The post-1945 
alliance allowed for the realization of these dreams and the spread of liberal 
ethico-juridical ideas. ‘Crimes against humanity’ was one among other such 
universalising concepts. Since such concepts – ‘humanity’ or ‘international 
community’ – do not have a fixed agent or subject but are dynamic, what seems 
to define them is the historical context in and through which they are being 
realized. This determinate context is not fixed but signifies a set of circumstances 
one finds oneself within. At this point, what I want to highlight is a 
contradistinction. If moral concepts acquire meaning within a particular socio-
historical and institutional context, then it makes sense to say that without such 
context, ‘humanity’ and ‘responsibility’, become trivial, partially empty and void 
of concrete meaning. Consequently, one can argue that without the 1945 alliance 
– that “bizarre alliance” as Eric Hobsbawm tells us – without the ‘coming 
together’, without the historical context which enabled institutional creation - 
the United Nations, its Charter and the signing of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights – such doctrines such as ‘crimes against humanity’ would be 
meaningless or immaterial. Koskenniemi posits, “whatever began at that time 
[Institut de droit international] came to an effective end sometime around 1960.” 
																																																								
553 Koskenniemi, 2001, op cit. 




That ‘end’ saw the emergence “of a depoliticized legal pragmatism on the one 
hand, and in the colonization of the professional by the imperial policy 
agendas”.555 It would be interesting to explore the context and practices, which 
led to a depoliticised legal pragmatism but that would be beyond the scope of the 
chapter.  
 
Legal cosmopolitans seek to materialize this process, to structure a coherent 
universal subject and demarcate that ‘in between’ of community. R2P is also part 
of this materialisation. It can be seen as a technique to ‘master’ the uncertainty 
and complexity of international political space and of subjectivity. And more 
particularly, it is an attempt to regulate the use of violence. According to 
Vivienne Jabri: 
“cosmopolitanism is not simply a mode of being, nor is it merely a set of ethical ideals, 
but has come to be constituted by a set of institutionalized practices, promoted or 
actualized, that come to redefine and reconfigure the international as a juridical and 
political space.”556 
As such, legal cosmopolitans who promote R2P demarcate and define not only 
what cosmopolitanism is and its possibilities but also the subject of 
responsibility, and in turn what responsibility means as performed by security 
institutions and their protection practices. In this light, one can argue, to the 
extent that cosmopolitan responsibility associates with the military humanism of 
R2P and the spread of liberal democracy, ‘responsibility’ within the responsibility 
to protect is defined and structurally constituted via the practice and rhetoric of 
‘military humanism’. Following the insights gained from Chapter 2, to hide the 
punitive dimension of the responsibility to protect under the rubric of protection 
points out to a failure to come to terms with the precisely ‘complex’, 
‘discomforting’, ‘contentious’ and ‘political’ dimensions of ‘responsibility’ towards 
the Other. In part, this thesis is about how a ‘notion of irresponsibility’ of the 
responsibility to protect helps to expose the normative framework of the concept 
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of the ‘responsibility to protect’, which in turn attempts to manage political 
plurality and ignores the complexity and potentiality of individual and political 
subjectivity.  
 
For Tony Erskine, to discharge responsibility requires agential materiality. 
Material agency, or in this sense cognitive agency, transfuses the ability to 
discharge responsibilities.557 Erskine has stated: “human individuals are generally 
thought to be paradigmatic moral agents”. 558  Conversely: “reference to the 
‘international community as a moral agent is deeply ambiguous” and further, 
“not only does the ‘international community’ as a moral agent lacks an identity 
that is independent of the identities of its constitutive members, but it does not 
have the decision-making capacity.”559 This pattern of thinking is associated with 
the idea of responsibility as accountability or blameworthiness. Legal 
responsibility requires such a strict identity on the part of the holder of 
responsibility because it necessitates a physical person or corporeal body with a 
specific structure of command to hold accountable for the failure of discharging 
responsibilities. As such, the UN or the UNSC can be seen as candidates of legal 
responsibility.560  
 
It seems relevant to highlight here the “sharper dividing line between political 
(collective) responsibility, on one side, and moral and/or legal (personal) guilt, 
on the other.”561 I am interested in the various ways the focus on the individual 
(and law as regulating the body and individual responsibility), works as a place of 
comfort against the discomfort produced through collective and structural 
responsibilities associated with mass suffering. To quote Hannah Arendt: “in the 
center of moral considerations of human conduct stands the self; in the center of 
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political considerations of conduct stands the world.”562 In crimes of a grand scale 
(for example, genocide or crimes against humanity) in which mass suffering 
occurs, legal (individual) accountability is not proportionate to the suffering cost 
and hence collective responsibility does not materialize. Someone can be relieved 
from legal responsibility but yet not from political or collective responsibility. 
Further, the difference between legal guilt and political responsibility does not 
mean that the legal and political spheres of responsibility are also distinct. In 
fact, legal guilt and moral responsibility in the face of mass crimes reveal an 
intimate relationship. In the face of mass crimes, the way we deal with legal guilt 
for mass crimes, influences and is influenced by our understanding of political 
(collective) responsibility. Arendt has famously claimed the distinctive nature of 
legal responsibility: “where all are guilty, nobody is. Guilt, unlike responsibility, 
always singles out; it is strictly personal”.563 This is also perhaps the basis of 
Erskine’s claim, that collectivities such as the ‘international community’ do not 
have identity and decision-making capacity. Arendt elsewhere says: “it is the 
grandeur of court proceedings that even a cog can become a person again.”564 
Note here the primary paradoxical relationship between social responsibility and 
legal responsibility. Conversely, on political or moral responsibility Arendt has 
said: 
“This vicarious responsibility for things we have not done, this taking upon ourselves the 
consequences for things we are entirely innocent of, is the price we pay for the fact that 
we live ourselves but among our fellow men, and that the faculty of action par excellence, 
can be actualized in one of the manifold forms of human community.”565 
This suggests that political and moral responsibility is much more complex than 
legal accountability or legal guilt, and that perhaps to prison oneself within the 
confines of legal responsibility is a failure to recognise collective responsibility 
emanating from the very fact of human co-existence and experience. Or, by 
focusing on legal responsibility or individual accountability something is lost. 
According to Erskine, “policy prescriptions that place duties with collectivities 
that do not meet the criteria for institutional moral agency  - such as the 
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‘international community’ – are not only fruitless endeavours, but they also risk 
being evasions of significant problems veiled as ‘calls to actions.’”566 Erskine 
suggests that some institutions, for example states but not nations, qualify as 
institutional moral agents.567 Yet, responsibility does not only emerge vertically, it 
also has a horizontal dimension. Erskine’s evaluation is a legal one, it 
presupposes a particular subject of responsibility and/or a structure of command 
that can then be connected to a specific action (or omission) for which it can be 
held accountable and thus be punishable. Given the agential void of the 
‘international community’, the political, social and collective ‘responsibility’ 
which it promises, fails to materialize. Over time, this non-materialization of 
responsibility becomes accumulated and what actually materializes is the 
understanding of a widespread, systematic and long-term suffering that no one is 
accountable for. In this sense, if the ‘international community’ has no identity 
and no agential materiality, how come we still think of ‘humanity’ as having 
responsibilities? Who assigns identities and duties on elusive collectivities like 
the ‘international community’ or ‘humanity’, and how? How do we assign 
political responsibility in bigger and wider networks, multi-structural and with 
multiple sites of action? Where a single structure of command cannot be 
identified, as legal reasoning necessitates, would that mean that materialising 
and actualising political responsibility for such wide networks is impossible?  
 
c. Sites of ‘irresponsibility’ within R2P 
 
The intention here is to uncover and expose ‘sites of irresponsibility’ within R2P. 
Since the responsibility to protect is a legal concept that assigns responsibility to 
the state and the ‘international community’, the following analysis seeks to 
investigate patterns and forms of the disappearance of political, moral and 
collective responsibility within the responsibility to protect concept. In other 
words, the intention here is to see how law and legal responsibilities organize 
irresponsibility in relation to the responsibility to protect concept. To explore 
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this, I use as signifiers Veitch’s three main features of modern social forms of 
organization to which I referred above, and their relation to the production of 
sites of irresponsibility.  
 
The division of labour and the significance of role responsibility 
 
In Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman demonstrated how modern civilisation 
aiming at social order, and specifically Western civilization, allowed for or even 
socially engineered the horror of the Holocaust. The modern management of 
morality, Bauman suggests, has furthermore the characteristics of (1.) the social 
production of distance; (2.) the substitution of moral responsibility, which 
effectively conceives the moral significance of action and (3.) the technology of 
segregation and separation.568 In other words the assumption is that evil and the 
mass human atrocities of WWII were not the product of disorder or social chaos, 
but rather of the “terrifying normality” of “the modern – rational, planned, 
scientifically informed, expert, efficiently managed, co-ordinated way”.569 Arendt 
has famously called the effect of top-down and socially engineered violence the 
‘banality of evil’. 570  The well-known portrayal of Adolph Eichmann through 
Hannah Arendt’s narration of his trial in Jerusalem is an attack against the 
understanding that individuals can single-handedly perpetrate crimes against 
humanity.571 It is the story of an ordinary man, devoid of his critical capacity, 
following the law and assisting order. It is also an attack against the trials 
themselves for their failure to grasp the global dimension and effects of ‘crimes 
against humanity’. Veitch’s notion of irresponsibility stems from a very similar 
central thesis. It aims to show the process of ‘legally caused harms’, “not as 
impotence, but as the system working”.572  
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The elements of the mechanisms of the inner-societal productions of order:  
standing armies, police forces, financial and welfare institutions, those 
bureaucratic institutions which provide for order and security - are also elements 
of communal identity and reality; they are producing, internalizing and 
institutionalising particular understandings of responsibility. Bauman claimed 
that one form of responsibility that we can recognize is a technical one rather 
than moral and is endogenous of the hierarchical and functional divisions of 
labour.573 In other words, this understanding of responsibility – role responsibility 
or command responsibility - emanates from processes produced by the division 
of labour. One of its central characteristics is the “disassociation from moral 
evaluation of ends”. 574  Functional, technical and command responsibility is 
associated with one fulfilling a duty, taking a decision under a specific role, or 
commanding subordinates, rather than thinking over the consequences of the 
“final outcome of collective activity, and the outcome itself”.575 Contrary to Toni 
Erskine, Bauman submits that role responsibility is “a condition in which he [the 
actor] sees himself as carrying out another person’s wishes”; the “agentic state is 
the opposite of the state of autonomy.”576 Bauman calls this responsibility ‘free-
floating’, in that it is ‘unanchored’.577 Responsibility is in this sense prescribed by 
one’s role. Hannah Arendt has drawn particular attention to this kind of 
responsibility referring to it as the ‘cog-theory’. 578  A further feature of role 
responsibility is that it minimizes ‘human proximity’ between one’s experience 
and the outcome of collective actions or roles producing suffering to the other. 
According to Bauman, “morality seems to conform to the law of optical 
perspective.”579 Role responsibility is closely related to legal responsibility. What 
is important here, as Veitch suggests, is that the legal form is the mediating 
form. 580  In effect, law organizes various role responsibilities into legal role 
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responsibilities. It establishes the boundaries of causation and defines what 
amounts to harm. It also defines the boundaries of thinking about responsibility 
itself within an activity. Other considerations, alternative considerations or 
further considerations of responsibility and of harm within an activity or practice 
stop where legal responsibility indicates. Whereas suffering occurs through the 
fulfilment of legal responsibility, suffering does not “register in law as 
problematic precisely because it was legal.”581 In this light, law cannot reflect on 
its ‘irresponsibility’; it is blind to the suffering that it produces. In organising legal 
role responsibilities, law also normalizes the political claims within an activity. 
While a demand of responsibility arises, law has already established the 
framework, criteria, claimants, harms and forms of redress under which that 
demand of responsibility is to be fulfilled. According to Veitch, “the legal form is 
seen to be desirable not because of its substantive rationality, but because of its 
instrumental deployment – the difference it can effect on the reality as a means 
of providing authoritative verdicts.”582 Through this lens, legal role responsibility 
squeezes out the complexity of political conflicts and of responsibility in order to 
make them manageable. It provides a system for the management of political 
conflicts. Nowhere is this more evident than in international law. International 
law is in effect a system that seeks to regulate competing political claims between 
states. 
 
The story of Francis M. Deng, the ‘father’ of sovereignty as responsibility and 
once passionate advocate of the concept and language of the responsibility to 
protect, illustrates the issue of role responsibility. Mading Deng, a South 
Sudanese diplomat, worked within the United Nations for more than 30 years. In 
1992, he was appointed by then UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali as 
Representative of the UN for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). He held this 
position for 12 years. In the course of his post he made multiple scholarly 
contributions including, in 1996, the co-authorship of Sovereignty as 
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Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa.583 This study has served as the 
conceptual underpinning of the responsibility to protect concept. The 
publication underscores the responsibility of the state to account for mass crimes 
or human violations committed in its territory to the ‘international community’. 
It underlines the belief that often the invocation of national sovereignty blocks 
the “international community from providing protection and assistance to the 
needy and helping in the search for an end to destructive violence”. 584 
‘Sovereignty as responsibility’ provided for a re-articulation of state sovereignty; 
not merely that state sovereignty is not a carte blanche but much more 
importantly, through the concept, ‘international’ protection pierces the thick 
armour of the state. The research suggests that internal conflicts in Africa 
illustrate the complexity of conflicts “rooted in the politics of identity and 
competition for power and scarce resource, which often clash with the demands 
of nation building”.585 Further, it acknowledged the devastating effects of the 
power vacuums produced at the end of centralized colonial government and the 
end of Cold War ethnic and national bi-polarization respectively.586 The project 
reflected and provided for various policies of integration and managing of 
conflict identities. It attempted to analyse the roots of violence in different 
African nations by expanding on issues within governance, the conflict of 
identities, financial conflicts and regional dynamics and international actors. It 
further concluded on the ambivalent role of regional and international actors, 
often positively creating a balance between competing claims and often 
aggravating claims to power. Yet, “a government that allows its citizens to suffer 
in a vacuum of responsibility for moral leadership cannot claim sovereignty in an 
effort to keep the outside world from stepping in to offer protection and 
assistance.”587 Such responsibility is conceived as action, it advocates that the 
international community must find the means and consensus to intervene even if 
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this is often poses serious risks or creates more conflict. In his role as researcher 
and Representative of the UN for IDPs, Francis Deng passionately advocated and 
worked to establish the position that state authorities should cooperate openly 
with international actors and abide by the rules governing the regime of human 
rights. In 2007 he was also appointed as the new Special Advisor for the 
prevention of Genocide and Mass atrocities. However, from 2012 up until July 
2016, Deng served as the UN ambassador of the newly independent South Sudan.  
 
In December 2013 violent conflict erupted between the Nuer and Dinka 
ethnicities and between the government and revolutionary armed opposition. 
The government was accused of atrocities in Juba, the capital of South Sudan and 
for expelling UN human rights ambassadors and aid workers. Deng, in his role as 
the South Sudanese representative, stood by his government and attempted to 
mediate the situation between his government and the UN. According to a 
Foreign Policy analysis, Deng preferred to ‘downplay’ the prospects of military 
intervention and attempted to mediate ‘behind the scenes’.588 In a United Nations 
Security Council resolution meeting in October 2015 on the provisions of 
extending UNMISS, the peacekeeping mission in S. Sudan, Francis Deng 
contested the view of the UNSC and the head of UNMISS, who proposed the use 
of drones (UAVs) for the purposes of investigating human rights violations, 
monitoring the ceasefire agreements and aid delivery. The resolution also 
included the threat of sanctions.589 Speaking after the vote, Deng claimed that the 
resolution was adopted without consultation with his Government. More 
specifically he said: “It is particularly regretful that issues on which the South 
Sudan Government had made its position clear have been adopted without 
regard to the Government’s point of view”.590 He claimed that the complete 
deployment of UNMISS personnel to the authorized military and police strength, 
including tactical military helicopters and UAVs, were “contested issues with the 
Government” and “to include them without consultation with the Government 
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was to invite controversy and potential disagreement and hostility.”591 He said his 
Government 
“needed assistance in such areas of building peace, building governance capacity and 
delivering essential services, among other things.  It was time for the United Nations and 
the international community to engage the Government on this constructive agenda 
instead of using negative threats of sanctions and punishment.” 592  
What is noteworthy is that Deng, who worked in the corridors of the UN and 
held high profile positions such as the Special Advisor on Genocide, regarded the 
language used in the resolution, the established practice of sanctions, and the use 
of UAVs for the purposes of monitoring as ‘negative threats’ and ‘punishment’. 
Therefore, for Deng as representative of S. Sudan, the ‘international community’ 
was not assisting the country in implementing its responsibility but hindering 
both their relations and progress. The language used in the resolution and 
proposed protection practices were established UN practices, of which Deng was 
well aware and of which he himself made use in the past as representative of the 
UN.  
 
The example of Deng’s case serves to illustrate the practical effects of role 
responsibility that is associated more with one fulfilling a duty rather than 
thinking reflexively about collective responsibility. Further, the example does not 
want to suggest that Deng should have accepted the resolution or that he was 
wrong, but only to underline the superficiality and rhetoric of the responsibility 
to protect concept and the complexity of responsibility for the other’s suffering 
under the very real and practical effects of the division of labour and of role 
responsibility. It is in this sense perhaps that responsibility is ‘free-floating’ 
according to Bauman, in that it is anchored in role responsibilities but ‘free floats’ 
between the different and distinctive roles. Responsibility, in this sense, fails to 
be discharged when one stops being reflective of the outcome of collective action. 
Military responsibility or command responsibility is paradigmatically such a 








The meaning and effect of processes of individualization within R2P 
 
The western concept of responsibility, which we can locate within international 
law and just war theory, has a Hebrew-Christian pedigree. Arendt suggests that 
“with the rise of Christianity, the emphasis shifted entirely from care for the 
world and the duties connected with it, to care for the soul and its salvation.”593 
From Nicomachean Ethics to Cicero, says Arendt, “ethics or morals were part of 
politics… The question is never whether an individual is good but whether his 
conduct is good for the world he lives in. In the center of interest is the world and 
not the self.”594 The modern concept of responsibility is associated with a subject 
that filtrates its morality through an emphasis on the conditions of the self, as if 
it is an autonomous and self-coherent subject. This is also in part the legacy of 
the Enlightenment. In the words of Veitch, “conceptions of autonomy and free 
will as the central understanding of responsibility, were to dominate the modern 
cognitive imagination.”595 In this sense the locus of responsibility as Arendt notes, 
is the self. 596  According to Veitch, “responsibility, focally conceived of as 
individual responsibility, emerged as part of a long historical process, one that 
saw the rise of the autonomous ‘individual’ freed from the bonds of feudalism, 
fate and superstition.”597 Today, even if responsibility represents no single notion 
and even if we can recognize multiple ‘technologies of responsibility’, as Veitch 
suggests, the notion of individual responsibility in fact retains a particularly 
dominant place. Individualization seems to play a very important role in the 
production of irresponsibility. Indeed, exposing this feature brings to light a 
much deeper difficulty – that of the appearance of self, the Other, as well as 
collective being, and how these appearances materialize in law and politics. 
 
Iris Marion Young in Responsibility for Justice argues that individual 
accountability and its attendant ‘personal liability model’ dominates the 
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normative framework of analysis on the causes and roots of poverty.598 According 
to Young, “the discourse on personal responsibility… assumes a misleading ideal 
that each person can be independent of others and internalize the costs of their 
actions. It ignores how institutional relations in which we act render us deeply 
interdependent.”599 Young argues that “the personal liability discourse attempts 
to isolate the deviant poor and render them particularly blameworthy of their 
condition which then justifies the application of paternalistic or punitive policies 
to them.”600 Now, according to Veitch, citing Ulrich Beck, the paradox of post-
modern individualization is that the same time the individual “sinks into 
insignificance, he or she is elevated to the apparent throne of world-shaper.”601 
More specifically:  
“Where the individual is an outcome – of complex and contradictory systemic demands 
and stakes – then the attribution of freedom, responsibility, capacity, etc. to the 
individual is inevitably bound up with an understanding of these demands and stakes. 
And to the extent that these systemic forms are able to shift around meanings of 
responsibility and hence to produced zones of non-responsibility…, then the notion of 
the individual likewise embodies these characteristics  - and not only superficially, but at 
its core.”602 
In its extreme, this self “‘which has no necessary social content and no necessary 
social identity can then be anything, can assume any role or take any point of 
view because it is in and for itself nothing.’”603 In the best case scenario the post-
modern thinking subject appears to be divided between the various notions and 
demands of responsibility, which appear more and more as a discomforting 
feeling of the ‘morally obscene sight’ of the asymmetry between articulating 
responsibility and establishing responsibility.604 The individual emerges and is 
located within a globalized battlefield that is “dominated by complex 
organizations and the systemic dynamics in which they operate”, but at the same 
time it also appears to retain a prominent place when it comes to discharging 
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responsibility. 605  Whereas suffering is the result of systemic contradictions and 
of complex networks, individual responsibility appears highly inadequate. The 
issue of individualization concerns the processes of individuation not only within 
oneself but also between self, community, state and global institutions. 
Therefore, individualization and subjectivity not only allow us to better 
understand the complex constitution of the subject but point out to a non-linear 
understanding of the constitution of state, community and of responsibility.  
 
Correspondingly, within the R2P, the process of individualization retains a 
prominent place. The operation of human rights, the vision of liberal 
cosmopolitanism and of ‘responsibility’ within the responsibility to protect 
concept attempts to transcend state-centred politics. The subject of protection of 
R2P is not the state but populations and the body itself. Furthermore, it is the 
state that is called upon to constantly provide for the subject’s protection. In 
practice, the international community only temporarily assumes collective 
political responsibility and only in the moment of decision; the question of 
responsibility always returns back to the political authority of the sovereign state. 
The sovereign state appears as a unitary subject under international law but it is 
not. It is as collective as the ‘international community’ is. Consequently, the 
paradox of the responsibility to protect is therefore the rhetorical insistence on 
the collective responsibility of the ‘international community’ – while the 
discharge of collective responsibility is realized through a form of legal individual 
responsibility – ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. Furthermore, it appears that it is 
only in the face of ‘failure’ that the international community assumes collective 
responsibility. In relation to R2P, the materialization of the international 
community is temporal. In contrast, both the demand for state responsibility and 
its materialization is ‘infinite’. The discharge of the social and political 
responsibility of the international community plays out as action at the moment 
of crisis and in the form of mediating and managing political transition. In 
addition, as also discussed in the next section, not only sovereignty as 
responsibility in international law is a form of individual legal accountability that 
																																																								




limits the horizon of realizing the collective dimension of responsibility but it is 
also particularly empowered through its attachment to ICL and the ICC and their 
authoritative character. The oxymoron within the responsibility to protect 
concept is on one hand the universalist aspiration of cosmopolitanism and on the 
other the particularist realization of that aspiration.606 The next chapter will 
probe deeply into other causes and effects of this paradox, the point here is to 
establish individualization as an important element in the organization of 
irresponsibility in relation to R2P and to provide an example.  
 
The process of individualization in relation to R2P has an effect on the process of 
recognition of both individual and collective political subjectivity. I will return to 
this issue in chapter 4. For the time being, it is sufficient to note, that legal 
cosmopolitanism embraces the belief that the management of complex conflicts 
is feasible; that it is possible, in the words of Bellamy, “to shape the perpetrator’s 
incentive structures or encourage internal dissent within the perpetrating 
elite.”607 This is based upon the assumption that not only there is a certain 
international political subjectivity but we can distinguish and manipulate 
accordingly other subjectivities. According to O’Callaghan, Walzer and his 
communitarian ethics, from which his just war theory emerges, cannot capture 
the constitutive relationship of the subject’s formation: “the auto-effective 
tradition contends that the self can engage with the outside world because it is 
assured of its own subjectivity.” 608  The implications of the processes of 
individualization are in this sense essentially exposing not only the complex 
process of subject formation but of community and state formation. ‘Sovereignty 
as Responsibility’ - the legal and political ‘individual’ responsibility of the state to 
its people - isolates the failed state and allows the ‘international community’ to 
adopt paternalistic and particularistic policies since those states are blameworthy 
of their condition. The exclusion of alterity seems necessary for the community’s 
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continuation and of “authentic communal life”.609  Furthermore, Walzer posits 
that regime change is preferable, supporting that intervention “can restore the 
minimal self-determination without altering the ability of the community to 
build a maximal shared life.”610 By way of empirical analysis O’Callaghan contends 
that in fact, the intervention, post-war reconstruction (the US constitutional 
plan) and the subsequent de-ba’thification within Iraq’s already distraught 
community furthered the ethno-sectarian conflicts. In fact, the Sunni populations 
felt that they were punished for Hussein’s crimes and were excluded from 
important societal positions. These men had been integrated under Hussein 
within the security forces and thus were military trained.611 This model of liberal 
cosmopolitan protection is one in which certain parts of the population are used 
as agents of internationally backed local governance while others become 
expendable and subject to punishment.  
 
In contrast to the intervention in Iraq, the removal of the regime in Libya 
happened with the support of the ‘international community’. The decision to 
intervene in Libya under Resolution 1973, according to Hehir, is not to be 
considered as a unique decision, however “it is certainly coherent with the spirit 
of R2P.” 612  The humanitarian emergency in Libya in contrast to what was 
portrayed by mainstream media and supported by NATO and its allies was not an 
emergency of the sort of Rwanda. Despite the facts, in the history of 
humanitarian interventions, the decision to use military force to halt the killing 
of Qaddafi’s adversaries was swift and was also promptly celebrated by liberal 
internationalists as ‘a new politics of protection’ championing the language of 
R2P.613 The intervention has also been closely linked to the work of the ICC.  
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Looking back at the conflict, the intervention did shape the outcome of the 
political struggle. Hugh Roberts has portrayed Qaddafi as a leader who did not 
loose completely the respect of his people.614 Instead, Qaddafi’s regime enjoyed a 
substantial measure of support, as the National Transitional Council (NTC) did. 
Libyan society was divided and, from one point of view, political division was in 
itself a hopeful development since, it signified the end of the old political 
unanimity enjoined and maintained by the Jamahiriya. In quickly removing 
Qaddafi from power the struggle lost a very important element in the recreation 
of government - political confrontation. Roberts argues that the impression given 
through Western media of a coherent public voice condemning Qaddafi and 
demanding his removal, was partially biased. Western media and pro-
intervention forces implied that within the mass of voices which demanded the 
removal of Qaddafi resided a vision of a specific, coherent, even democratic 
society which the liberal states and international organizations can partner with.  
 
Research for this thesis commenced in January 2011, amidst what emerged as the 
‘Arab Spring’ of the Middle East. Both the intensity and size of the 
demonstrations produced a sense of anxiety and disorientation of what the future 
holds for the region. The demonstrations brought to light an array of divergent 
voices and identities from various socio-economic and religious backgrounds in 
the Middle Eastern and North African regions, “long dismissed as prisoners of the 
“Oriental soul.” 615 Following the self-immolation of Muhamed Bouazizi on 
December 17, 2010 in Tunisia and the successful ousting of president Ben Ali, who 
held the presidential office since 1987, mass demonstrations followed in Libya, 
Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Bahrain. Egypt while remaining fragile to violence and 
authoritarianism managed to oust Hosni Mubarak and form a central 
government. The revolutions, which took place in Libya, Syria and Yemen, did 
not result in such swift regime change but plummeted into a struggle for power 
between very different political subjectivities, ranging “from the secular to the 
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neoliberal to Islamist.”616 The next day could see the secular or neoliberal camps 
aligning with the Islamist, the Islamist with the secular or neoliberal. Political 
subjectivity is an uncertain phenomenon always marked by change. Libya is 
currently (2018) split between rival political factions and militias with no effective 
central government in sight. The UN-backed Government of National Accord 
(GNA) led by Fayej al-Saraj, is a result of the Libyan Political Agreement signed in 
December 2015 and the effort of the UN to form a central government. However, 
the UN-backed government is contested by rival factions, such as the chief 
commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar that dominates 
Eastern Libya and is backed up by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.617  
Haftar’s LNA is aligned with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 
and refuses to recognize the UN-backed government in Tripoli.618 The situation in 
Libya becomes a fertile ground for other heavily armed groups, such as ISIL, to 
enter Libya and make territorial gains. Syria entered its seventh year of civil war, 
in which more than four other countries are militarily involved by providing 
intelligence, ammunition or financial assistance to either the government, or to 
the different factions. Turkey is conducting its own war inside Syria against the 
Kurdish YPG whom it considers an offshoot of the PKK, the US and coalition 
forces assist the Syrian Democratic Forces and from 2014 have been using all 
available military technology to annihilate the Islamic State. The different 
regional, strategic and geo-political interests, that many of these countries see in 
Syria, do not show any sign that we will be seeing an end to brutality soon. In the 
age of innovative digital technology and of direct access to information, “few 
events in recent history have been subjected to so much inadequate and partial 
reporting”.619 Indeed, keeping up to date with events and locating reliable sources 
on both the wars of Libya and Syria is a daunting task, let alone to be able to 
distinguish between different political subjectivities, perpetrators and victims. 
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The Western powers in connection with other African and Arab countries, which 
most of the time, share strategic and financial ties, de-politicised the question of 
governance and of justice in the Libyan conflict. At the same time they 
immunized both themselves and partner countries, which retain no better record 
of mass human rights violations than Qaddafi’s Libya within or outside their 
states, such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, China, Russia, Turkey and the United States. 
These states are not solely collaborating on the basis of their cosmopolitan ethos. 
Much more importantly, they share financial and strategic needs. Reiterating 
Wallerstein’s world-system analysis for a moment here, current cosmopolitan 
socialization arrives also with a demand “of the acceptance of the very real 
hierarchies that are the product of the system”620 and an assurance that an 
efficient, competent world-economy remains in place. We shall be careful not to 
‘underrate state power’ but at the same time when one considers the content of 
cosmopolitan responsibility one must also “give proper attention to social forces 
and processes and see how they relate to the development of states and world-
orders.”621 This understanding, by extension, might have the ability to curtail the 
difference between what cosmopolitan responsibility claims of being and how it 
materializes.  
 
According to Bauman, “human mutuality and community rest no longer on 
solidly established traditions, but rather, on a paradoxical collectivity of 
reciprocal individualization”.622 For Chantal Mouffe:  
“it is not a question of moving from a ‘unitary unencumbered self’ to a ‘unitary situated 
self’; the problem is with the very idea of the unitary subject. Many communitarians seem 
to believe that we belong to only one community, defined empirically and even 
geographically, and that this community could be unified by a single idea of the common 
good. But we are in fact always multiple and contradictory subjects, inhabitants of a 
diversity of communities (as many, really, as the social relations in which we participate 
and the subject positions they define), constructed by a variety of discourses, and 
precariously and temporarily saturated at the intersection of those positions”.623  
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As such, the liberal democratic position cannot account for systemic failures 
because, much more importantly, it fails to appreciate the political space of 
‘pluralistic democratic order’.624 Liberal cosmopolitan positions and the concept 
of the responsibility to protect fail to respond to the problems of ethnic and 
sectarian conflicts because they are confined within the paradox and dichotomy 
of universalistic aspiration and particularist realization. In this light, a site of 
‘irresponsibility’ within the responsibility to protect is the inability to grasp both 
the state’s and the individual’s condition within complex global societal relations 
and the international political space. Therefore, it seems important to move 
towards a rethinking of the subject of responsibility in international law and 
think productively on the limits and effects of empowering, as well as the 
conditions of disempowering political subjectivity.  
 
‘Transference of responsibilities’: (a.) the ‘unreal’ normative pathologies of R2P and 
(b.) R2P and international criminal justice  
 
The division of spheres of human action is part of the technology of separation, 
for example the separation of the economic sphere from the legal or the legal 
from the political and the political from the economic. Veitch calls this 
phenomenon of social organization ‘forms of responsibility transference’.625 The 
separation of spheres of human action, for example the separation of the 
economic from the political, or the legal from the political, is a form of 
transference of responsibility; treating them as distinct ontological universes 
eliminates the discomfort resulting from the reality of there being parts of a 
largest totality. However important, the effects of the separation of the economic 
and political spheres of action will not be discussed in this chapter.626  Generally, 
the concept of ‘cognitive dissonance’627 describes the mental discomfort or unease 
experienced by a person who simultaneously holds two or more contradictory 
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beliefs, values or ideas. When the dissonance reveals itself, the psychological 
theory suggests that individuals will tend to eliminate the cognition that 
produces the feeling of unease. In this sense, cognitive dissonance is the 
experience resulting from the mentality of the separation of spheres of human 
action. Furthermore, the outcome of the process of separation is the transference 
of responsibility across institutional settings and self-regulated norm-producing 
entities.  
 
In relation to R2P forms of transference of responsibility result from the 
separation of the legal sphere from the political and from the fragmentation of 
the international juridical field itself. However, the juridical cannot be separated 
from the political. The juridical is inherently linked to the political, “to the polis 
as its constitutional provision.”628 Furthermore, according to Veitch, a way to 
transfer responsibility is to “shed the burden of responsibility for one’s fate by 
transferring it to a vast monolithic whole’ – “nature, or history, or class or race, or 
the ‘harsh realities of our time”, or one can argue to the war-like and self-
interested nature of man.629  
 
a. The ‘unreal’ normative pathologies of R2P 
 
Roland Paris summarized the ‘structural’ problems of the responsibility to 
protect. 630  Roland views the responsibility to protect primarily as policy. 
Therefore, the way to judge if such policy is effective is by calculating whether its 
implementation carries what it promises: to protect populations from mass 
human atrocities. He concluded, through an analysis emphasizing on 
effectiveness, that the anxieties and problems of the responsibility to protect 
concept have more to do with its internal logic than with the criteria of its 
implementation. He identified five ‘fundamental and seemingly irremediable 
																																																								
628 Douzinas, 2006, op cit., p. 42. 
629 Veitch, op cit., p. 57, drawing upon Isaiah’s Berlin the concept of political monism: ‘trading moral 
responsibility for determinist visions and to an unpredictable future order.’ 
630 Roland Paris. (2014). The Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive 




tensions’ within the responsibility to protect concept: (1.) The mixed motives 
problem: that intervention for humanitarian reasons always carries the co-
existence of both self-interest and altruism, (2.) The counterfactual problem: the 
difficulty in demonstrating success, (3.) The conspicuous harm problem: no 
matter how careful military interventions always cause certain damage, (4.) The 
end-state problem: the difficulty of withdrawal and of regime change and (5.) The 
inconsistency problem: that there will be cases in which masses of civilians are in 
grave danger but the international community cannot or chooses not to 
intervene.631 These ‘pathologies’ in Paris’s view ‘trap’ the responsibility to protect 
concept within its very logic. In a response to the article, Ramesh Thakur, one of 
the co-authors of the concept disagreed with none of Roland Pari’s ‘structural 
dilemmas’, however, along with Gareth Evans, they “do not see them as real.”632 
He goes on to explain the reasons of rejecting such “pessimism”.633 For Thakur, 
these ‘pathologies’ do not resonate as real because the responsibility to protect 
concept works as a language, because the concept’s ‘dynamic’ is “refining rather 
than rejecting the principle”.634 In other words, the concept fosters consensus and 
that is enough. According to Ramesh Thakur: “R2P does not and cannot escape 
this structural constraint, but it did not create it: the dilemma is inherent in the 
use of force.635 A form of ‘transference of responsibility’ thus occurs where the 
pitfalls and normative inconsistencies are not a product of the responsibility to 
protect concept; the responsibility to protect concept is not complicit in 
‘irresponsibility’ produced through its operation – normative inconsistencies and 
pathologies are considered as structural dilemmas of any use of force. In this 
sense, the responsibility to protect concept achieves what it was meant to achieve 
– ‘a detailed normative articulation’ of “international authority to undertake 
executive action for protective ends.”636 In other words, the question is not and 
cannot be whether the ‘internal logic’ of militaristic protection practices is 
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effective or coherent. The question of the ‘internal logic’ of the responsibility to 
protect is out of the table; it does not even register as ‘real’ (whatever this 
means). For Thakur, “R2P does not address the distribution of jurisdiction and 
authority among states, but between states and international actors.”637 Here, 
Thakur fails to account for the issue of equality among states, that being the 
distribution of jurisdiction and authority.  
 
For proponents of R2P, the problem of juridical inequality is not conceived of as a 
foundational problem of the responsibility to protect concept: the issue of 
inequality is a ‘reality’ of international political life but not of law or policy. In 
this sense, juridical inequality does not and should not impede the work of the 
law. R2P is purely a set of criteria that trigger the international authority to use 
violence for protection purposes. According to Thakur, the ‘choice’ today is not 
between intervention or non-intervention, “but whether the intervention will be 
ad hoc or rules based, unilateral or multilateral and decisive and consensual”.638 
Just war theory (and R2P) cannot measure, judge or conceptualise collective and 
outward responsibilities. It is not in the interest of the just war theorist to do so. 
Just war theory begins with the threshold criteria of intervention so that all 
questions of responsibility are not considered. The terminology given by just war 
theorists to just war theory as ‘applied ethics’, allows disengagement from the 
question of ethics and of collective responsibility per se. In other words, just war 
theory works as ‘irresponsibility’ precisely because it closes the question of ethics 
and thus the question of responsibility. For Veitch, “the organization of 
irresponsibility is precisely the inability to have the question of responsibility 












b. R2P and international criminal justice 
 
Both the ICC and R2P share a common vision: the commitment to avert mass 
crimes and to become the means to that end. Frédérick Mégret rightly states that 
the ICC and R2P projects should be seen as ‘practices of power’ that complement 
each other and, are mutually dependent and constitutive.640 According to Mégret 
both share ‘classic features of idealism’, are “at the avant garde of a movement 
that seeks to endow states with positive as opposed to negative obligations” and 
both are ‘technocratic projects’.641 Their intimate relationship points also to a 
‘darker side’. While being presented as projects that seek to minimize violence 
and constrain power and sovereignty, they gravitate towards both power (in the 
form of the authority of the Security Council and ‘Great power’ prerogative) and 
sovereignty (both rely on state cooperation) for their implementation. 642 
According to Mégret: 
“both share a certain fascination with violence, either the violence that is in the criminal 
law or the violence that is in intervention. They vie for the legitimate control of this 
violence if only to claim that atrocities should be confronted with more violence…  In this 
they are obsessed with political violence, as opposed to the manifold ways in which 
violence operates in the world and at the risk of doing violence”.643 
The intervention in Libya was marked by its connection with the work of the ICC 
and the obsession to prosecute Qaddafi. 644 UNSCR 1970 (2011), the previous 
resolution to UNSCR 1973 which authorized all necessary means, referred the 
situation to the prosecutor of the ICC, imposed an arms embargo, asset freezes 
and travel bans to individuals linked to Qaddafi.645 The seven-month Operation 
ended on 31 October 2011 signalled by Qaddafi’s capture, and subsequent killing, 
by anti-Qaddafi fighters on the ground (20 October 2011). Qaddafi’s killing by 
ground fighters went viral over the Internet and social media. Every person who 
had access to the Internet had also instant access to Qaddafi’s final hours, in 
which a “dazed, confused, and blood-soaked” Qaddafi was lynched and killed by 
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fighters who rejoiced over his capture, humiliation and eventual killing. 646 
Considering that Qaddafi was under an ICC arrest warrant from November 2011 
until his death, there was no condemnation of Qaddafi’s killing, albeit a brief 
statement two months later by Luis Moreno Ocampo, former chief ICC 
prosecutor, at a UN briefing following an SC meeting, in which he stated that 
Qaddafi’s death “creates suspicions… of war crimes”.647 In contrast, the immediate 
responses following the dictator’s extrajudicial killing did not include such 
cautious rhetoric. Barack Obama saw the death of Qaddafi as an opportunity to 
celebrate US policy in the Middle East:  
“For the region, today’s events prove once more that the rule of an iron fist inevitably 
comes to an end. Across the Arab world, citizens have stood up to claim their rights. 
Youth are delivering a powerful rebuke to dictatorship. And those leaders who try to 
deny their human dignity will not succeed.”648  
Hillary Clinton, moments after Qaddafi’s death, laughed about it in an 
interview stating “We came, we saw, he died.”649 The work of the ICC was 
connected with such moralizing rhetoric and in fact, connecting the 
intervention with the seemingly politically neutral work of the ICC served to 
hide the morally contentious effects and aims of the intervention, as well as the 
politically charged significance of the fact that the rebels might have also 
committed ‘crimes against humanity’.  
 
Christine Schwöbel argues that international criminal law provides comfort 
against the discomfort of international human rights law. 650  Traditionally, 
international law is concerned with theorising state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility. The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 651  is one such culminated attempt. However, 
criminal state responsibility has always been met with certain hesitations. The 
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approach that the ILC took was to change the focus of attention from the notion 
of international state crimes. The Draft Articles focused instead on describing the 
criminal liability model for internationally wrongful acts, to the specific 
consequences of a breach of obligations erga omnes and of peremptory norms 
(jus cogens). 652  In addition, it attempted to establish a legal framework of 
attributing responsibility to particular agents of the state.  
 
The notion of both state responsibility and individual responsibility draws its 
content from a variety of sources: international humanitarian law, case law on 
state responsibility, the Genocide Convention, the UN Charter and other primary 
and secondary sources. The centrality, which the regime of human rights 
acquired over the years, suggests that states are asked constantly to account for 
any allegations of gross human rights violations perpetrated within their borders. 
An example of such a practice of accountability is the call for emergency sessions 
of the UNSC as regards to the commissions of crimes against humanity. The legal 
primacy of individual criminal responsibility in international law is attributed to 
the idea that collective (criminal) responsibility is a legal fiction.653 International 
criminal law works procedurally through an individual criminal liability model. 
Therefore, from a legal point of view, individual criminal responsibility in terms 
of prosecution and indictment is carried out relatively straightforwardly, as 
opposed to state responsibility. Adversarial third-party adjudication conducted in 
judicialized settings is reasoned on accountability determinations of the 
individual as the central unit for action. 654  Theorising individual criminal 
responsibility is also in this sense relatively unproblematic. 
 
As discussed, socio-historical analysis suggests that mass crimes in the history of 
mankind were not performed or executed by single individuals. Instead, mass 
human rights atrocities were perpetrated through organized structures. In the 
trials and convictions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the concept of 
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criminality was not attributed to any state. Instead, international legal practice 
prosecutes and convicts individual leaders and officials. The establishment of the 
International Criminal Court is the result of this understanding. 
Notwithstanding, the broad notion of a state being responsible for internationally 
wrongful acts or omissions is a well-established feature of international law. It is 
customary to hear calls for a state to fulfil its responsibilities towards its people, 
yet juridically that does not suggest the state as a whole. It is the agent who’s in 
command that finally needs to give an account of his acts or omissions.655 The 
problem and paradox here is one in which international criminal responsibility is 
concerned with individual responsibility “whereas specific sanctions of 
International Law constitute collective responsibility.”656 When the ‘international 
community’ kills in the name of human rights and protection, who gives an 
account for the suffering and violence it produces? Or, does international 
criminal responsibility truly address the issue of mass atrocities? Collective 
military interventions for protection purposes can also result in acts of collective 
punishment. What one can observe is a paradox with regards to 
individual/collective responsibility and individual/collective punishment in 
international law.  
 
Mark Drumbl argues that Western practices of punishment drawing upon 
Western domestic law are inadequate in responding to mass atrocities, 
“participation in atrocity becomes a product of conformity and collective action, 
not delinquency and individual pathology.”657 It has often been claimed that the 
domestic to international analogy, where criminal justice reasoning follows the 
model of ‘proscription, determination of responsibility and intentional infliction 
of pain’ in the form of punishment is “a degradation of the international criminal 
justice.” 658  Theories of punishment have been uncritically reshuffled for the 
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demands of international authority.659 Drumbl submits that empirical analysis of 
the cases of Rwanda and Afghanistan highlight that “structural simplicity 
pursued by the prevailing paradigm of persecution and incarceration squeezes 
out the complexity and dissensus of central and meaningful process of justice and 
reconciliation.” 660  He proposes an advancing from ‘law to justice’, the 
incorporation of bottom-up input and of extra-legal initiatives under which a 
broader understanding of responsibility for atrocities might create the possibility 
of discharging the collective responsibility implicated in mass atrocities. 661 
Drumbl’s critique of international criminal responsibility should be valued. 
Indeed, to ‘expand the lexicon of international justice’ and “classify the great evils 
as something more than just crimes”662 opens up the possibility of a broader 
horizon of conceptualizing responsibility and punishment in the international 
realm. However, is such an approach in terms of ‘theorizing responsibility’ with 
regards to mass human atrocities enough? What becomes of collective 
responsibility if international criminal accountability becomes normality, while 
collective sanctions amounting to forms of collective punishment remain rooted 
in the apparatuses of the UNSC or NATO and its allies?  
 
In the words of Michael Dillon, proponents of criminalization of social and 
political violence:  
“appeal to a system of individual moral subjectivity that, in the very absence of any 
transcendental authority guaranteeing it, they seek to employ as a material system, 
specifically through juridification, … to translate politics and the disputes of which it is 
comprised into administration and policing.”663 
The criminalization and legalization of social and political violence casts a 
shadow over the prospective and retrospective responsibilities of authority. The 
mainstream claim in support of individual criminal punishment is that it restores 
the dignity of the victim and carries didactic determinations in order to deter 
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future atrocities of a similar kind from occurring. Yet, the focus on the individual 
overshadows the political context. This, says Koskenniemi, is not to suggest that 
collective responsibility shall always take precedence over individual 
determinations but rather that in each case perhaps both are better than the 
permanent legal rationale of individual accountability. 664  If the promise of 
international criminal trials is to give an account of what had happened or to 
deter:  
“the truth is not necessarily served by an individual focus it may rather obstruct this 
process [historical truth] by exonerating from responsibility those larger (political, 
economic, even legal) structures within which the conditions of criminality have been 
created – within which the social normality of a criminal society emerges”665   
Political conflicts are conflicts of ideologies. Through this lens, ‘humanity’ (i.e. in 
crimes against humanity) should not be seen and treated as a fixed totality. 
Instead, political conflicts reveal the fragility and uncertainty of what ‘humanity’ 
means; in conflict, it is precisely ‘humanity’ that is being contested. In this sense, 
the work of the ICC and broadly the universal criminalization of social and 
political violence should be seen as moments in which particular views on 
humanity are being both contested and re-inscribed. According to Koskenniemi 
when international criminal trials take place the whole system of international 
criminal jurisdiction is on trial.666 In such cases it should be reminded, according 
to Koskenniemi, “no moral community is being affirmed beyond the elusive and 
self-congratulatory ‘international community’”.667 In this sense, we should take 
note of the varied meanings and representations of both ‘humanity’ or 
‘international community’, especially when these materialize through the 
practice of R2P and the work of the ICC and thus under the same banner of 
‘protection’. In other words, we should turn to the “semantics of intervention”, as 
Stahn noted, to understand the effects of folding humanitarian rationales with 
punitive ones.668  
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Furthermore, we should be wary of the political selectivity of international 
individual criminal prosecution. Simply put, if going to war against Iraq was a 
‘mistake’, but Qaddafi’s ‘mistakes’ were ‘crimes against humanity’, human rights 
materialize, in the words of Gerry Simpson, as “human rights with a vengeance” 
or in this sense, ‘humanity’ with a vengeance.669 What Simpson and Koskenniemi 
in fact argue, is that we should be cautious to how international criminal justice 
takes place, in what historical and political context and what is perhaps being 
excluded in its application. International criminal justice can function to both 
overshadow the political context of international violence by focusing on the 
individual and, at the same time, relativize and disturb the concepts of sovereign 
equality, the concept of international ‘protection’ and the concept of ‘humanity’. 
In other words, what is being relativized is the concept of responsibility in 
international law per se. In this sense, both the criminalization of social and 
political violence and prosecutions in the name of universal justice and humanity 
should be seen as ‘responsibility practices’. This lens can point to the limits and 
collective consequences of such ‘responsibility practices’. If international criminal 
justice prosecutes and punishes, as Simpson put it, “only those on the wrong side 
of history”670 then, sometimes, we might be better off without such justice. In the 
words of Simpson:  
“International criminal justice – the great institutional machine engineered by talented 
and humane diplomats, kept in motion by lawyers who have sacrificed material reward 
for a life in pursuit of humanitarian ends, directed at putting defeated enemies and 
human rights violators in jail, and celebrated every week in a public lecture advertising its 
virtues – might now be one of the less auspicious ways to do good in the world.”671 
Christopher K. Lamont, in his study of transitional justice mechanisms placed in 
Libya in the aftermath of the UN authorized intervention, claimed that Western-
backed practice was complicit in the fabrication of an ‘exclusionary’ and ‘highly 
retributive’ form of justice resembling political and social ostracization of “local 
sources of authority that did not fall within Western conceptions of the liberal 
																																																								
669 Gerry Simpson. (2016). Human Rights with a Vengeance: One Hundred Years of Retributive 
Humanitarianism, Australian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 33, pp. 1-36, Kirby Lecture, 2015, 
ANU. 
670 Ibid., p. 30. 




state”.672 As in the case of Iraq noted earlier, these now isolated groups were 
politically active and most of the times heavily armed. Nevertheless, the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) did not suspend western-backed 
transitional justice efforts but instead made transitional justice a vital and 
strategic component of post-Libya reconstruction. Further, it continued to back 
‘internationally recognized governments’ even if it ‘noted’ that Libyans were 
“distrustful of political institutions, such as parliaments and political parties” and 
supported transitional justice laws to which revolutionary armed groups were 
amnestied, whereas the old state apparatuses and affiliates of the Qaddafi regime 
were suppressed and targeted. 673  It also persisted to support the NTC’s 
transitional justice mechanisms even if these “challenged existing international 
legal norms and standards.”674 Post-conflict reconstruction is an important part of 
R2P, the situation in both Iraq and in Libya does suggest however how 
‘irresponsible’ can these legal mechanisms prove to be in the face of deeply 
sectarian and ideological conflicts. The report which the UNSMIL provided, to be 
executed by the NTC, submitted in 2012, singled out any reference to Islamic 
political thought which seemed to be an integral component of justice shared by 
a big part of the Libyan society. UNSMIL provided a blue-print document with a 
‘diagnosis’ of the crimes committed and the mechanisms that were to be used in 
order to uncover the ‘truth’.675 According to Lamont: 
“rather than viewing local actors as instrumentalizers of transitional justice, peace-
building and state-building practices should be acknowledged as generating conflict 
between local governance practices and transitional justice is just one of the axes along 
which these conflicts play out.”676  
If the aim is to form an inclusive civil society and stable welfare institutions, at 
least “resistance to international norms and practices of transitional justice 
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should be interpreted not as recalcitrance but rather as attempts to advance 
alternative political orders.”677 As Tallgren has posed: 
“Perhaps international criminal law serves a purpose of simultaneously both to reason 
and to mystify political control exercised by those to whom it is available in the current 
‘international community’. Perhaps its task is to neutralize, to exclude from the political 
battle, certain phenomena which are in fact the pre-conditions for the maintenance of 
the existing governance…”.678 
In some very important ways the work of the ICC and the focus on the individual 
marginalizes a set of questions that have to do with the ‘collective’ and political 
authority of both R2P and the ICC. ICL and the work of the ICC are sites of 
comfort for R2P. Both the work of the ICC and the invocation of ICL can conceal 
the ‘politics’ of intervention under the neutral banners of justice for the victims 
and punishment for the perpetrators. Their operation in connection with R2P 
and in the context of an international crisis relieves some of the pressure and 
anxiety of the political nature of R2P. The correctness and sanctity of ICL, as well 
as the potency of the ICC to provide authoritative verdicts on perpetrators and 
victims alike, are attributes that R2P lacks of and finds in the invocation of ICL 




This chapter attempted to illustrate the relationship between social modes of 
organizing responsibility practices, their mentalities and R2P. The ‘sites of 
irresponsibility’ (i.e. division of labour, individualization, “transference of 
responsibilities”) within R2P demonstrate that these are not merely 
implementation gaps; they are intrinsic because they are products of social 
modes of organizing responsibilities and thinking. As such, irresponsibility is 
internal to R2P.  
 
One of the insights of this chapter is that the form of international cosmopolitan 
policing, which R2P fosters, fails to understand the political subjectivity of both 
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community and subject formation. If the form of political subjectivity imagined is 
one that conforms only to “a liberal projection of what constitutes the 
emancipated self and one that assumes universal rights as the necessary 
discursive and juridical precondition for the emergence of the political subject”679, 
‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ never materializes, it is something other than what it 
claims. As asserted by Jacques Rancière: “politics cannot be defined on the basis 
of any pre-existing subject.”680 A connecting further insight was that the assertion 
of the ‘international community’ in relation to R2P is an act of self-constitution. 
Likewise, its promised ‘responsibility’ can also be seen as such a process or act.  
 
The urgency for action transforms the responsibility within R2P into a temporary 
project. The question is not whether R2P delivers what it promises, what kind of 
meanings it creates and what are its effects; the use of military force for human 
protection purposes is not to be contested. As Ramesh Thakur put it, “conceptual 
purity and analytical consistency is a requirement of academic rigour divorced 
from the untidy and messy real world of politics inhabited by policy-makers.”681 
The main and comfortable claim here is that there are no alternatives; immediate 
and direct use of military force is necessary (e.g. “real world of politics”) in the 
face of mass atrocities and mass human rights violations. This is an ideological 
and highly politicized claim in its own right. Such claims, from proponents of 
R2P, have the potential to overshadow the structural conditions of mass 
atrocities, to foreclose the possibilities of imagining alternatives, and to control 
and organize the discursive framework of responsibility practices. Furthermore, 
legal rationality and individual legal accountability work well with this pattern of 
thinking since they fulfil the desires for certainty and mastery that the use of 
military force prescribes (e.g. the relationship between R2P and international 
criminal justice).  
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Instead, the ‘notion of irresponsibility’ developed in this chapter attempts to 
highlight those social modes that organize responsibility and are being excluded 
by such patterns of thinking. This chapter has shown that collective and political 
notions of responsibility, as well as the ‘pathologies’ of R2P remain largely 
unacknowledged by the mainstream discourse around R2P. The division of 
labour and its attendant role responsibility, the processes of individualization 
and the varied ways ethic0-political responsibilities are transferred and 
disavowed with regards to R2P are to be seen as primary ‘sites’ of vulnerability. 
These features are not only of analytical value; such ‘sites’ inhibit responsibility 
practices and have material and ‘real world’ consequences. In the introduction of 
the chapter I referred to the recognition of ‘irresponsibility’ as a site of 
discomfort: “of intellectual restlessness”.682 If what is lost in the preference of 
comfort over discomfort is the possibility of recognition of ‘sites of 
irresponsibility’, the real loss is the intention to be critical and reflective. 
 
To this end, proponents of R2P are not interested in what becomes of 
responsibility towards the Other in theory and practice, but that it enables 
policy-makers to construct international moral arguments and to argue within a 
predetermined moral framework the case for international action. In this sense, 
the responsibility within R2P is best seen as a technocratic responsibility, a 
formality. As Jabri suggests, when cosmopolitanism works as a practice of 
government it is a politics that places primacy on security, rather than a politics 
defined through solidarity.683 From this point of view, the responsibility to protect 
concept begins to look more as a responsibility to control rather than to protect. 
The next chapter turns to ‘international political subjectivity’ - how individual 
and collective subject formation emerges in relation, in being-with, the other – to 
argue that the global ethical responsibility we find in R2P emanates from a 
foreclosing structure of address.  
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One of the connecting threads of this thesis has been to reflect on the meaning, 
effects and limits of ‘responsibility’ within R2P. So far, the analysis has explored 
the dominant vantage point(s) of thinking about the issue of protection and 
some of the normative assumptions that underpin the justifiability of the use of 
violence for protection purposes. Chapter 2, investigated both ‘classical’ and 
‘contemporary’ uses of just war thinking in relation to the concept and 
highlighted how and why just war thinking pervades accounts, which tend to 
support R2P. Chapter (3) investigated three main features of modern forms of 
social organization with their ‘attendant mentalities’, as signified by Veitch, and 
how these features relate to and manifest within the theory and practice of the 
R2P. These were: (1) the division of labour and the significance of role 
responsibility; (2) the meaning and effects of processes of individualisation and 
(3) how “transference of responsibilities” occurs in relation to the concept. The 
resulting insight gained from their analysis was that sites of irresponsibility are 
fabricated from the inside out. That a notion of irresponsibility is internal to 
responsibility practices with regards to protection, as these emanate from modern 
forms of social organization and their ‘mentalities’. Following Veitch’s 
proposition, this ‘irresponsible mentality’ disconnects effects and causes and 
discriminates between suffering in the presence of legal institutions and within 
organized responsibility practices. Through this lens, irresponsibility in relation 
to the responsibility to protect concept can be thought of, not merely as one of 
‘implementation’, ‘procedure’, ‘legality/illegality’, ‘authorization’ and ‘consensus’, 




better conceived as ‘an ability to respond’ and not merely as legal accountability 
and blameworthiness.684  
 
A further insight gained through the above mode of analysis is that distinctive 
notions of human subjectivity inform concepts and organized practices of global 
responsibility. As Outi Korhonen and Toni Selkälä also note, “the recognition of 
subjectivity is at the core of different concepts of responsibility.”685 Or, as Anne 
Orford pointed out, the theme of responsibility “addresses the conflict at the very 
interior of the subject, whether that subject be the liberal individual, the 
sovereign state, or the discipline of international law.” 686  Coextensively, I 
understand the responsibility to protect concept as a dominant institutionalized 
moral language and framework that is linked, both to the historical site of its 
emergence and to a juridico-moral history, a history as responsibility (as 
discussed in Chapter 2, R2P links back to the ethical framework of just war 
theory). The concept points to particular views of human and political 
subjectivity both in theory and in practice. As a final chapter and ‘layer’ in the 
critique of R2P that this thesis provides, this chapter explores how individual and 
collective subject formation emerges in relation, in being-with, the other. When 
it comes to protection practices, moving the lens to ‘international political 
subjectivity’, has analytical and substantial value for international lawyers, 
policymakers and the discipline itself. If the way international law, international 
lawyers, policy makers and security officials push, more or less, towards 
particular forms of political subjectivity, what kinds of subject or identity 
relations emerge? What kind of global ethical responsibility is communicated 
through R2P and its ‘international community’?  
 
This chapter argues that the global ethical responsibility we find in R2P emanates 
from a ‘foreclosing’ structure of address. Such a foreclosing structure fails the 
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promise of protection and of cosmopolitanism at an inter-subjective level and 
transforms global ethical responsibility into a project of governance, 
management and control. This vantage point is one in which the ‘international 
community’ of liberal international law and of legal cosmopolitanism projects 
self-assuredness, in terms of identity, of legality and legitimacy and of 
sovereignty; and fails to account for the limits of its own self-understanding, its 
internal irresponsibility and violence. It communicates a duty of care that is 
based primarily on punishing violators of a liberal international order, rather 
than on recognition, protection and/or solidarity. The juridico-moral framework 
of R2P in theory and practice both constitutes and is constitutive of forms of 
political subjectivity. Therefore, it substantially circumscribes the politico-ethical 
limits of both theory and practice, as it is materially controlling the structure of a 
global ethical framework of responsibility. Through the accounts of social and 
political responsibility we find in Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, accompanied 
by relevant critical legal and critical international relations literature, it is 
possible to gain an understanding of ethical global responsibility grounded in 
‘irresponsibility’. Such a concept embodies the internal conditions, paradoxes and 
‘aporias’ of responsibility (such as those explored in Chapter 3) and therefore, 
acknowledges these as parameters to theory and practice. However, it does not 
consider these parameters as limiting but instead, as conditions of global ethical 
responsibility. A practice of responsibility could also include, being willing to 
communicate the limits of self-understanding and the limits of agency; in other 
words, performing vulnerability, not keeping in secret and exposing oneself. This 
vantage point yields a radically different approach to global ethical responsibility 
from that of liberal internationalists and legal cosmopolitans.  
 
a. The ‘terrifying secret’ of responsibility and the ‘economy of sacrifice’  
 
In The Gift of Death, Derrida unveils an account of responsibility through the 
Abrahamic story and Isaac’s sacrifice. 687 It is a story of the subject’s relation to 
																																																								




itself, the relation to self as being before the Other, God, the universal and the 
particular every Other (the other is every (bit) other).688 Along with the ‘mystical’ 
images that permeate his interpretative account, Derrida “follows the traces of a 
genius of Christianity that is the history of Europe” and therefore, narrates a story 
or history of the liberal and post-modern juridico-moral concept of 
responsibility.689 He unveils a paradoxical and binary account of responsibility. 
His ‘aporia’ of responsibility (that irresponsibility appears as the necessary other 
side of responsibility) is a conceptual figure of thought that negotiates between 
politico-legal generality and responsibility to the singular other. The idea here is 
to explore some of these physiognomies of Derrida’s radical account of 
responsibility. 
 
For Derrida, a sufficiently ‘conceptualized’ or ‘thematized’ concept of 
responsibility must contain “what ‘responsibility’ means; that is to say 
everywhere.”690 In doing so, Derrida insists that a critical analysis of the concept 
of responsibility should entail, not only particular and general meanings, but also 
a ‘history’ of responsibility as it is manifested within the range of international 
political spaces and of subjectivity. Therefore, as Rosalyn Diprose suggests, 
‘Derridean’ responsibility should be read as responsiveness: “that affirms but also 
disrupts and critiques one’s cultural heritage, and thereby constitutes the self as 
futural.”691 According to Diprose, “this self-critique includes a critique of the 
juridical concept of responsibility we have inherited.’ 692  Through this lens, 
conceptualizations and thematizations of responsibility that do not take into 
account effects and meanings that the structure of the juridical concept of 
responsibility re-produces and operates might yield a closure to the possibilities 
of approaching or responding to the Other. What figures predominantly in 
Derrida’s work is a rejection of forms of dogmatism and of logics which would 
paralyze futurity: “conceptual exigence is necessary, even where it takes into 
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account the paradoxes and aporias, by accepting that burden and declaring them. 
It is, once again the condition of responsibility.”693  
 
Derrida’s account of responsibility is complemented by his projects on hospitality 
and forgiveness, justice, democracy to-come or the ‘heading of the other’. These 
are some of the ‘figures’ of what he calls the ‘im-possible’.694 What could be said 
about forgiveness could also be said about hospitality, cosmopolitanism and even 
justice695: “Forgivenness is not, it should not be normal, normative, normalizing. 
It should remain exceptional and extraordinary; in the face of the impossible: as if 
it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality.”696 For Derrida, the 
‘hyperbolic ethical vision’ of forgiveness can produce “here, now, in the urgency 
without waiting, responses and responsibilities”697, even pushing towards an 
evolution of the law. Derrida’s aporia is a reality, the im-possibility of 
responsibility “seizes me here and now”; “this impossibility is thus not a 
(regulative) idea or ideal” 698 , it cannot be normatively totalizing. Just as 
forgiveness, hospitality’s ‘principle’ calls: “or even creates the desire for, a welcome 
without reserve and with an exposure without reserve…”
699 Through the same lens, 
responsibility which becomes regulative: “to the strict meaning Kant gave to the 
regulative use of ideas (as opposed to their constitutive use), we would, in all 
rigor, in order to say anything on this subject and, especially, in order to 
appropriate such terms, have to subscribe to the entire Kantian architectonic and 
critique”.700 It is in this sense that Derrida opposes in part the Kantian ethic of 
hospitality. The universal law that will ultimately govern the domain of the 
political conditions of hospitality, circumscribes the form hospitality takes, and 
thus becomes a contradiction in ‘principle’. For Derrida, the Kantian ethic of 
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hospitality is a ‘conditioned hospitality’, which also becomes a conditional 
promise. In this sense, it is significant not to conceive hospitality, autonomy, 
democracy, justice and responsibility as regulative ideas, not to normalize the 
space of the promise of international law, to be left with “a despairing 
messianicity or a messianicity in despair”.701 Regulating the promise of justice or 
of democracy represents for Derrida a closure, which waits indefinitely on a 
future that is already assigned, always deferring the possibility of a future in the 
present. In a sense, Derrida opposes to such closures because these also limit the 
potential of creativity and imagination, in the singular moment of deciding on 
responsible action, specifically at the moment of encounter. If the decision 
results in a fully pondered ideological and regulative future:  
“the decision no longer decides anything but is made in advance annulled. It is simply 
deployed, without any delay, presently, with the automatism attributed to machines. 
There is no longer any place for justice or responsibility (whether juridical, political, or 
ethical).”702 
According to Derrida, we do not need to believe in the biblical story of Isaac’s 
sacrifice to recognize the discomforting and aporetic structure of responsibility. 
Even if one treats the biblical story and its theological connotations as a ‘fable’, 
what is uncovered and exposed is the experience of morality and the paradoxical 
structure of responsibility.703 European history, for Derrida, is also a history as 
history of responsibility. A history of responsibility that is ‘tied up to a culture of 
death’, to an economy of sacrifice and dying for the other. Arguably, such a 
history challenges the amnesia of exploitation and of colonialism through acts of 
‘responsible protection’. For the proper use of Derrida’s aporia in the context of 
our discussion, we need not to focus so much on the Christian and theological 
physiognomies of the concept of absolute responsibility Derrida deconstructs, 
but on the themes at play. Ultimately, this is perhaps the point of Derrida’s 
uncovering of the moral fable, the deconstructionist move and the possibilities 
that it produces. The interpretative and deconstructionist process produces 
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necessarily discomfort before the impasse of the concept of responsibility, yet 
such uneasiness becomes a condition of responsibility. Discomfort in this sense is 
better understood as intellectual restlessness and that ethical responsibility 
requires openness towards an even imponderable ethical relation, one that has 
not already been decided and normatively framed. Derrida shares with us that:  
“The exercise of responsibility seems to leave no choice but this one, however 
uncomfortable it may be, of paradox, heresy, and secrecy. More serious still, it must 
always run the risk of conversion and apostasy: there is no responsibility without a 
dissident and inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or 
doctrine.”704 
Derrida’s ‘aporia’ of responsibility contains the themes of secrecy, of the other, 
and of sacrificial logic and points to an economy of subjectivity:  
 “for if there were no absolutely heterogeneous interiority separate from objectivity, if 
there were no inside that could not be objectified, there would be no secrecy either. 
Whence the strange economy of the secret as economy of sacrifice that is brought to bear 
here.”705 
As Derrida reminds us, this ‘aporia’ (irresponsibility in responsibility and vice 
versa) is an everyday phenomenon, and it is intimately linked to an economy of 
sacrifice. Connected with the insights gained from the analyses of Chapters 2 and 
3, the ‘sites of irresponsibility’ explored within the responsibility to protect, can 
provide both a sense of discomfort and of anxiety; yet also, these sites represent 
some of the realities, material conditions and expose some of the normative 
inconsistencies of the concept of the responsibility to protect. This could perhaps 
be seen as the ‘economy’ of the responsibility to protect concept. We need to 
remember, as Derrida proposes in the Gift of Death, that the “smooth functioning 
of such society”: 
“its discourses on morality, politics, and the law, and the exercise of rights (whether 
public, private, national or international), are in no way impaired by the fact that, 
because of the structure of the market that society has instituted and controls, because of 
the mechanisms of external debt and other similar inequities, that same “society” puts to 
death or (…) allows to die of hunger… Not only is it true that such a society participates in 
this incalculable sacrifice, it actually organizes it.”706  
																																																								
704 Ibid., p. 27.  
705 Ibid., p. 101. 




Our responsibility practices, or general responsibility, also relates to the values 
and relationships that the economy of the market produces “which usually goes 
together with the juridical grammar that the address has been fair”.707 Therefore 
the ‘aporia’ of responsibility, not only unravels an economy of subjectivity with its 
internal violence, but also takes place within the economy of sacrifice of the 
market and through economic exchange.708 Derrida here reminds us, that these 
spheres of human action (economic-legal-political-ethical) cannot be divorced 
from each other, neither from how the subject embodies and relates to these 
spheres intimately. Responsibility practices along with their attendant concept of 
responsibility are located in “everyday discourse, in the exercise of justice, and 
first and foremost in the axiomatics of private, public, or international law, in the 
conduct of internal politics, diplomacy, and war, [located within] is a lexicon 
concerning responsibility that can be said to hover vaguely about a concept that 
is nowhere to be found…” 709  Through this lens, responsibility is not a 
metaphysical concept but is relational, ‘performative’ and political. Derrida’s 
radical concept of responsibility pushes us beyond an idea of responsibility as 
legal accountability, even if this seems outrageous or “nihilist or relativist”; “be 
concerned”, he continues, “in the face of such display of good conscience”, 
pointing out to the rhetorical use of responsibility in international law and in 
human relationships more broadly.710 As it is tied up to a culture of death, 
responsibility is also tied up to fear, the unknown, and the mystery that 
surrounds it. This fear can be further interpreted as an anxiety - an anxiety that 
emanates specifically from a domain of ‘undecidability’ - that manifests in every 
singular and contextual practice of responsibility. In contrast, perhaps it is also 
linked to a domain of freedom, reflexivity, deliberation and agency. Trembling 
occurs as a physical reaction to the scene of address or responsibility, to the 
unknown and the uncertain. Derrida references the mysterium tremendum in 
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Kiergaard’s essay Fear and Trembling, as including an implicit reference to Saint 
Paul. In the Epistle to the Philippians 2:12, the disciples are asked to work 
towards their salvation knowing all along that it is God who decides, and not in 
his presence (parousia) but in his absence (apousia), “without wither seeing or 
knowing, without hearing the law or the reasons for the law.”711 According to 
Derrida, Abraham never reveals the secret of the sacrifice of Isaac but keeps in 
secret of what God has ordered him. Here it appears that absolute responsibility 
implies singularity in the moment of decision but what is also implied according 
to Derrida is that: 
“by not speaking to others, I don’t account for my actions, that I answer for nothing [que 
je ne reponde de rien] and to no one, that I make no response to others and before 
others. According to Kiergaard, ethical exigency is regulated by generality; and it 
therefore defines a responsibility that consists in speaking, that is, of involving oneself 
sufficiently in the generality to justify oneself, to give an account of one’s decision and to 
answer for one’s actions. On the other hand, what does Abraham teach us, in his 
approach to sacrifice? That far from ensuring responsibility, the generality of ethics 
incites irresponsibility. It implies me to speak, to reply, to account for something, and 
thus to dissolve my singularity in the medium of the concept. 
 
Such is the aporia of responsibility: one always risks not managing to accede to 
responsibility in the process of forming it… This is the ethics as “irresponsibilization”, as 
an insoluble and paradoxical contradiction between responsibility in general and absolute 
responsibility. Absolute responsibility is not a responsibility, at least not general 
responsibility or responsibility in general. I need to be exceptional or extraordinary, and 
it needs to be absolutely and par excellence: it is as if absolute responsibility could not be 
derived from a concept of responsibility and therefore, in order to be what it must be it 
must therefore be irresponsible in order to be absolutely responsible.”712 
By keeping the secret of sacrifice to himself, Abraham betrays his family and the 
ethical order.713 In this light, it is when we attempt to communicate responsibility 
through language or law that responsibility necessarily produces sites of 
irresponsibility. It is in the medium of language and perhaps in the medium of 
law, that the ‘aporia’ of responsibility is exposed. As will be discussed later in 
relation to Butler’s account of responsibility, it is in the process of giving an 
account that the subject cannot determinedly narrate its self because it finds 
itself in relation to some norms, to an ethical order and within a juridico-moral 
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discourse that precedes and exceeds its own life. In Derrida we can locate an 
account of responsibility (an economy of sacrifice) that links to the previous 
Chapter (3) and Veitch’s notion of an ‘irresponsible mentality’ - produced 
through modern forms and mechanisms of organizing responsibility practices - 
which is implicated in the production of large-scale harms and in organizing 
irresponsibility. 
 
b. Cosmopolitanism and its critics 
 
The limits of cosmopolitan promise 
 
Liberal cosmopolitan or liberal internationalist accounts revive, and sometimes 
reinvent, Kantian metaphysics of universal reason to advance an idea of a unified 
common humanity under a global public law of liberal democracies. 714  For 
example, David Held reinvigorates a linear line of Western philosophical thought 
beginning with the Stoics and the idea of the cosmos as encompassing the whole 
of humanity. He concludes at a ‘Kantian’ cosmopolitanism connected with ‘public 
reason’, and develops a contemporary understanding based on egalitarian 
individualism, reciprocal recognition and impartialist reasoning. 715  It is a 
cosmopolitan legal framework that focuses on participation levels and security. 
As Held notes, “public policy ought to be focused” on the prevention of serious 
harms and the conditions “inflicted on people against their will and without their 
consent.”716 Central to this account is the idea of an autonomous moral agent and 
of active agency with impartialist reasoning as a “frame of reference” for rules and 
principles that can be universally shared.717 It is this view of subjectivity and of 
liberal cosmopolitanism that becomes the most challenged. Recurrently it 
becomes the ground upon which “the limits to the moral validity of 
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communities” is granted.718  Gilbert Leung criticizes Held’s cosmopolitanism and 
asserts that in Held’s account:  
“autonomy, pluralism and difference are good, but too much of a good thing ought to be 
punishable within cosmopolitan courts of law… he [Held] nonetheless gives us a radically 
open future with one hand and takes it away with the other by ruling out any 
cosmopolitan structure that is not constituted by the fundamentals of standard 
liberalism.”719  
Leung contradicts a legally enforced liberal cosmopolitanism with a critical 
history of cosmopolitanism that aligns with the cynics and a critique on legal 
coercion and ‘stoic denial’720. For Leung:  
“it should be noted that since concrete or active liberty is the particularity of the struggle 
against shackled life, the end of the end can be realized not when the free flow of creative 
invention is posited as an ideal, but when there is an active engagement in the process of 
breaking free from formal idealizations.”721  
Furthermore, Held’s:  
“imponderable future goes hand in hand with foreclosure within a fully pondered, 
ideological and institutional global framework. The remaining task (which might also be 
viewed as the task of freedom) thus becomes one of the thinking conditions in which 
such foreclosure is itself foreclosed.”722  
Political authority in this sense becomes legitimized and recognized only when it 
adheres to liberal cosmopolitan standards. According to Held: “states may forfeit 
claims to sovereignty, and individuals their right to sovereign protection, if they 
violate the standards and values embedded in the liberal international order”.723  
 
From the perspective of legal cosmopolitanism, Hans Kelsen advances a ‘pure’ 
theory of law where international law is seen “as a world or universal legal 
system. And the primacy of this world system can be linked with the idea of a 
universal legal community of human beings overreaching the individual state 
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communities, whose validity is rooted in the sphere of morality.”724 The intrinsic 
element of this legal strand is that the validity of a global public law is granted on 
law itself: “for the objectivist theory of law the concept of law is identified with 
that of international law and for that very reason is at the same time a moral 
concept.”725 As seen in Held, Kelsen too registers a vision in Kant’s perpetual 
peace through a coming together of all states under a ‘world federal state.’  
 
Kelsen however paradoxically requires that, since state sovereignty is a temporal 
category to be surpassed, primacy should be given to the criminal punishment of 
violators of international law by the courts of international law. For Kelsen, such 
a court of law for the punishment of war crimes works only if the war’s victors 
allow themselves to be judged by the same standards as the defeated. Only then, 
he says: “the legal nature – that is, the generality – of the punitive norms and the 
very idea of international justice be saved.”726 Here, Kelsen implies that juridical 
equality and legitimacy are still elementary for the progress to a world federal 
state able to ‘justly’ punish transgressions. Juridical equality here validates the 
system of global justice. Ultimately, the foundation of international law’s political 
authority is equal sovereignty. It is therefore difficult to imagine how 
international law will overcome its deep-rooted relation with sovereignty, since 
the vision of international justice presupposes a commitment to juridical equality 
which itself necessitates a commitment to state sovereignty. To return back to 
the point, what these cosmopolitan accounts share, both Held’s and Kelsen’s, is 
an ‘ideal’ system of liberal international law, involving a linear process of 
historical thinking and towards the gradual disappearance of state sovereignty. 
However, it is a vision which in order to be made realizable, forces denial of 
international law’s foundational violence and amnesia of its exclusionary and 
instrumental past. Such a vision deposits its faith in a linear historical process, 
which looks always towards a ‘bright’ future but denies its ‘dark’ past. 
Furthermore, its juridico-moral framework reproduces the problem it wishes to 
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overcome, namely state sovereignty. Ultimately, the individualism of states is 
fundamental to this vision. As R. B. J Walker notes “in some very important 
respects cosmopolitanism must be read as a constitutive aspect of the problems 
that many of those attracted to cosmopolitanism seek to address.”727 
 
Vaughan-Williams identifies three limits to the cosmopolitan promise: first, a 
teleological view of history; second, a Eurocentrism masqueraded as 
universalism; and third, a continued reliance on the sovereignty of the state.728 
There is indeed as William Smith proposes a differential treatment of each case 
of humanitarian emergency among ‘cosmopolitans’. 729  Accordingly, the 
divergence of cosmopolitan accounts over the issue of humanitarian intervention 
should be highlighted. Yet, the problem remains one in which cosmopolitanism 
is treated as a regulative ideal in the unavoidable absence of certainty over the 
ultimate decision to use force and of the ultimate political nature of such 
decisions. Vaughan-Williams, who draws on Derrida’s concept of responsibility, 
states that the ethic of hospitality, which we find in Kantian thinking and its 
reinvention in contemporary cosmopolitanism, is a conditional ethic. Not only 
because the state remains at the heart of its conceptualization but also because as 
Derrida reminds as  
“any agenda or programme designed to extend hospitality to others constitutes an 
attempt to provide an ethical generality in world politics that is doomed to failure. As 
soon as a course of action is taken to try to assure or guarantee the ‘equal and legitimate 
rights of others’…some others somewhere else in the world are always betrayed.”730 
In addition, drawing from the analysis of Derrida’s account of responsibility, a 
regulative ideal can be seen as a shelter (or phantasy) of certainty, mastery and 
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From anxiety to control: disciplinary affinities and legal rationality  
 
The above account is not and cannot stand as a critique of Kantian metaphysics 
or Kantian morality. What is noteworthy from Held’s or Kelsen’s account 
however, is the apolitical and neutral engagement - even a sort of ‘existential’ 
investment - in the revival of Kantian metaphysics and his legacy to defend and 
support the liberal cosmopolitan project. In relation to legal cosmopolitans, such 
as Kelsen, Kantian metaphysics and the dream of perpetual peace is also used to 
defend international law’s project in the absence of such material reality. The 
dream not only works as a way to transfer normative questions in relation to 
protection practices in a non-cosmopolitan present, but such an intellectual 
investment provides a sense of comfort and of certainty that materially 
constitutes a self-assured self and a coherent international political/legal 
subjectivity. With the use of relevant critical legal literature, such a similar 
intellectual investment with regards to the celebration from the part of some 
international lawyers of Vitoria’s ecumenical humanitarianism and 
internationalism, has already been explored and challenged in Chapter 2. 
Likewise, J. D. Haskell notes and explores “the almost fetishistic hold of Grotius 
on the imagination of international lawyers”731, citing Hersch Lauterpacht as an 
example. Haskell argues, that “Lauterpacht adopts the traditional narrative that 
Grotius ‘secularized’ the law of nations, which in turn, provides for the 
groundwork claim that international law is a detached process of peaceful 
resolution”732 . Such a treatment of Grotius as some ‘avant-garde of secular 
jurisprudence’ “is to suppress the overall tenor of his writings, as well as to miss 
strong thematic linkages between his ‘secular’ work and the ‘profoundly 
Christian’ traditions of the protestant humanists and late medieval Catholic 
jurists”.733 Whereas Haskell uncovers a different story that reveals the exclusion 
of non-Christian peoples from the sphere of natural law or a legitimizing 
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narrative for trade interactions and colonial exploitation. This kind of intellectual 
investment reveals an anxiety to work with and within political subjectivity and 
complexity. Amidst this anxiety of being, international lawyers tend to treat 
Grotius as either an advocate of “liberal religious tolerance and formal equality” 
by obscuring “the historically exclusionary origins of the Western liberal state”, or 
denounce “his theory as self-serving justifications of empire.”734 Instead, Haskell 
suggests that international lawyers should treat Grotius as a politically situated 
figure. According to Haskell: “rather than shy away from the partisan nature of 
Grotius’s convictions, we might instead accept them as the very conditions of 
emancipatory politics”735 and to “proclaim a fidelity to truth without apology.”736 
 
Matthew Nicholson points out that we can observe a more general tendency in 
international law, which succumbs in the comfortableness of the form and 
methodology of ‘past texts’.737 In doing so, those spaces of political subjectivity 
that need to remain open and negotiable are being foreclosed. For Korhonen and 
Selkälä legal cosmopolitanism, as it relates to conceptions of international 
responsibility, is being primarily defined by its ‘formalistic’ approach to codes of 
state liability.738 In this group, Korhonen and Selkäla include the more ‘pure’ or 
‘conservative’ approaches of international law, figures the likes of Kelsen, to those 
more ‘progressive’ the likes of Koskenniemi or Klabbers. 739  According to 
Korhonen and Selkälä there are certain physiognomies that connect this 
approach with respect to ‘theorizing responsibility’. The most prevalent ones are 
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individualism and state-centrism.740  The crude categorization here might do 
injustice to the work of Koskenniemi as a whole. Koskenniemi’s ‘culture of 
formalism’ is best seen as an inquiry and critical investigation into the culture of 
international legal thinking more broadly and as such he has been critical of this 
culture in more than one occasion.741 Nevertheless, Korhonen and Selkälä observe 
that the ‘formalist project’, to which they include both Kelsen and Koskenniemi, 
“sets up the cosmopolitan peace project on the formal morality of law’s equity 
and reciprocity, in which responsibility for one’s transgressions is systematically 
given by virtue of the concept of the law itself.”742 According to Korhonen and 
Selkälä, the formalistic approach in this sense does not consider how the 
theorizing of responsibility includes for example cultural and ‘socio-economic’ 
considerations. The concept of legal state liability takes these considerations as 
‘non-issues’.743 The teleological character of the cosmopolitan ideal, the idea of 
the cosmos in progress towards an emancipatory telos of perpetual peace sustains 
the need for objective legal certainty and of the lawyer for epistemological 
certainty. Therefore, the cosmopolitan ideal works perfectly with individual legal 
accountability. The need of the legal form for the certainty of a corporeal body 
with a structure of command to account for violence and for justice is sustained 
by an idea of the state or of the individual as sovereign. The use of professional 
language and the retreat to established methods is rooted in an anxiety to control 
an increasingly networked, multifaceted, digital reality with multiple sites of 
command and systemic contradictions and to influence state practice. According 
to Nicholson:  
“the more international law is confronted with a complex and fragmented reality of 
competing values and complex choices the more it retreats into conservative self-
assurance. To fully explore questions of nature and method would risk the future of the 
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discipline, so it is (apparently) preferable to avoid such questions and keep on using the 
‘toolbox’.744  
Nicholson, quoting Benjamin, argues that international law should always be “re-
imageined” as an “idea” – “something constantly remade to represent present 
reality.”745 Building upon Benjamin’s critique of violence and his concept of ‘pure 
means’ of representation, international law should be “a means of presenting an 
image of what is, what was, and what should be to an audience.”746 For Nicholson 
international lawyers should pursue representation rather than control and adapt 
something of a poet’s anxiety, who in writing that something different into being 
they bring that new into reality. As discussed, in the previous chapter, the 
modern feature of social organization that is the division of labour and its 
attendant issue of role responsibility recurrently becomes a pattern for the 
disappearance of collective and social responsibility. In contrast: 
“Re-imageination disperses law’s violence, removing the possibility of playing the ‘role’ of 
the lawyer, by abandoning the notion that there are particular forms or methods which 
only lawyers understand. We are all international lawyers because representation is all 
there is – there is no defined form, method, or ‘role’.”747  
In this sense, the international lawyer is not someone who simply represents the 
legal method but is primarily a critical reader or a ‘social theorist’ who articulates 
and represents the conditions and limits of present materiality and human 
existence in view of the law.  
 
The conservative use of a ‘toolbox’, for example on the use of force or the use of 
conventional diplomatic language, might forbid, as Gerry Simpson notes, “more 
emancipatory or dissident ‘forms of life’ or ways of going about things – or just 
closes off a bit of our humanity.”748 A turn to another language is a turn to 
understanding things differently or of organizing thinking otherwise. In contrast 
to rational or formalistic approaches to international law, Simpson looks at ‘the 
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sentimental character of international law’. Simpson suggests a poetic turn to 
writing and thinking international law, a turn also towards, one could say, 
discomfort and complexity against ‘excess’ and ‘simplicity’. 749  According to 
Simpson, “the whole idea of an international law (responsibility to protect, 
human rights interventions) of humanitarianism is built around such 
distinctions”, of good and evil, perpetrators and victims.  
 
Such moral simplicity overshadows structural violence and structural 
conditions.750 One might rightly claim that a turn to ‘the sentimental life of 
international law’ might exacerbate even more the excess of moral simplicity. 
Simpson is arguing “a sort of boiled down, unillusioned sentimental life is what 
we might be after, sentiment without sentimentality. A sentimental life that takes 
the emotional pulse of the work we do but allies it to an economy of irony that is 
at the same time detached but involved.”751 Nicholson’s and Simpson’s theses 
have particular valence in relation to the responsibility to protect concept. Driven 
by an anxiety to influence state practice and to control the reality of the ‘void’ of 
international law and of political subjectivity, it can be argued, that the authors 
of the concept, retreated to the familiar language of just war theory and to the 
language and formalism of state responsibility as of necessity. Their ultimate goal 
was to produce ‘consensus’ and therefore previous formulations and languages 
appeared in this light more effective. In doing so, the authors failed to explore 
how ‘sites of irresponsibility’ arise in cases of protections, or, for example, how 
discourses of individual responsibility overshadow structural complicity. An 
alternative practice would be to explore and expose those ‘sites of irresponsibility’ 
and to treat them as real living conditions. The results of that exploration might 
have been closer to the real material conditions of international law. As such, it is 
an attempt to curtail the difference between a fully pondered and utopic idea of 
international law and international law’s reality and present.  
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The ‘critical’ response in IR 
 
Nicholson’s and Simpson’s above theses echo the insistence of post-structural IR 
scholars to “try and exploit networks of communication that reach beyond the 
traditional limits of disciplinary affinity.”752 International lawyers and academics 
struggle and debate on how to approach international law better to make it 
relevant. This has to do with the “idea” of international law, that includes both 
what international law represents and how it materializes. 753  In this light, 
international law has been experiencing a ‘crisis of representation’. According to 
Richard Ashley and R. B. J Walker:  
“In crisis, subjects and objects appear not as sources of meanings that might be signified 
or represented in words but as open texts that are ever in the process of being inscribed 
through a hazardous contest of representations. The subject is deprived of self-evident 
identity… In a crisis of representation…every answer is immediately received as but one 
more groundless representation, no more and no less sincere or legitimate than any 
other.”754  
The ‘void’ of international law is a space that is simultaneously the terrain of 
hope and of despair, of ‘utopia’ and ‘apology’, of futurity and closure. It is also the 
space that the promise of cosmopolitanism occupies. In such a crisis the question 
becomes one of how to fill the void and therefore different dispositions to action 
emerge “amidst the undecidable ambiguities of space, time, and identity 
encountered here and now.”755 It is not only international law that is occupied by 
such a ‘void’. Post-structuralist IR theorists are concerned with the notion of 
‘sovereign’ capacity more broadly. If we understand sovereignty and sovereign 
agency as not confined to a stable identity or limited by juridical exigency, then 
‘sovereignty’ reveals a ‘performative’ and political nature - it can be best seen as 
an act of self-constitution. However, how is this conceptualization better or more 
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helpful with regards to thinking about global ethical responsibility and 
humanitarian practice?  
 
According to Ashley and Walker:  
“the problem of sovereignty is profoundly paradoxical. Accenting the root, we may say 
that it is profound in the sense that it is preoccupied with the problem of foundation: a 
fundamental principle, a supporting structure, a base on which society rests, a fund of 
authority capable of endowing possibilities, accrediting action, and fixing limitations.”756 
Ashley and Walker are concerned not only with state sovereignty but also with 
the “‘objective reality’ of a human nature that a ‘sovereign man’ might 
represent.”757 It is thus not only the concept of the sovereignty of state that fails 
to materialize in present reality but the idea of ‘sovereignty’ broadly speaking, of 
rationality and of self-assurance: “every semblance of sovereign subjectivity is 
exposed as but a projection of desire, groundless and powerless in itself.”758 An 
undecidable and groundless ethical relation to the other without the certainty of 
sovereign subjectivity opposes the desire of the lawyer and of legal judgment for 
certainty and legal accountability. As discussed in the previous chapter, legal 
certainty and accountability necessitates an identifiable subject of responsibility 
and/or structure of command that can be connected to a specific action (or 
omission) for which it can be held accountable and thus be punishable.  
 
Legal responsibility requires a strict identity on the part of the holder of 
responsibility because it demands a physical person or corporeal body to hold 
accountable for the failure of discharging its responsibilities. Therefore, for the 
lawyer and the discipline of international law a ‘crisis of representation’ that is 
also a crisis of sovereign subjectivity is better to be dealt with outside of the 
discipline itself. The examples of ‘disciplinary affinity’, explored at the beginning 
of this section highlight a denial which legal cosmopolitanism suffers from. This 
denial is manifested in the patterns of reading, of writing and comprehending “a 
discipline’s ‘referent reality’ as an objectively given external domain that is not 
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only independent of ‘our’ knowing but also capable of authorizing and limiting 
what ‘we’ can validly think and say about our world.”759 In their anxiety to control 
and to maintain, international lawyers embraced a progressive history of 
instrumental reason from the Stoics to Kant and to a self-assured concept of 
responsibility. For Ashley and Walker, this kind of reading and embracing of 
history is a ‘memorializing’ reading, which speaks in a ‘religious register of 
desire’. 760  In the words of David Kennedy, we perhaps need to think 
humanitarian responsibility as critique. “We have mistaken”, he argues, “a 
pragmatic vocabulary of instrumental reason for responsibility. The idolatry of 
tool disguises itself as wisdom of the long run. But let us assess those long term 
promises with cold and disenchanted eyes.”761  
 
Derrida’s deconstruction and his philosophy, along with the work of critical 
theorists such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-
Luc Nancy and Judith Butler among others,762 have influenced an important 
number of international relations academics, who produced a voluminous 
literature at the end of 1980s and during the 1990s. These international relation 
theorists sought to provide an understanding of ethics, politics and foreign 
policy763 beyond conventional paradigms in international relations. The end of 
Cold War bipolarity ‘re-moralised’ and ‘re-vitalised’ the influence of liberal 
institutions of governance; that ‘excess of power’ planted the seeds of a 
‘disciplinary crisis’ in international relations or, rather, it made such crisis much 
more visible. Arguably, it is not a coincidence that such a literature and debate 
about the nature, values, identity and agency of such institutions, including the 
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sovereign state and sovereign agency, emerged during that period.764 Just as 
critical legal theory, critical or ‘post-structural’ international relations seek to 
provide investigations of our ‘schemas of intelligibility’ and of conventional 
normative understandings and to challenge the ontological essentialism that 
pervades positivist and epistemological accounts of international relations. 
Intelligibility is to be understood here as those epistemic ideas or beliefs on the 
nature of life “that establish domains of the knowable.”765  
 
David Campbell observes that the most criticized aspect of Derrida’s 
deconstructionist logic is “undecidability”. 766  For that Campbell asserts that 
Derrida’s concept of responsibility is not to be understood as a carte blanche to 
an ‘anarchical irresponsibility’, it does not deny responsibility, “the very notion of 
undecidability is the condition of possibility for a decision.”767 Complementing 
the Derridean notion of undecidability with the Levinasian ethic of the other-
regard, Campbell contends that there is indeed a ‘political’ thesis in Derrida’s 
account of responsibility. It is an account that is ‘antitotalitarian’ and “gives its 
politics a particular quality”; “deconstruction’s affirmation of alterity 
deterritorializes responsibility, and pluralizes the possibilities for ethics and 
politics over and beyond (yet still including) the state.”768 For example, Campbell 
in Writing Security incorporates into the study of foreign policy and international 
relations the ethical and philosophical inquiry of the self/other relation and 
provides an account of the state [the US] as a narrative and representational 
structure.769 Hence, the state is seen primarily as a historically and discourse 
situated ‘self’, whereby its identity comes into being in relation to difference and 
otherness. Such an identity is always situated in a never-ending process of 
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becoming. Therefore, such analyses turn to the inter-subjective processes of 
global ethical life. According to Campbell: 
“states are never finished entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the 
practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of 
identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in 
permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and 
varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a 
process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose 
its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.”770 
 
Similarly, Cynthia Weber develops a notion of ‘performative states’ whereby 
sovereign identity and agency are being ‘dislocated’ and ‘decentered’ in an 
attempt to move “beyond traditional definitions of sovereignty (e.g. sovereignty is 
status or sovereignty is like a basket).”771 As Weber suggests: “This kind of 
analysis ‘denaturalizes’ the meaning of the state and its relationship to 
sovereignty. Foreign policy speeches, cables, press conferences etc. may also be 
analyzed as performative enactments of a state’s sovereignty.”772 To develop her 
notion of performative states, Weber draws on Judith Butler’s notion of 
performative gender. The notion of ‘performativity’ will be discussed later. The 
point of using both Campbell and Weber here is to show how an uncertain and 
unfixed sphere of political subjectivity enters the performative circuits of 
international relations, opening up to a wider and complex network of inter-
subjective and intra-subjective constitution. Such a way of thinking tends to 
apprehend the categories, collectivities and collective practices of international 
actors and institutions as “impersonations” or representations and their acts as 
the “proliferation of performances the very moments when representation seems 
to fail. Moments of international military intervention illustrate this.”773  
 
A more recent study inspired by the deconstructionist logic of Derrida and his 
paradoxical concept of responsibility is that of Dan Bulley. Bulley provides a 
‘critical post-structuralist reading’ of British and EU foreign policy. He dissects 
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British (from 1997 to 2007) and EU foreign policy (from 1999 to 2004) and reads 
foreign policy as ‘text’ in an attempt to show how “their logic undermines its own 
basis.”774 While reading the texts of British and EU policy, Bulley draws attention 
to the construction of subjectivity, the subjectivity of a ‘we’ able to carry out an 
intervention and the subjectivity of a ‘them’ or an ‘other’ that is to receive help.775 
This understanding is familiar to how this thesis comprehends the ‘rhetoric’ and 
effects of the ethical framework of the responsibility to protect, how and what 
kind of global ethical responsibility the responsibility to protect concept 
‘communicates’. It is this primary understanding that pushed the thesis in an 
exploration of its juridico-moral framework and the responsibility (‘sites of 
irresponsibility’) within the responsibility to protect concept. Chapter 2 and 3 are 
results of such an investigation, while Chapter 1 focuses on its legal foundation 
and legal debates which foregrounded the concept. Drawing also on Derrida’s 
paradoxical responsibility, Bulley notes that any ethical relation is “neither 
possible nor impossible” but is rather ‘undecidable’ and political – “a continuing-
to-live-with undecidability”. 776  Bulley argues that the “politics of ethics”, 
including the notion of responsible practice, “are marked by irresolvable but 
necessary contradictions.”777 Therefore, the possibility of our ethical relation, as 
noted by Bulley, can only be ‘negotiated’ contextually in the face of the encounter 
and of the call for responsible protection. According to Bulley, the ‘undecidability 
of ethical concepts’ produces two obvious responses:  
“either acknowledge them and resolve that an ethical foreign policy is impossible and 
perhaps even dangerous in its impossibility; or, ignore the contradictions and paradoxes 
and act as if we know who/what ‘we’ ‘are’, what responsibility and hospitality mean and 
how they can be enacted. Both these responses are rejected as fundamentally unethical: 
the first because it acknowledges itself as such; the second because, as Derrida says of 
responsibility, any inadequate thematisation of the ethical is itself an irresponsible, 
unethical thematisation.”778  
An important element of Bulley’s post-structural critique is that we cannot know 
whether “in reality” policy makers and diplomats were indeed attempting to act 
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ethically in each crisis. In other words, the intentions with regards to 
humanitarian practices are not something we can ever completely be certain of. 
Yet, what we can know is how such an ethical relation to otherness is 
represented. As Bulley argues, “these foreign policy texts rely on the possibility of 
a collective subject of ethical foreign policy, they require a ‘we’, an ‘our’, an ‘us’ 
which can act ethically”.779 Therefore, juridico-moral frameworks such as the 
responsibility to protect concept if read as ‘texts’ reveal acts of self-constitution 
and of identity and entail particular views of human and political subjectivity. As 
a result, it is possible to identify what kind of global ethical responsibility is 
represented or advocated, what pattern of thinking perhaps leads to such 
representation and ethical relation and who is being represented and how. As 
explored in the previous section, such an analysis produces discomfort for the 
international lawyer, the liberal cosmopolitan and the discipline of international 
law itself because it reveals a networked and multifaceted world underpinned by 
inter-subjective and intra-subjective recognition, which challenges the 
predilection for certainty and self-assurance. In the following sections, drawing 
on Butler’s idea of ‘Scenes of Address’ as spaces of constitution and recognition 
(misrecognition), I attempt to illustrate how and what kind of global ethical 
responsibility is ‘negotiated’ or communicated through the responsibility to 
protect concept and what is to be gained by such an analysis.   
 
c. ‘Scenes of Address’: ‘performative’, mediated and uncertain subjects 
 
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler elaborates a post-Hegelian account of 
recognition through the work of Adriana Cavarrero which grounds the social in 
the dyadic encounter. 780 She uses Laplanche’s psychoanalytic work to expose the 
limits to understanding and narrating the self and builds upon Foucault’s later 
theory of subject formation, Adorno’s ‘human-inhuman’ dialectic of ethical 
dispositions and theory of responsibility, to underline that ethical action 
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necessitates an avowal of error “as constitutive of who we are.”781 Even though, as 
Butler argues, Foucault and Adorno make different claims on Kant’s use and 
effect of moral reason, they both refer to Kant to establish a common point. 
According to Butler, “Although Adorno faults Kant for not recognizing error as 
constitutive of the human and Foucault lauds him for apprehending precisely 
that, they both concur on the necessity of conceiving the human in its 
fallibility.”782  
Butler draws on Foucault’s notion of ‘self-criticism’783 to show that the question 
of ethics emerges precisely at the limits of our schemas of intelligibility, where 
one is at the limits of what one knows yet under the demand to be addressed and 
to address. This ethical predisposition fights at several fronts at the same time. A 
fear of an unknown other both within and outside the self, establishes an ongoing 
reflection on particular and universal demands of responsibility - of singular and 
collective – and pursues an ongoing inquiry between oneself and schemas of 
intelligibility. Butler remarks: “I find that my very formation implicates the other 
in me, that my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my 
ethical connection.”784 It seems that in such an ethical relation one even risks 
oneself and suffers an ongoing constitutive loss. 
Similar to Foucault’s ‘self-criticism’, Adorno by introducing the dialectical 
inversion of the ‘inhuman-human’ opposes an individualistic and a ‘regulative’ 
ethics, pushing towards a politics, or an ethics, of responsibility than a politics of 
conviction. Adorno does not define the human for us but instead grounds the 
notion of the human in a “double movement, one in which we assert moral 
norms at the same time as we question the authority by which we make that 
assertion.” 785  The inverse dialectic in Adorno seeks to counter certain 
presumptions that fixate normative categories into coherent and self-sustained 
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subjects. According to Butler, the dialectical inversion of Adorno’s ‘inhuman’ 
dimension: 
“facilitates an immanent critique of the human and becomes a trace or ruin through 
which the human lives on (fortleben). The “inhuman” is also a way of designating the way 
social forces take up residence within us, making it impossible to define ourselves in 
terms of free will.”786   
In this sense, ‘we’ embody the inhuman.787 It is an understanding that challenges 
the ‘embedded’ political subjectivity and ‘humanness’ of cosmopolitanism.  
 
Butler uses Levinas and Laplanche to underline both the primacy of the other 
and our vulnerability. For Levinas the address of the other precedes any 
formation of the self. The Levinisian other makes an ethical demand that obliges 
‘me’ to respond to a ‘face’, no matter what the other has done or who he is. Butler 
reads Lalplanche to supplement Levinas and to emphasize not only the 
precipitating interruption of the self by the other, a ‘primary impingement’ and 
“from the start an ethical interpellation”788, but also a non-narrativizable exposure 
to the other. According to Butler, Levinas’s other emerges through a persecution 
and an accusation but Laplanche’s ego emerges through ‘enigmatic signifiers’ that 
the infant suffers from the adult world.789 In this light, the unconscious makes it 
difficult or even impossible to give a full account of oneself “not only because the 
body has a formative history that remains irrevocable by reflection, but because 
primary relations are formative in ways that produce a necessary opacity in our 
understanding of ourselves.”790  
As Butler states: 
“the very terms by which we give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible to 
ourselves and to others, are not of our making… what we often consider to be ethical 
‘failure’ may well have an ethical valence and importance that has not been adjudicated 
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by those who too quickly equate post-structuralism with moral nihilism.”791  
Can what binds us be our ‘opacity’ to each other? Or, that a sense of a ‘we’, or of 
an international self, can emerge by being grounded in our reciprocal recognition 
of the failure to fully give an account of ourselves? Butler sees primary 
vulnerability of both the ‘idea’ of a self-determining self, and the ‘idea’ or identity 
we inscribe upon the other through speech, as being a possibility for 
responsibility. Therefore, she attempts to ground an account of responsibility, 
which does not emerge through persecution, accusation or ‘bad conscience’ in 
the process of addressing the other. A self-certain self would also mean to 
condemn the other. In her own words, she “hopes to show that morality is 
neither a symptom of its social conditions nor a site of transcendence of them, 
but rather is essential to the determination of agency and the possibility of 
hope.”792 Butler’s account of the formation of the subject and of ‘frames’ of 
recognizability complicates responsibility practices because, at first sight, it 
appears as if the subject has no capacity of moral agency and moral 
accountability. However, as Butler argues, “The ‘I’ is always to some extent 
disposed by the social conditions of its emergence.”793 Accordingly, it is only the 
subject’s critical deliberation upon the norms and their interpellations that opens 
the domain of ethical deliberation; “ethical deliberation is bound up with the 
operation of critique.”794 This understanding forms the crux of Butler’s account of 
how we can become accountable subjects. Butler argues that it is possible to 
ground a notion of personal and collective (social) responsibility that serves as a 
conception of ethics and of responsibility through a theory of subject formation 
that acknowledges the limits of self-understanding. It is an understanding that is 
sensitive to how subjects form identities within the particular moment of the 
encounter; who am ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’, or ‘they’ is a question that can be posed at the 
moment of encounter.  
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The question of who am ‘I’, ‘we’, or ‘they’ opens up a space of ethical reflection 
and legal/political deliberation. Now, situating the question in the moment of 
decision and in the frame of an event with regards to large scale loss of life while 
simultaneously thinking through a theory of subject formation that 
acknowledges the limits to self-understanding, has the potential to break with 
fixed identities and programmatic ethics, empower forms of political subjectivity 
and allow/let subjects speak and be heard. In other words, the encounter as a 
moment of interaction can also be seen as a process of creating new 
understandings of self and Other or community and Other(s), as well as be useful 
in taking responsibility for our practices and role. To understand in this sense 
“what we are doing when we practice, write and think about international law”.795 
Identities are understood here as depended variables to the process of interaction 
per se. In this sense, the question of who am ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘you’ and the ethical relation 
to the ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘they’, disrupts both identity (the self, Other, including communal 
understandings of self and Other) and the scene and structure of recognition and 
allows it to be recasted in the moment of decision. To be sure, the ‘I’ can be the 
international lawyer, the academic, the UN-worker, the official, the discourse-
situated subject. The ‘you’ can be the politically-situated Other. The ‘we’ can be 
the dominant notion of an ‘international community’. Hence, to disrupt such 
identities will be to engage in critical deliberation on their identity, relation to 
social norms and ethical response. The question also highlights the importance of 
theorising inter/intra subjectivity to understand notions of responsibility, and the 
opposite, to theorize notions of responsibility to understand inter/intra 
subjectivity.  
 
It is this question that grounds the possibility of responsibility since, and if, the 
self can deliberate on its social conditions of emergence and the dominant ethical 
order. For Butler the demand for the continuous maintenance of self-identity 
operates as ethical violence and that “suspending” such a demand for both self 
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and other is a condition for ethical possibility.796 For Butler, the Nietzschean 
account of how we come to be morally responsible persons reduces morality to 
bad conscience and generalizes the scene of punishment. 797  Although the 
Nietzchean account, says Butler, has played a crucial role in Foucault’s 
disciplinary society, Foucault does not reduce morality to bad conscience. For 
Foucault “reflexivity emerges in the act of taking up a relation to moral codes” 
and this reflexivity “does not always rely on the violence and prohibition and its 
internalizing effects.”798 According to Butler, Adriana Cavarrero provides for an 
Arendtian (and Levinasian) conception of the social by supplying to the act of 
recognition a direct question that is addressed to the other - “Who are you?”.799 
In doing so, Cavarrero contradicts the Nietschean view of morality by 
emphasizing that we are “of necessity, exposed to one another in our 
vulnerability” and thus introducing to the ‘foreclosing’ Nietszcean account 
another scene of address, the impossibility of the ‘I’ without the other. 800 
According to Butler, Cavarrero unfolds a scene of recognition that begins from 
the dyadic encounter and moves to the social to ground the social in the 
dyadic.801 By giving emphasis to the question of the ‘you’, Cavarrero contradicts 
positivist and individualistic ethics: “The you is ignored by individualistic 
doctrines, which are too preoccupied with praising the rights of the I, and the 
‘you’ is masked by a Kantian form of ethics that is only capable of staging an I 
that addresses itself as a familiar you”.802 Yet, Butler argues, neither ‘singularity’ 
can tell a complete narrative of the self for which it is accountable or give a 
complete account of the self. Nor, in the same light, can ‘precariousness’ itself be 
properly or fully recognized.803 Therefore, what is here proposed is that before we 
proceed into a ‘theorizing of responsibility’ we need to acknowledge a kind of 
violence in the heart of ethics. What Butler here suggests is that considering a 
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‘politics of singularity’ is fruitful, yet such ‘politics’ should be grounded in the 
limits of one’s self-understanding, including a collective sense of self-
understanding. 
Butler’s account can be placed within an emerging discourse of an ‘ethics of 
recognition’ that builds primarily upon the Hegelian philosophical system.804 
Hegel’s central philosophical argument, from which post-Hegelian theories of 
recognition emerge, take the struggle or process for mutual recognition with 
another as elementary to the constitution of the inter-subjective self. Hegel’s 
theory of recognition occurs within three central spheres of ethical existence: in 
the family, in civil society, and in the state. The self develops consciousness 
through mediation and relation to these central spheres in an effort to gain 
independence. As it relates and mediates with the public realm it “attains 
consciousness of universality through membership in the totality of the political 
order.”805 According to Kochi: “For Hegel, legal rights and legal personality are 
universals generated at a higher level of abstraction underlaid by inter-subjective 
recognition.”806 For Kochi: 
“Through recognition, Hegel tries to show not only how moral and legal universals are 
produced through differing forms of relations and mediations, but further, that within 
the operation of recognition there resides a certain violence, a violence of misrecognition, 
negation, and alienation, which does not stand outside of ethics but occurs as a central 
part of it.”807  
The subject not only recognizes but also misrecognizes, fails to recognize, and 
resists to extend recognition. Through this lens, the Hegelian subject is subjected 
to an ongoing process of recognition, situated in the divergences between the 
universal and the particular, the ethical order and the social, political and 
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economic organization of human life. The subject extends recognition but its 
recognition is limited by all those conditions, forms of social and political 
organization that while making recognition possible, at the same time disrupt 
recognition and the ethical relation. In this light, our social modes of organizing 
responsibility and how we perceive the whole architecture of global ethical 
responsibility and its institutions and practices including present and past modes 
of legally enforced irresponsibility and violence, for example unequal juridical 
and socio-economic relations, are conditions of misrecognition and of 
irresponsibility. The argument made here is that to not account for such sites or 
conditions, not to expose and speak of those conditions in relation to practices of 
protection is to precisely jeopardize these practices. According to Butler, the 
process of recognition transforms the ‘I’ endlessly, and in that process the self 
suffers some ‘constitutive losses’.808 The self finds the ‘I’ “outside one self”, is being 
‘dislocated’ by recognition, “our capacity to respond to a face as a human face is 
conditioned and mediated by frames of reference that are variably humanizing 
and dehumanizing.”809 Crucially then, the scene of recognition does not only 
include the dyadic encounter, the exchange is mediated and conditioned by the 
social conventions and all that is external to the dyadic.810  
 
‘Scenes of address’811 can be imagined as topoi, places, through which and in 
which the self begins to articulate an account of itself. This ‘scene’ is significantly 
a ‘space’ of constitution and of process. It is also the ‘place’ within which and 
through which the subject experiences morality, the operation of norms (of law) 
and the story of the self through recognition. Therefore, the mediating processes 
of inter-subjectivity, that is language, law or indeed the economy of the market 
and of exchange for that matter, are crucial to the constitution of the subject. If I 
try to give an account of myself, the account depends on a structure of address 
that I find myself already within and that circumscribes the possibilities and 
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political edges of my account. Recall for a moment Derrida’s radical and 
hyperbolic notion of responsibility. We can see that both Derrida and Butler 
conceptualize an internal, and even unwilled, irresponsibility within the concept 
of responsibility. They both recognize a primary violence at the heart of ethics. 
For Derrida, as already discussed, every attempt of responsibility is constituted 
and maintained through some acts of exclusion. In the process of responsibility 
something else (as another conceptualization or an imponderable ethical 
relation) or other(s) are inevitably left out. In this light, the ‘notion of 
irresponsibility’ expounded in this thesis within the concept of responsibility 
represents a primary vulnerability. Despite our best intentions we cannot fully 
govern or control the effects of the mediating processes of communication and of 
organization we use both upon us and upon others. Yet, we must try to 
distinguish between an inescapable and unwilled irresponsibility in the heart of 
ethics from the irresponsibility that we can perhaps avoid through recognizing 
some primary sites of irresponsibility. Otherwise, it seems, we would have 
effectively removed any possibility of active moral agency and of social change, as 
Campbell noted, “stasis would be death.”812 Butler’s insistence on the postulation 
of the subject that is not self-grounding and cannot fully account of itself 
complements the irresponsibility of responsibility we find in Derrida. ‘Theorizing 
responsibility’ must, in a Derridean sense, be ungrounded and undecidable but 
also through Butler grounded in our recognition of a mediated, uncertain and 
vulnerable self who is not always capable of recognizing the other neither to fully 
give an account of itself. This violence of misrecognition, both of the self and of 
the other is a violence of recognition that also lies in our collective actions of 
recognition – ‘we’ are not always capable of fully articulating a collective account 
of ourselves. 
 
‘Scenes of address’ also entail processes of narration. ‘Narrative capacity’ 
constitutes for Butler a precondition for any account of moral agency.813 In 
Excitable Speech, Butler attempts to account on how vulnerable we are to 
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language and its effects and how the ‘citationality’ of discourse, i.e. the subject’s 
conditionality or partial non-autonomy, can work to intensify our sense of 
responsibility for the discourse itself. 814 Drawing on Foucault, “the subject has its 
own ‘existence’ implicated in a language that precedes and exceeds the subject, a 
language whose historicity include a past and future that exceeds that of the 
subject who speaks”.815 Butler emphasizes on the social dimension of normativity, 
in order to show that normativity precedes and exceeds any dyadic encounter.816 
In Bodies that Matter, Butler explicates how sexual difference is produced by the 
social and normative constructions, which normalize, dominate and hierarchize 
conceptual distinctions of gender. 817  Coextensively, in Precarious Life Butler 
explores how western and liberal forms of life are being differentiated in terms of 
value against non-western and illiberal forms, especially in post 9/11 global 
society.818 The differential allocation of grief chooses who normatively counts as a 
human as it highlights those we exclude from the necessary process of grief.819 
Then we can go about and ask “the conditions under which a grievable life is 
established and maintained, and through what logic of exclusion, what practice 
of effacement and denominilization.” 820  Here we could think of the recent 
reaction and publicity which the Paris attacks received, as opposed to the Beirut 
attacks in 2015 which happened a day before. For Butler grievability is an obituary 
to life that makes possible non-military responses to violence: “the violence we 
commit is violence that falls within the realm of the recognizably human, but the 
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violence that others commit is unrecognizable as human activity, then we make 
use of a limited and limiting cultural frame to understand what it is to be 
human.”821 There is an abundance of such ‘hierarchy of grief’ in everyday life, 
which is not limited to a differential treatment between western/nonwestern 
lives but also among all life. In this case, the differentiation between lives that 
count more or less, becomes part of an economic exchange. The 
diplomatic/financial ties, bilateral and other trade agreements, differentiate 
between states that are going to be publicly demonized, blamed and face 
sanctions for their mass human rights abuses (these are the lives whom a foe 
kills) and those who are going to escape the sanctioning regime or loud public 
condemnation (these are the lives whom a friend kills). An illustration is Saudi 
Arabia’s coalition and its mass human rights violations in the war in Yemen, 
receiving considerably less systematic attention, sanctions and political 
condemnation as opposed to Assad’s Syria.822 The UK in February 2018, amidst 
the war and investigations into mass human right violations in the Yemen war, 
offered ‘red carpet treatment’ to prince Mohammed bin Salman in his visit to the 
UK.823 
 
Narration, rhetoric and the transference of language through ‘speech acts’ work 
not only “as a means by which information is conveyed but also as a rhetorical 
deployment of language that seeks to act upon the other… this telling is doing 
something to you, acting on you, in some way and this telling is also doing 
something to me, in ways that I may well not understand as I go.”824 In this light, 
the ‘perfomative’ is a force and ‘performativity’ is a process which effects, injures 
subjects but also enacts subjects. According to Butler, “…the ‘I’ has no story of its 
own that is not also the story of a relation – or a set of relations – to a set of 
norms”.825 Norms and conventions produce ‘frames’ of ‘recognizability’ which are 
																																																								
821 Ibid., p. 89. 
822 Rick Gladstone. (2016, January 31). Saudi Coalition in Yemen Inquiry into Bombings, The New York 
Times, Retrieved from nytimes.com. 
823 Emily Thornberry. (2018, March 7). Britain’s red carpet for the Saudi ruler is shameless, The 
Guardian, Retrieved from theguardian.com. 
824 Butler, 2005, op cit., p. 51. 




themselves produced through ‘schemas of intelligibility’. 826  For Butler, the 
language that frames the encounter is also a language of normativity that suggests 
what will and will not be recognizable. As Butler notes, this is, in a way, 
Foucault’s supplement to Hegel.827 Along these lines, discourse can be thought of 
as a history of ‘interpellations’. A successful performative “accumulates the force 
of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of 
practices.”828 If the performative succeeds and becomes law “the meaning of 
political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of persecution.”829 
Something meaningful might be lost in the instance of juridification. A ‘history of 
interpellations’ is lost, yet is this history utterly irrecoverable?  
 
To attempt to understand the history of the discursive framework(s) under 
which, and the juridical ordering through which, a moral or political thesis 
materializes, along with its particular historical conditions, is a practice which 
seeks to account how we become adapted to prevailing views of the subject and 
how, perhaps, we can then see over restrictive normative fixations. Such 
‘prevailing views’ or normative fixations become more visible when the objective 
reality that is advocated, or the representation, fails to live up to ones 
apprehending of reality or to its living material conditions. A ‘performative 
failure’ is the site where the performative fails in some way to capture and seize a 
normative or perceptual context. Something in what was done fails to live up to 
what was said, promised or represented. For Derrida breaking force (force du 
rupture) is a structural feature of any sign.830 The chance of failure is proper to 
the speech act itself and can “enter these performative circuits.”831 According to 
Butler “when perlocutions fail, it is because a certain discursive wager on what 
reality might be fails to materialize.” 832  For both Butler and Derrida 
‘performatives’ are dynamic because they can break with context. ‘Performativity’, 
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is also the capacity of the performative to effect change. The performative, “not 
only fails” but “depends on failure.”833 ‘Performative politics’, according to Butler, 
refers to certain acts of self-constitution that can and do control our material 
identities: “If we say for example, for instance, that gender is performatively 
constituted, then we call into question whether there is a stable gender in place 
and intact to prior expressions and activities, that we understand as gendered 
expressions and activities”834 Coextensively, to understand the responsibility of 
the ‘international community’ or of ‘sovereignty’ as performatively constituted is 
to inquire on their mechanisms, expressions and activities. It is also a 
precondition to the question of who am ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘you’ or ‘they’. It is in this sense 
that both Butler’s account of responsibility and Derrida’s radical responsibility 
‘deterritorialize’ responsibility. Their account represents a linguistic or aesthetic 
turn, on how one understands moral agency and responsibility through the 
constitution of moral agency itself.  
 
In this light, foreign policy, intervention and representations of the ‘international 
community’ through theory and practice are sites of self-constitution and of 
becoming with. Furthermore, the responsibility to protect concept also emerges 
as such a ‘scene’ linked to a specific ‘structure’ and carries a particular juridico-
moral framework, which circumscribes and controls our responsibility practices. 
Drawing on both Derrida and Butler, R2P as an institutionalized moral 
framework and language, which has accumulated the force of authority through 
repetition or citation of prior and authoritative set of practices, has thus become 
‘successful’. It has therefore been reduced to an act of persecution where, 
according to Butler, meaningful political opposition is threatened or 
compromised. It is therefore only a performative failure or contradiction that can 
enter its ‘performative circuits’ and uncover perhaps its ‘anachronistic’ and 
violent ethos. 
  
d. R2P as a foreclosing structure/mode of address 
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The responsibility to punish? 
 
The operation of the responsibility to protect concept to support a humanitarian 
military intervention can be perceived as a space, or ‘scene of address’. Through 
this ‘space’ the collectivity that is the ‘international community’ becomes 
positioned to give an account of itself and to others in relation to the suffering 
produced by mass crimes and mass human rights violations. The responsibility to 
protect concept emerges as a structure/mode of address whereby identities, 
meanings and courses of action begin to take shape and form ideas and images of 
who the ‘international community’ is and who is the subject of protection. 
Building on Butler, the decision to use force and how is necessarily superseded by 
the structure of address in which it takes place. The concept is a ‘narrative’ with 
an older and broader juridico-moral framework of reference that precedes a 
decision of the UNSC and any humanitarian and/or protective practice. It is 
important that we understand R2P as a mode of address, so that we take into 
account the form, which that address will finally take. Now, a foreclosing ethical 
structure of address is one which does not take into account the conditions of the 
constitution of the subject of both self and other as its point of reference and as 
limits to its ‘ethical relationality’, but builds upon delimited ‘sovereign’ or self-
assured notions of subjectivity and moral agency. If the desire is to be recognized, 
to live and persist, then a foreclosing structure of address is one that does not 
take into account the full scene of recognition which includes the scene of 
misrecognition, of mediated, vulnerable, performative individuals or collective 
subjects. To extend this argument, if we understand R2P as a mode of address, 
which has accumulated the force of authority, is constitutive and constitutes 
collective subject-formation, then not to account for this ‘scene’ is a foreclosure 
to the possibility of responsible ethical relations per se. In the case of the 
responsibility to protect concept it is impossible to provide a rounded critique of 
the concept that is limited to legal accountability. The responsibility to protect 
concept is primarily an ethical precept that grounds universal jurisdiction on the 




ethical mode of address, which frames a global ‘scene’ of social recognition. 
Furthermore, as it provides the grounds of universal jurisdiction on the use of 
violence, it can be seen as a global institution of punishment. According to 
Butler:  
“the institutions of punishment and imprisonment have a responsibility to sustain the 
very lives that enter their domains, precisely because they have the power, in the name of 
“ethics”, to damage and destroy lives with impunity. If, as Spinoza maintained, one can 
desire to live life in the right way only if there is, already or at the same time a desire to 
live, it would seem equally true that the scenario of punishment that seeks to transform 
the desire for life into a desire for death erodes the condition of ethics itself.”835 
Could it be even said, that the responsibility to protect concept by reiterating a 
victorious, coherent, liberal international self (with all this implies) or by its 
failure to account for the ‘sites of irresponsibility’ that it operates within 
responsibility practices as being reduced to an act of persecution and 
punishment, performs a form of address and indicates a view of life that 
coincides more with a Nietszchean understanding of morality, that is aggressive 
and turns back on itself?  
 
The new phase of international policing and of security, which emerged at the 
end of the Cold War feeds upon the dreams of a nebulous cosmopolis. Liberal 
international law indicates that the maintenance of peace and security is to be 
fulfilled through a strengthening of international law and of the notion of 
international criminal responsibility in particular. Therefore, punishment is a 
central element in discharging the responsibility of the international community 
towards the victims of gross human rights violations. Cosmopolitan, liberally 
conceived, human subjects are to be protected under consensual and ‘collective’ 
military power. Douzinas has labelled this security agenda as ‘military 
humanism’: the new justa causa being that of human rights.836 The responsibility 
to protect therefore, within these particular historical conditions, captures the 
liberal need to normatively frame the post-Cold War ethical response to mass 
human rights atrocities in which collective human institutions lost credibility, 
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identity and meaning. The rushed calls to an ‘end to impunity’ highlights the 
urgency of international political authority and of international law, now 
unconstrained by an other, to act in the name of human rights. In the name of 
populations some become rightless. Douzinas states: 
“the unjust, inhuman enemies of the international moral order deserve no mercy. They 
must be punished paradigmatically in order to establish the moral authority of the new 
military humanism. The punishment grounds the right of the punisher to mete out the 
medicine.”837 
Through this lens, punishment is seen as a method of social cohesion under a 
specific historical world order. The responsibility to protect concept is the last 
refuge of political authority to fill the ‘void’ of a certain ‘international community’ 
in the absence of fixed normative universal values. Chapter 2 attempted to 
untangle the relationship between the concept of the responsibility to protect 
and the juridico-moral domain of just war theory. As such, the chapter 
highlighted the limitations, inherent problems and contradictions of just war 
theory that become part of the concept of the responsibility to protect. I has been 
argued that the punitive element of just war thinking operating as the other side 
of protection, and its deep rooted intellectual relation to sovereign authority and 
order is an undervalued element, which has serious practical consequences on 
the meanings and effects of humanitarian protection practices. Lauren Wilcox, 
drawing on Butler has observed that the responsibility to protect concept as a 
security practice “[is] implicated in (and reliant upon) different kind of bodies 
and configurations of bodily relations.”838 According to Wilcox: “taking seriously 
the bodily precariousness means being attentive to the discourses that produce 
certain subjects as inhuman or as only bleeding, suffering bodies outside the full 
political context under which we and they are constituted.” 839 Such analyses have 
the potential to identify the epistemic and normative limits of extending 
protection and social recognition. As Christopher Hobson also notes:  
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“there is a pressing need to reckon… the violence and vulnerability central to R2P but 
often absent from the discourse surrounding it. Doing so offers the possibility of 
developing a more nuanced understanding of harm, one that avoids the comfortable 
binary tendencies… which separate protector and protected, aggressor and victim, right 
and wrong.”840  
The responsibility to protect concept was an attempt to rearticulate universal 
jurisdiction of justified uses of violence in response to ‘failings’ of protection of 
the international community’s constituent parts, its states. Through the analysis 
of the meaning and effect of individualization within the responsibility to 
protect, it has been argued, that the responsibility to protect concept 
overemphasizes on a normative framework of individual responsibility. State 
responsibility, and its concomitant ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, is a form of 
individual legal accountability in which ‘failed’ or ‘rogue’ states become 
blameworthy of their condition. One of the connecting arguments of both 
previous chapters (2 and 3) was that this normative framework overshadows 
structural complicity and systemic violence. In this sense, legal accountability 
and individual responsibility work to overshadow structural complicity and 
collective (social) responsibility. The concept results in an oxymoron whereas a 
collective responsibility and a ‘universalist aspiration’ is being professed through 
and by the ‘international community’ but is only ‘particularly’ realizable only 
through the state. Its cosmopolitanism is grounded on a discourse of 
individualism and agency that exhausts itself at these particular limits and fails to 
identify precisely these as limits of its global responsibility. This results in an 
articulation of responsibility and of international law that necessarily ‘falls’ 
because the individual or the state finds itself as the first causal link of violence 
and of accountability. It is in this sense that its ‘cosmopolitanism’ fails its promise 
at an inter-subjective and intra-subjective level and becomes a foreclosing 
structure of address. Dan Bulley defines this kind of subjectivity as ‘failing 
subjectivity’ differentiating between ‘succeeding’ (subjects) and failing (objects). 
State failure, in this sense, manifests as “a privileged discursive point, or master 
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signifier that establishes the oppositions that make meaning possible and fix it 
there.”841  
 
It is perhaps this political strand of cosmopolitanism that translates into a 
responsibility to punish under the rubric of protection. It is this form of control 
that Francis Deng, as representative of South Sudan, attempted to express, when 
he said: “It was time for the United Nations to engage the Government on this 
constructive agenda [help in building governance capacity] instead of using 
negative threats of sanctions and punishment.”842 It is finally, perhaps, this sense 
of management and control that ‘feels’ like collective punishment. Chapter 2 
argued that the ‘responsibility’ we find in proponents of just war thinking such as 
Walzer, Tesón and Bellamy rests substantially on an idea of an ‘international’ 
coherent self, defined in terms of its shared values, its liberal and equal members. 
Even if these authors sometimes make different judgments about military 
intervention in reference to an intervention’s specific context, their juridico-
moral framework recreates such a ‘privileged discursive point’. The framework 
allows the ‘international community’ to adopt paternalistic and punitive policies 
aimed at the reconstruction of regimes and formations of government that will 
be willing to adopt liberal policies or engage in putative diplomatic ties, political 
and trade relations. If the responsibility to protect communicates a duty of care 
and performs a form of care that results in punitive or exclusionary practice, it 
also normalizes, depoliticizes and immunizes a self-assured self against an Other. 
The Other becomes an alterity: it is not part of the constitution of the self and 
becomes punishable. It can be argued that this vantage point is one in which the 
‘international community’ of liberal international law and of legal 
cosmopolitanism projects a self-assured subjectivity over other forms of life, 
differentiates between forms of political subjectivity and between both causes 
and harms. Such a universal structure of address is a foreclosing structure, it 
closes off an array of responses that can be utilized at the time of the encounter 
itself by implicating the self in an inter-subjective ethical relation that begins 
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with the limits of responsible action and the limits of self-understanding. In 
contrast, the victorious self - proud of its liberal policies and institutions – 
declines to account for the forms of violence it operates through its responsibility 
practices and its foreign policy, fails to grasp structural punishment as part and 
parcel of international law and most importantly fails to be reflective and critical 
of its own limits and internal responsibility and therefore, its own role as a 
mechanism of collective subject-formation. This is a vantage place of comfort.  
 
Recognizing failure, irresponsibility and vulnerability: in being-with 
 
It is in this sense that the ‘notion of irresponsibility’ presents a site of discomfort, 
of complexity, of intellectual restlessness and vulnerability. The responsibility to 
protect concept becomes violent once its form of address within the historical 
and social conditions of its emergence regulates a ‘we’ that is always uncertain 
and historically contingent. It is a ‘we’ that emerges as it speaks and acts. If what I 
am unable to tell is an account of the ‘I’, let alone to tell an account of the ‘we’, 
then what binds us is perhaps our failure to account for ourselves. To know the 
limits of our global responsibility and to let go of an international coherent self 
might open the way for our condition of responsibility. According to Butler: 
“condemnation can work against self-knowledge, inasmuch as it moralizes a self by 
disavowing commonality with the judged. Although self-knowledge is surely limited that 
is not a reason to turn against it as a project… To know oneself as limited is still to know 
something about oneself, even if one’s knowing is afflicted by the limitation that one 
knows. Similarly, condemnation is very often an act that not only ‘gives up on’ the one 
condemned but seeks to inflict violence upon the condemned in the name of “ethics”.”843  
Through this lens, to expose and to acknowledge our limits of intelligibility and of 
responsibility is to rethink responsibility in terms of a relation that builds upon 
the conditions that bring moral subjects into being.844 It is an account that turns 
the light inwards, first upon the self or the ‘we’ before turning the face towards 
another. This understanding attempts to offer an account of responsibility that is 
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detached from strict legal accountability or state ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 
and grounds an account of responsibility that is more structural, complex and 
internal. Whereas the normative incoherencies and sites of irresponsibility are 
brought to light and challenged, proponents of the concept and of legal 
cosmopolitanism tend to attack back by accusing those critics of ‘pessimism’ or 
‘inaction’. That these critics and their critiques do not make sense of the ‘messy 
world of politics and policy’, or, that they are unrealistic about the use of military 
force (and violence) as indispensable means of ‘responsible’ statecraft and 
international life. How military intervention can bring about ends – halt the 
violence, save the victims, transform these ‘failed states’ into democratic states 
and bring them under the rule of international law, its customs and conventions.  
 
Much of this denial which liberal international law suffers from rests upon a 
‘failure’ to acknowledge the performative and discourse oriented normative 
ethical framework, its sites and domains in which this professed responsibility 
becomes irresponsibility (i.e. irresponsibility is internal to responsibility 
practices), not only by being a failed policy but as an ‘irresponsible mentality’ 
produced through modern social forms of organizing responsibility, through the 
foundational violence of liberal international law and through a kind of violence 
and misrecognition at the heart of ethics. Accordingly, it can be argued that 
liberal international law and its attendant uncritical legal cosmopolitanism is 
complicit in the organization of irresponsibility when it ‘fails’ to recognise first its 
own mutative, variable and context specific nature of political subjectivity. 
Contrary to an idea of ‘international community’, of sovereignty and of 
responsibility as performatively constituted, the ethical underpinnings of the 
responsibility to protect fixate subjects, concepts and responses under already 
delimited and binary understandings (such as ‘successful’ and ‘failing’ states). In 
this sense, one could argue that responsibility practices become aggressive, they 
coincide with an aggressive view of life, one that turns back on itself, as it fails to 




community in opposition to itself.845 Alterity then, becomes something to combat 
(with arms and coercion) and not something to understand or to recognize 
predominantly.  
 
 ‘Terrorism’ and misrecognition 
 
The responsibility to protect concept has also been used in response to states that 
‘harbour’ terrorism or are unable to defeat terrorists within their borders. As 
such, these states become subjects to the use of military force without their 
consent because they have ‘failed’ to confront a serious threat. Two days after the 
Paris attacks, France carried airstrikes on ISIS strongholds in Raqqa. These 
airstrikes can straightforwardly be described as punitive, perhaps also carrying an 
element of retribution.846 The Russian and Turkish responses in Libya and Syria, 
opposing the NATO strategy in dealing with humanitarian crises, suggest that 
the logic and interests of the US, the UK and France are against Moscow’s 
understanding of when and how NATO allies are supposed to act in response to 
gross human rights violations and intra-state conflict. This understanding is 
deeply affected by regional interests, values, ethnic and religious identities.847 
The resulting crisis of post-Qaddafi Libya prompted Russia to opt towards 
‘regime security’ to avert a regional crisis between different Islamic and opposing 
fractions, to control the situation in the North Caucasus and to prevent a 
strengthening of the western liberal paradigm of doing foreign politics in the 
Middle East. Turkey follows a similar practice of ‘regime security’. Nonetheless, 
all countries concerned opted for the use of military force against those whom 
each camp considers as terrorists or a ‘serious threat’ to their security. All of these 
states use the same moral argumentation to assault the peoples whom each camp 
considers a ‘terrorist threat’. The official response from the United Nations, 
following an alleged bomb attack on a Russian jetliner which killed 224 people 
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over the Sinai and the Paris attacks - coupled with other terrorist attacks in 
Tunisia, Ankara and Beirut - was the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2249 on 20th 
of November 2015. The resolution called up on member states:  
“that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with 
international law, in particular with the United Nations Charter, as well as international 
human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of ISIL 
also known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL also known as Da’esh 
as well as ANF, and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated 
with Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups,…”848  
It is counter-productive, to say the least, to expect that such a broad resolution 
with such an extensive list of terrorist groups will not be used to further one’s 
security and regional interests. More important, however, is the rationale which 
holds a state ‘unable or unwilling’ to deter a terrorist threat and that becomes 
simplified and recognized altogether as a ‘threat to international peace and 
security’ and a ‘threat to mankind’, incorporating the language, framework and 
recent practice of the responsibility to protect concept.849  Punitive counter-
terrorist military airstrikes, without the consent of the ‘failed’ state are further 
linked to the wording and language of R2P and obscure further the thin line 
between protection and punishment and control or management from above.850  
 
Furthermore, the international response to terrorism becomes ‘foreclosed’ within 
the same normative and ethical framework at the cost of taking seriously, and for 
all parties and countries involved, the roots, causes and complexity of violent 
radicalism, extremism and violent fundamentalism. In contrast, terrorism has 
become widely linked with states, religions and ethnic identities and as such, 
both research and practice becomes foreclosed, under-examined and largely 
unexplored. Following Butler, such treatment is a form of dehumanization, which 
makes possible the assertion of a ‘we’ that “defines itself over and against a 
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population understood as by definition illegitimate, if not dubiously human.”851 
In relation to our preference for certainty and self-assurance, as opposed to 
complexity and discomfort, Tanzil Chowdhury stated that “structural violence, as 
one of the contributory explanations of terrorism, offends both our predilection 
for simplicity and holds government to account to a very high standard – and for 
those reasons, we often reject them to our peril.”852 François Hollande addressed 
the nation in the aftermath of the Paris attacks of November 2015 and vowed 
revenge, “We are going to lead a war which will be pitiless” and described the 
attacks as “acts of war”: 
“What the terrorists want is to scare us and fill us with dread. There is indeed reason to 
be afraid. There is dread, but in the face of this dread, there is a nation that knows how to 
defend itself, that knows how to mobilize its forces and, once again, will defeat the 
terrorists.”853 
The assertion here of a ‘we’, a nation that ‘knows best’, is a representation of a 
‘privileged discursive point’, a claim of self-identity, a representation of mastery 
and comfort that not only knows how to defend and defeat (has ‘already’ done 
so) but knows ‘what the terrorists want’ and in a sense it is a representation that 
knows what ‘terrorism’ is. This understanding not only crudely simplifies what 
and who a terrorist is, but much more importantly it “denies its own constitutive 
injurability.”854 We have witnessed that such rhetoric and practice sustained the 
airstrikes in Libya, Syria and Iraq against terrorist strongholds, even if the 
terrorist attacks are carried out in other countries and therefore, revealing a 
wider network with multiple sites of command. Many of those, which were 
identified as guilty for the attacks, where citizens born and raised in European 
soil not necessarily ‘harboured’ in those ‘failed’ countries.855 This very simplicity 
in recognizing and identifying who counts as a terrorist and where such terrorists 
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reside is a self-certain understanding that ‘we’ are able to ascertain not only who 
counts as a terrorist and who does not but also that ‘we’ are able to strike in 
precision and kill the individuals responsible. Such a representation may very 
well be counter-productive for both our understanding of ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorist acts’ and our complicity in creating what we name in the other – 
namely, fear. As Butler states: “As much as the sovereign subject disavows his 
injurability, relocating it in the other as a permanent repository, so the 
persecuted subject can disavow his own violent acts, since no empirical act can 
refute a priori presumption of victimization.”856 Through this lens, the slogan that 
emerged after the attacks: ‘We are not afraid’, to which thousands marched, can 
also be seen as counter-productive. There is reason to be afraid but as a reason to 
contemplate an inevitable physical vulnerability and “the posibilities of our own 
violent actions in relation to those lives to which one is bound” everyday and 
everywhere.857 Drawing on Butler and the justification given for the Iraq War, 
Maja Zeufuss observed the problematic notions of subjectivity and vulnerability 
and suggested that “arguments for the war cannot effectively be contested 
logically, rather we must highlight the way in which they produce what they 
name.”858 Zeufuss does not focus on ‘how the war undermines the goods it 
claims” but on “how the justification produced a  considerable amount of 
certainty about who ‘we’ are.”859 According to Zeufuss: “the question of ethics, of 
how we relate to others, is in danger of obscuring the way in which we are always 
already related to them.” 860 In other words, we are vulnerable not only to others 
but to ourselves. The rise of the Islamic State in Libya and beyond is the evidence 
of the inability to realize the potential consequences of our practices.861  
 
Where and when failure lies 
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Christopher Hobson reasons a ‘humble approach’ and practice: “a humble 
approach is not only accepting the limits of what is knowable, but also 
acknowledging and working within the limits that can be readily identified.”862 
Such an approach differs significantly from the approach taken by a number of 
supporters of the Libyan intervention, which celebrated the intervention’s rapid 
response equating in a sense an authorized military action with responsible 
action because it happened to be consensual and legal. Drawing on the 
consequences of the intervention in Libya by NATO and its allies, Hobson states 
that there was ‘sufficient evidence’ and reasonable expectation that post-conflict 
reconstruction would be met with serious structural and political difficulties that 
could tear the country apart. The intervention was carried out in support of rebel 
forces, which ‘were not reliable or united’ and this was a fact that was known to 
UN corridors long before the decision to intervene.863 The simplistic assertion of 
a ‘we’ against the ‘terrorist threat’ is similar to the simplistic assertion of a ‘we’ 
that can locate similar ‘moderates’ in other countries and befriend them. Here, 
not only is there a fabricated confidence of who the ‘we’ is in the first place but 
there is also a false certainty in transferring ‘our’ own subjectivity in those others 
and removing from them at the same time the possibility of deliberation and 
reflection of their own political subjectivity. For Hobson ‘the notion of humility’ 
he finds in the work of Reinhold Nieuburn:  
“has relevance both for political actors directly engaged in making decisions, as well as 
for commentators and scholars analyzing and advocating certain courses of action… This 
brings with it a sense of responsibility, which entails squarely facing the consequences of 
decisions made, and accepting failure when it occurs.”864  
Hobson claims that R2P was born out of failure and he is right to claim so.865 But 
what failure is he referring to? The inaction in Rwanda was interpreted and 
morphed into the ‘never again’ rhetoric. It then transformed into a slogan for 
action. In contrast, the intervention in Kosovo – where unilateral military 
intervention did take place – morphed into a debate for ‘failing consensus’ and an 
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institutional debate of legality/illegality. Kosovo was interpreted as a case of 
‘failing consensus’ and the affirmation of the call to collective action 
overshadowed the structural significance of moral difference, or rather of the 
moral indifference of the inaction in Rwanda. Following the debate of 
legality/illegality of Kosovo, the ‘failure’, which the ICISS addressed, was more of 
a procedural and institutional nature. The commission was concerned with the 
establishment of a single political framework of reference under which dominant 
sovereign states and other parties could engage in international moral argument, 
rather than with a substantive evaluation of the practice and the consequences 
and meanings it produces in the here and now of international political space. In 
Darfur, as in Rwanda, R2P did not deliver the vision of collective and consensual 
action; as if R2P was a panacea, a cure that if applied would imply a new dawn for 
the people of Darfur.866 The intervention in Libya, as discussed in chapter 3, 
happened with the support of a UNSC, it was an authorized intervention under 
the language of R2P and was thus heralded as ‘a new dawn’ in protection 
practices, a concept that finally works. Here, again, as with the Rwanda-Kosovo 
contrast, the Libyan ‘success’ overshadowed the pragmatic inability to respond to 
the crisis in Darfur, not because R2P was not applied but because humanitarian 
crises of mass violations of human rights are structural and long-term.867 In each 
of these cases, ‘failure’ as a structural phenomenon, is never part of an analysis 
including the exact consequences of the management of conflict and of the 
meanings the intervention produces globally. More importantly, ‘failure’ is not 
taken up as a question of how the intervention altered the life conditions of those 
left to bear the aftermath of violence, of those that had not died. Today, R2P ‘fails’ 
again in Syria.  
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Suffering and human pain in the face of mass atrocities temporally effects an 
insurmountable pressure to ‘act’ within already set ethical parameters and 
programmes. Yet those patterns of moral behaviour and codes of conduct have 
indeed failed the promise in more than one occasion. The stumbling dichotomies 
of legality/illegality and of action/inaction have overshadowed the theory and 
practice of the use of force for humanitarian purposes at the cost of “theorising 
responsibility” otherwise. In contrast to an understanding of failure as procedural 
or as a failure of ‘consensus’ for action, this chapter argues that failure should be 
understood as constitutive and internal. If we are to agree with Bauman that 
“human mutuality and community … rest on a paradoxical collectivity of 
reciprocal individualization”868 or, with Mouffe that we are “always multiple and 
contradictory subjects… constructed by a variety of discourses, and precariously 
and temporarily saturated at the intersection of those positions”869 then, it seems 
that we have to rethink both a theory of responsibility and of ‘failure’ in terms of 
these limitations. Accordingly, the chapter does not propose a program or policy 
that can be implemented in order to respond to these limitations but instead 
takes these limitations as a precondition to theorizing responsibility in 
international law.  
 
Concluding remarks 
“… the capacity to make and justify moral judgments does not exhaust the sphere of 
ethics and is not coextensive with ethical obligation or ethical relationality…judging 
another is a mode of address…Hence, if there is an ethic to address, and if judgment, 
including legal judgment, is one form of address, then the ethical value of judgment will be 
conditioned by the form of address it takes.”
870
  
The ethical dispositions of the responsibility to protect concept attempt to 
control the ‘void’ of international political subjectivity and so control the space of 
moral argumentation in ways that paralyze our capacity to think and theorize 
responsibility otherwise. Conversely, the understanding of the event of using the 
responsibility to protect concept as a ‘scene of address’ (a ‘space’ of constitution 
and of process) presented in this chapter, is an attempt to explore our inter-
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subjective ethical relations. To understand ‘sovereignty’, ‘international 
community’ and ‘responsibility’ as performatively constituted is to overcome the 
stumbling dichotomies of legality/illegality and action/inaction. It is from this 
space of complex inter-subjectivity that one should begin ‘theorizing 
responsibility’ in international law. The ‘sites of irresponsibility’, which were 
explored in chapter 3 in relation to R2P as signified by Veitch, at first appear as if 
they obliterate any chance of responsible practice. In contrast, what they do, is to 
precisely expose those inter-subjective and social conditions that might push 
towards a ‘theorizing of responsibility’ that is reflecting on the complex material 
conditions of the process of responsiveness and of responsibility. Responsibility 
requires that we take stock of our present, that we include the effects of the 
division of labour, of role responsibility, of reciprocal individualization and 
alienation, and of the normative paradoxes that are produced through 
fragmentation and compartmentalization and treat them as real. These are 
indeed sites of irresponsibility that produce complexity and discomfort and 
arguably might complicate any decision process, long or short. Yet, these are also 
sites that reveal our shared vulnerability and uncertainty. The notion of 
irresponsibility comprised through ‘sites of irresponsibility’ as explained in the 
last chapter is a conceptual device that sheds light on the internal dimensions of 
responsibility practices and treats ‘irresponsibility’ not as the opposite of 
responsibility but as responsibility. Exposing, even speaking or writing of such 
sites of vulnerability and misrecognition, is to make an attempt to represent a 
little more of the reality or the full ‘scene of recognition’ of both the theory and 
practice of the responsibility to protect concept. In this light, the conscious 
recognition of that failure (of irresponsibility) through a process of self-critique 
that takes into account the social conditions of ‘opacity’ and coexistence with the 
other is responsibility.  
 
The universal fails and becomes violent ‘if it cannot be appropriated by 
individuals in a living way’, or, more generally if it does not respond to their 
living conditions: “the universal precept … if it did operate there as a 




form of an exclusionary foreclosure.”871 What becomes of law and responsibility 
to protect the other under this understanding? Responsibility becomes a dead 
word perhaps. It is a responsibility that ‘forgets’ its political and violent past, 
neutralises, depoliticises and overshadows the struggles against past and present 
modes of persecution in the realization of human freedom and denies to come to 
terms with the discomforting plurality of global inter-subjectivity. The 
recognition of the self and other as under ever-changing global social conditions 
of ‘irresponsibility’, of the aporia of responsibility, of the inescapable ‘failure’ to 
give an account for the other that is internal to responsibility practices, partly 
recalls and refuses to ‘forget’ struggle and the violent past. We are already in a 
global ethical inter-subjective relation with each other. In this light, we can argue 
that the universal precept should not be occupied by any identity, if that identity 
frames or recognizes one form of life over another. Nonetheless, the universal 
precept can never be thought of as ‘empty’, since it is always historically occupied 
by some ‘idea’ or ideas. As such, ethical exigency would need to always account 
for what international law or the universal represents and who represents it. We 
can argue that the universal is a site of exchange and recognition (or 
contest/struggle if one wishes to argue that) and international law a process of 
communication. If that space becomes occupied by a totalizing and teleological 
universal, that universal becomes violent and exclusionary. International lawyers 
have struggled over the years to make international law relevant - to make it 
work. Yet, if international lawyers and policy makers deny or ignore to account 
for the ‘operation of universality’ and what it produces “that ethos becomes 
violent.872   
 
This chapter explored the importance of on-going critical and moral inquiry in 
relation to responsibility practices and the use of force as a means of protection; 
response-ability as a form of critique. A concept of responsible protection needs 
always to move beyond disciplinary affinities and orthodoxies. As Derrida 
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reminds us: “there is no responsibility without a dissident and inventive rupture 
with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or doctrine.”873 
 
Within the responsibility to protect, the notion of irresponsibility, can also be 
thought of as ‘performative contradiction’.874 It can work as conceptual resource, 
which exposes the internal contradictions of previous conventions and of 
formulations of the universal, and highlights the violence performed, in order to 
open the space of ‘reisignification’ 875  or re-imagination. The limits of 
responsibility (as irresponsibility) in this sense expose that anxiety of control and 
of mastery. That anxiety makes one reiterate past texts, and indeed play a specific 
role, persist within the comfortableness of institutionalized paradigms, including 
the paradigm of state accountability or the punishment through the protection 
framework of just war theory, against perhaps a robust theory or sense of social 
or collective global responsibility. The question of what the inter-national 
represents, what sovereignty entails and who the ‘we’ of the international 
community includes, is limited and foreclosed within these structures or modes 
of address. It is in this sense that ‘irresponsibility’ presents a re-appropriation or 
representation of the scene of address, because it seeks to move towards a theory 
and practice of responsibility that recognizes these social modes of organizing 
responsibility as integral to the experience of responsibility. These social modes 
occupy a domain of ethical failure. Yet, this ethical failure, or indeed precisely an 
acknowledgment of the failure to recognize becomes a resource for the 
repossession of ethical relationality per se. It is an understanding of an uncertain, 
historically contingent and vulnerable collective ‘we’. It is a response and protest 
against physical and ethical violence. Accordingly, this conceptual analysis turns 
to roots, systemic contradictions and modes of organizing as elementary to the 
understanding of different forms of global violence and how ‘we’ can perhaps live 
with uncertainty. 
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“Sacrifice, vengeance, cruelty – all that is inscribed through the genesis of 
responsibility and moral conscience.”875  
 
This thesis offered a theoretical, socio-legal and philosophical critique of the 
responsibility to protect concept in international law. The conceptualisation of 
the ‘international community’, as well as its organized ‘responsibility practices’, 
representational structures, narratives and processes of individual and collective 
inter-subjective/intra-subjective constitution was a key feature of the analysis. 
This thesis attempted to overcome the limitations imposed by the sterile 
language of legality, illegality or legitimacy. It placed emphasis on how we arrive 
at a decision to use force, what patterns of thinking and modes of global 
international organization are intimately linked with our resourcefulness for 
global ethical judgement and the meanings and effects produced by 
‘humanitarian interventions’. Hence, this thesis did not attempt to provide any 
solutions or policies on ‘how to end mass atrocities’, a resolution to the 
controversy over humanitarian intervention or its problems. The aim was to 
move towards a theory and practice of responsibility that ‘re-cognizes’ the social 
modes, visions and world-views that organize our thinking on human protection 
practice in international law.  
 
At present, the mainstream discourse around R2P is preoccupied with: (a.) 
collective action (dubbed as ‘success’), vetoed Security Council resolutions or 
unilateral action (dubbed as ‘failure’), and (b.) individual and state accountability 
or blameworthiness (prosecuting perpetrators, punishing ‘crimes against 
humanity’). Also observable is an obsession to find “inventive ways to penetrate”, 
to manage conflicts, “end state-perpetrated atrocities”, and distinguish different 
kind of political subjectivities within a conflict. 876  ‘Calls’ for humanitarian 
intervention, however benevolent, overshadow a range of normative and 
practical questions, such as what kind of action, by who, with whom and how 
such an intervention will improve the lives of the people left to bare the 
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aftermath of violence. Urgent appeals for the use of force, to alleviate the 
suffering, to punish perpetrators or ‘send a strong message to dictators’, fail to 
comprehend the meanings and effects of humanitarian interventions and often 
become the chief bulwark to robust approaches to mass human atrocities and 
gross human rights violations. The mainstream discourse around R2P is one that 
has: (a.) already established that there is a sound normative and ethical 
framework in which political decisions and questions of responsibility in 
response to mass atrocities can be taken, and (b.) that there is a sovereign 
‘international community’ with its military (and even ethical capacity) to carry 
the promise of protection and decide between the good and bad, the perpetrators 
and victims. What we are therefore lacking from this almost completed picture of 
sovereign and self-assured humanitarianism, the discourse around the concept 
assumes, is the will, the criteria and the consensus to collectively authorize 
military interventions for human protection purposes. This thesis provides a 
radical theoretical and socio-legal approach by focusing on the limitations 
imposed by the present mainstream discourse around the responsibility to 
protect concept. As such, it embodies a critique of the liberal juridical and moral 
claims which the responsibility to protect concept inherited and represents. The 
structure of the thesis, as discussed in the introduction of the thesis and brought 
throughout, was specifically chosen in order facilitate the main goal of this work. 
The aim was to provide a rounded critique of the responsibility to protect 
concept in international law in both theory and practice and to offer an 
alternative approach, by highlighting the importance of inter/intra subjectivity, 
to ‘theorizing responsibility’ for large scale loss of life in international law, as well 
as the importance of ‘theorizing responsibility’ to understand inter/intra 
subjectivity in international law and international relations. 
 
Rethinking the “theorizing of responsibility” for large scale loss of life in 
international law 
 
International authority (universal jurisdiction) and punishment through protection 
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Chapter 1, explored the legal debates on the use of force both during and after the 
end of the Cold War. The chapter also reflected on the gradual development and 
expansion of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. During the 1990s 
the Security Council was more willing to extend the notion of ‘threat to 
international peace and security’ and consider gross human rights violations as 
an international concern that may warrant the use of force for human protection 
purposes. Overall, the chapter exposed the tension between state sovereignty and 
human rights, between legality and legitimacy, as well as the practical 
impossibility of criteria such as consent and impartiality. The 1990s saw the 
revitalisation of international institutions and liberal policies and the re-
moralization of the international order (the return of just war theory within R2P 
and the prominence of liberal/legal internationalism and cosmopolitanism). As 
such, since the 1990s, the tension between legality and legitimacy came to a 
breaking point in the controversy over the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. 
The ICISS report was an attempt to ‘forge a new consensus’ on the over-debated 
issue of humanitarian intervention at the turn of this century. In other words, it 
has been an attempt to articulate the normative framework, criteria, codes of 
conduct and the authority under which a decision for humanitarian intervention 
should be taken. The redefinition of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ that it 
articulated did not however ease any of the tension between article 2 (4) of the 
Charter and human rights. Ultimately, what the report did was to ‘marry’ legality 
and legitimacy. In light of the recent debates in the Security Council on the air-
strikes carried out by the US, the UK and France over the alleged use of chemical 
weapons by Bashar Al-Assad in Syria on 14 April 2018, the question of when and 
where the ‘international community’ can intervene to alleviate the suffering of 
populations in other states remains a politically divisive issue. The Libyan 
intervention seems only to have been ‘collectively’ enforced because the geo-
political interests of the permanent members of the Security Council converged 
or did not severely clash. Given R2P’s impressive institutional and linguistic 
internalization, military intervention for human protection purposes is generally 
seen as both legal and legitimate if only “blessed by the Security Council.”877  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the juridico-moral framework of just war thinking as 
reinvented within R2P, claims to offer a “common language” that is “pluralistic” 
and “indeterminate.”878 Contemporary just war theorists, such as Walzer and pro-
R2P supporters such as Bellamy, present just war theory as an apolitical 
framework within which each case of humanitarian intervention can be judged. 
As such, R2P’s ethical and operational framework is also presented as apolitical. 
Contrary to such accounts, it has been argued here that contemporary just war 
theory approaches that champion the reinvention of just war theory in R2P 
recurrently deny or fail to account for the punitive ethos of just war thinking. The 
rationalization of international constitutionalism, the ‘war convention’, natural 
law, positive law (its rules and entities) works to legitimize the juridico-moral 
framework of just war thinking and to overshadow the concepts of international 
authority, moral hegemony and power per se. R2P with its juridico-moral 
framework, should therefore be seen not only as an institution of protection but 
also as an institution of punishment. In this light, responsibility practices foster 
both protection and punishment and should be seen as such. Furthermore, 
responsibility practices should be viewed as power practices and techniques of 
global governance. An understanding of how it is that liberal moral authority, 
international legal authority and current frameworks of R2P, naturalize and mask 
discourses of exclusion is fundamental if we are to attend to some of the 
problematic features of broadly accepted and unaccounted violent practices or 
ethical presuppositions.  
 
To hide the punitive ethos of humanitarianism under the rubric of protection is 
to fail to come to terms with the meanings and effects of punishment, as well as 
to what cosmopolitan ‘responsibility’ and ‘protection’ can translate into, namely a 
responsibility to punish transgressions of liberal international law. To recognize 
and acknowledge that the other of protection is punishment, pushes to a theory 
and practice that wishes to detect not only who is being protected, how and why, 
but who is excluded, not recognized and purged from the domain of the political 
in the name of ethics and human rights. In this sense, the punitive ethos of 
humanitarianism should be recognized, exposed, acknowledged and the 
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selectivity of war crime trials and criminals should be taken seriously. If, as 
discussed, human rights have the potential to be both militant and anti-militant, 
violent and non-violent, inclusionary and exclusionary, it is only by attending to 
their operation and binary nature that we are able to see how human rights 
actually materialize. Perhaps if we do not, we are only left with “human rights 
with a vengeance.”879  
 
Just war theory is a juridico-moral framework that allows international actors to 
debate and argue the application of the use of force when a ‘threat to 
international peace and security’ occurs. Its criteria allow, from a sovereign 
standpoint, to make distinctions between perpetrators and victims, between just 
and unjust interventions and materially control the parameters of ethical and 
political questions. Significantly, it is not a framework that opens up questions on 
the use of force per se or indeed on the ethicality of military interventions for 
human protection purposes. The reasonableness of this framework “is established 
via the assumption that a particular framework, paradigm, or standpoint of 
normativity is necessary.”880 For both staunch R2P supporters such as Bellamy 
and legal cosmopolitans such as Louise Arbour, ‘collective’ action under the 
Security Council or individual criminal prosecution under the ICC, are from the 
outset implicated in the validation and reinforcement of the ethos of the 
responsibility to protect concept. In this sense, the mere exercise of international 
authority provides for the legitimacy of the concept and for the ethicality of its 
juridical and moral framework. Whereas international authority (in the form of 
the Security Council) fails to reach consensus, scholars such as Walzer, Bellamy 
or Fernando Téson highlight the primacy of the legitimacy of human rights or 
humanitarianism through the threshold criteria of just war theory within R2P, 
and are able to explicate why military interventions for human protection are 
necessitated. We are back to ontological assumptions about the nature of human 
life and its progress. In this instance, just war theory and the responsibility to 
protect concept work as feedback loops that justify liberal humanitarianism and 
liberal governance per se.  
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If we treat the responsibility to protect concept as a technique of liberal global 
governance, the ‘duty of care’ assigned to the ‘international community’ to 
protect individuals from mass atrocities through the concept of the responsibility 
to protect, more often than not, translates into a responsibility to punish 
violators of liberal international order, rather than on recognition, protection 
and/or solidarity. ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’, the concept that foregrounds the 
responsibility to protect concept, becomes a ‘master signifier’ that bifurcates the 
international order between ‘failed’ and ‘responsible’ sovereign states. In this 
light, ‘failed’, ‘failing’ states, or states that are ‘unwilling or unable’ to protect 
their populations are seen as objects to be ‘taken over’ by the ‘international 
community’ in the name of human rights. Their political subjectivity is 
compromised, assumed, managed. As Korhonen and Selkälä note, “[i]n its calls 
for universalism and humanitarianism, state responsibility within the 
international setting has expanded to cover politics over life itself.”881 If the 
ethical global responsibility that is communicated materializes as management, 
control and punishment, then the promised cosmopolitan responsibility of 
protection becomes a dead word. It converts into legal individual accountability 
that is to be assigned within already established laws, distinctions, entities, and 
taken-for-granted frameworks. Instead, ethical/social and collective 
responsibility requires flexibility, should always be negotiated, explored and 
critiqued.  
 
Internal irresponsibility and violence 
 
In Chapter 3 the notion of irresponsibility was used as a conceptual resource that 
helped the analysis to draw on meanings and physiognomies of the concept of 
the responsibility to protect that have been largely excluded or marginalized by 
the discourse around R2P. The ‘notion of irresponsibility’ devised in Chapter 3, as 
other of responsibility within the responsibility to protect concept, ‘talked back 
to’ the discourse of R2P and pointed to certain ‘features of modern social forms of 
organization’ that we very often take for granted. These features, even if they 
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make up our present living conditions, are part of our everyday life, both private 
and public, are not easily identifiable. This is mainly because we do not think of 
these features as organizing irresponsibility, ethical failure or misrecognition. 
Features such as the division of labour and role responsibilities, reciprocal 
individualization, or the ‘transference of responsibilities’ through the distinctions 
and combinations of social systems (their transference within a social system 
itself), do not resonate as peculiar. They are features of a post-modern 
administrative, legal and political normality that is thought of as ‘essentially 
humanizing’, or essentially responsible. Irresponsibility or immorality, are thus 
not conceived of as internal, constitutive or structural. According to Bauman, 
“the incidence of immoral conduct on anything more than a marginal scale may 
be explained as an effect of the malfunctioning of ‘normal’ social 
arrangements.”882 Chapter 3 argued that the irresponsibility of R2P is constitutive 
of the normal functioning of our organizing practices, or as Veitch has put it, “of 
the system working.”883 In this sense, irresponsibility should primarily be seen as 
the other of responsibility (in Derrida’s language) and not as a state of exception. 
To this end, the predilection of international lawyers for legal individual 
accountability, state sovereignty and formalism significantly limit our capacity to 
both theorize responsibility in international law and approach in fruitful ways the 
issue of ‘large scale loss of life’. In many ways, both the formalistic approach to 
law and the managerialist approaches to mass atrocities can reduce our ability to 
look for the conditions that fabricate and become entangled with the domain of 
global ethical responsibility. 
 
Response-ability and critique 
 
All these conclusions point to a limited theorizing of responsibility in 
international law. Instead, what should be vigorously pursued in further research, 
is what Anne Orford rightly described as “[the] variety of ways to come to terms 
with the complicated and infinite process of constituting the subject through the 
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institutions of law and language.”884 The concept of global ethical responsibility 
reveals an on-going relationship between security apparatuses and discourse, 
individual and collective subject-formation and legal norms and universals. Social 
international structures penetrate conceptions of self and community as well as 
the boundaries of a global ethical relationality. Security practices and global 
ethical norms, such as R2P, constitute and are constitutive of both state and non-
state identities and behaviour. Legal cosmopolitan and liberal internationalist 
approaches to mass human rights atrocities, showcase a denial to address the full 
scene of recognition underpinned by inter-subjective/intra-subjective 
constitution and moments of exclusion or misrecognition both in the theory and 
practice of global ethical responsibility. Such a global ethical responsibility 
becomes aggressive, turns back against itself, as it does not recognize the Other 
as part of the constitution of the collective self.  
 
This thesis argued that ‘response-ability’ is an on-going relation bound up with 
the operation of critique. Ethical decision-making and response-ability is a 
process and a relation of negotiation at the time of encounter. The encounter and 
the moment of decision is to be seen as a process of interaction which sustains 
the space of community, of identity and of global ethical responsibility infinitely. 
Reinventing an ethical tradition and retreating to delimited understandings of 
responsibility and sovereignty offers no robust alternatives and is not enough if 
‘we’ are to address or respond in robust ways to the issue of mass human rights 
atrocities and ‘large scale loss of life’. And perhaps responsibility is 
irresponsibility, recognizing all that we fail to account for, or that we 
misrecognize, realising responsibility as history of responsibility, the 
acknowledgement of the uncertainty and boundlessness of who the ‘we’ or the 
‘they’ is; perhaps responsibility is the many calls to explain oneself that we do not 
answer or refuse to answer ‘for oneself before the other.’ This requires 
‘intellectual restlessness’, being willing to communicate the limits of self-
understanding and the limits of agency; in other words, performing vulnerability, 
not keeping in secret, exposing oneself and living with discomfort. 
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